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Preface
You hold in your hands the product of my doctoral research: Financial Liberal-
ization, Exchange Rates, and Economic Development. The sea portrayed on the
cover can be seen as a metaphor for international capital movements: both play an
important role in human development but can get tumultuous at times. In my doc-
toral research I have studied the effects of financial liberalization. My main results
indicate that capital controls have mainly negative effects on exchange rates, but
that controls on inflows might have positive effects on a domestic level. I also put
forward project finance as a form of capital that functions well even in markets with
low levels of financial development.
Looking back over the past four years, I realize that I have learnt a lot, both
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to develop my own ideas and arguments. I had the opportunity to make my own
mistakes and to learn from them, yet he was always available whenever I needed
advice.
A special word of thanks also goes to my second supervisor, Stefan Straetmans.
His patience and continued confidence in me helped me greatly in completing my
dissertation. His love for science and good Belgian beer is contagious and I fondly
look back on our late night conversations featuring both.
My other co-authors, Stefanie Kleimeier and Ron Jongen, should not be forgot-
ten. It was a great pleasure to write a paper together with Stefanie and I have learnt
a lot from doing research with her. I have enjoyed the time that I have spent with
Ron as office mates and am very happy that we ended up working together on a
project. I sincerely hope that we can all continue to cooperate in the future. I also
thank Bertrand Candelon for his useful advice on my research.
I also would like to thank all other people who shared my experiences and sup-
ported me throughout my thesis: Weihua and Natascha, for giving me a second
home in Maastricht after I moved to Florence; Amaresh, for his efforts to make me
a more cultured —and Indian— person; And of course Rik, Mathijs, and all the
i
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My last words of thanks go to my my parents Co and Lia, and my brother Roy,
for the unconditional support that they have given me over all these years. Words
are not enough to describe how valuable they are to me. I can only say: I am proud
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the central tenets of economics is that free markets are superior. In theory,
free goods-markets allow customers to buy goods that they like to consume best and
forces producers to be competitive. Likewise, free capital markets allow for the most
efficient allocation of capital. Rich countries which have too much capital can lend
it to poor countries that have too little. Lenders receive higher returns than they
could have made at home and borrowing countries can lower their cost of capital and
stimulate investments. Furthermore, capital mobility increases the diversification of
assets and thereby reduces the riskiness of investments.
A broad consensus emerged among academics and policymakers in the 1990’s that
capital controls should no longer be a part of the international financial architecture.
As a result of this, many countries liberalized their capital accounts and international
capital flows increased dramatically in the period between 1970 and 1990. Financial
markets flourished and financial innovation made them increasingly sophisticated.
Bretton Woods, the period of strong monetary controls and fixed exchange rates that
characterized the period between the Second World War and the 1970’s, seemed far
away.
Yet, although the picture is clear in theory, it is far more complex in practice.
There are many imperfections in the market: markets are not complete, information
is asymmetric, and credit markets are imperfect. In the presence of these market
distortions, the rationale for financial liberalization is less compelling. Furthermore,
the recent literature on financial crises has emphasized the possibility of multiple
equilibria and self-fulfilling speculative attacks. In a perfect world the ‘first-best’
solution is to liberalize; in an imperfect world, however, capital controls may be
‘second-best’: if other market distortions are present, capital controls may still be
welfare-enhancing. The recent string of financial crises have painfully demonstrated
this point. In 1997, the Asian crisis laid bare the vulnerability of the financial
system, created by large capital inflows. The effect the crisis had (not only on the
directly affected countries but also the global financial structure as a whole) forcefully
thrust capital controls back on the agenda; the countries that had liberalized, such as
Thailand and Indonesia were the hardest hit by the crisis, while China and Malaysia,
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which relied on capital controls, seemed largely unscathed by it.
The recent events of 2007-2008 have shown that even the economies of the indus-
trialized countries are vulnerable to crashes in the financial system. What started as
a string of defaults on sub-prime mortgages in the United States has rapidly evolved
into a global financial crisis, the likes of which have not been witnessed since the
great depression of the 1930’s. Few countries have been spared the pain of this
recession and central banks around the world have been forced to resort to extraor-
dinary measures. Iceland lost 90% of the value of its stock market in a day after
its complete banking sector collapsed and many other countries have been forced to
partially nationalize their banking sectors. These events have led many to doubt
the virtues of free markets; calls are being made for ‘Bretton Woods II’, a return to
stricter regulation of financial markets and of international capital flows.
As the clamoring for more international regulation increases, research into capital
controls has regained prominence. Industrialized countries will most likely not resort
to such drastic measures as closing their capital accounts again, but the current
wave of regulation will undoubtedly have an impact upon the decision of developing
countries whether to open up their capital accounts. A balanced view on both the
costs and benefits of capital controls is important in order to offer guidance for this
decision. The aim of this thesis is therefore to obtain new insights into the role of
international capital movements, in particular the effects of financial liberalization on
exchange rate dynamics and economic development, through an empirical approach.
This thesis consists of a collection of studies; the chapters are self-contained and
can be read in any order. As such, some overlap between the different chapters
is inevitable, especially in the literature and methodology sections. Rather than
forming a tight cluster of chapters focussing on a single topic, the chapters are
loosely connected around the central theme outlined above. The thesis has been
divided into three parts, each of which focuses on one of the following research
questions:
1. What are the characteristics of exchange rate expectations?
2. How does financial liberalization affect parity conditions and exchange rate
risk?
3. How is economic growth affected by the use of capital controls and what types
of capital are effective when financial markets are underdeveloped?
The first part of this thesis considers survey data on exchange rate expectations.
The observable nature of survey expectations offers a direct approach to test the ra-
tionality of expectations independently from the issues of model validity. Although
much research has been undertaken in this field, none of the previous research has
systematically documented the properties of the data itself. Chapter 2 fills this gap
by providing a list of empirical stylized facts which characterize the time-series prop-
erties of survey foreign exchange rate expectations. Relevant statistical properties
are described which are common to a wide variety of currencies and forecast hori-
zons. Although not at the heart of the matter of financial liberalization, the use of
survey exchange rate expectations opens up several lines of investigation related to
financial liberalization, some of which are mentioned in the conclusion.
3The second part of this thesis investigates the links between capital controls
and exchange rate dynamics. Chapter 3 investigates whether capital controls are
effective in providing countries with additional monetary freedom. More specifically,
the interaction between exchange rates, interest differentials and capital controls
are considered. Insulating the local economy from financial markets is one of the
motivations of governments for maintaining capital controls. A fixed exchange rate
and monetary freedom, for instance, can only coexist if there is no capital mobility.
This chapter tests the effects of capital account liberalization on deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity; both in Western European and emerging countries
and proxied by several measures of financial liberalization.
Chapter 4 considers the effect of capital controls on exchange rate volatility.
One motivation given for maintaining capital controls is to reduce exchange rate
volatility. Large depreciations of the domestic currency seem to be a particular
source of concern for domestic policy makers. Currency crises can be very costly to
an economy and recent history has seen a large number of them occur in emerging
economies. This chapter investigates to what extent capital controls succeed in
curbing extreme currency fluctuations. Statistical extreme value analysis is employed
to investigate if capital controls succeed in lowering exchange rate volatility. First,
the fatness of the tails of the spot exchange rate returns is considered. The fatter
the tails, the more likely it is that extreme events will occur. Second, the analysis is
extended to quantiles (looking at the largest depreciation that countries can expect
to experience over, say, 10 years). The chapter tests whether extreme quantiles are
lower in the controlled or liberalized periods.
The third and final part of this thesis considers the broader question of economic
development. Many studies have attempted to offer guidelines as to how emerging
economies can transform their closed, underdeveloped, markets into open, devel-
oped, ones. The last two chapters contained in this part add to this literature by
investigating how financial liberalization affects these countries and which type of
capital is suitable for instances in which financial markets are not yet well developed.
Chapter 5 studies the link between financial liberalization and economic growth.
In this chapter, a new measure of capital controls is constructed. The measure dis-
tinguishes (a) between controls on capital inflows and controls on capital outflows,
and (b) between controls on various types of capital. Previous studies have postu-
lated that not all types of controls are equally beneficial (or harmful) to developing
economies. By studying a broad cross-section of countries, this study separates the
effects of each type of control in order to shed light on the question of which types
of controls are beneficial and which are not.
Chapter 6 shows that a specific type of capital—project finance— is effective
in the least developed markets, where most types of international capital have pre-
viously been shown to be less effective. Project finance is characterized by the
creation of a legally independent project company, funded primarily with (syndi-
cated) non-recourse finance. It is generally used for complex high-risk projects with
large information asymmetries between the principal and the agent. In this study,
it is hypothesized that project finance is beneficial to the least developed economies
as it is able to compensate for a lack of domestic financial development. It is argued
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that the contractual structure unique to project finance leads to better investment
management and governance. In the empirical analysis the effects of project finance
on growth are measured in a wide cross section of countries. The analysis pays spe-
cific attention to the effects on low-income countries, where financial development
and governance is weakest.
Finally, chapter 7 brings together the contents of the different chapters, provides
prospects for future research, and provides the conclusions.
Part I
Exchange Rate Expectations
5

Chapter 2
Time-Series Properties of
Survey Exchange Rate
Expectations∗
2.1 Introduction
In the last couple of decades the use of survey exchange rate expectations have gained
a lot of popularity. The observable nature of survey expectations offers a direct
approach to test the rationality of expectations separate from the validity of exchange
rate models. The previous inability to measure expectations forced the simultaneous
testing of these joint hypotheses. Indeed, the use of survey expectations has enabled
the end of some disputes in the international finance literature, for instance on the
relative importance of risk premia versus irrational expectations. MacDonald (2000),
Maddala (1991), Takagi (1991), and Jongen, Verschoor, and Wolff (2008) all give
comprehensive overviews of the literature on exchange rate expectations; the models
of expectations formations and the explanations they have provided for exchange
rate behavior. Yet, although a lot of research has been undertaken in this field,
none of the previous research has systematically documented the properties of the
data itself. Stylized facts have been reported for nominal exchange rates (De Vries,
1994; Mussa, 1979), forward rates (Baillie and Bollerslev, 1994), and asset returns
(Cont, 2001), but not yet for survey exchange rate expectations. This chapter fills
the gap by summarizing the time series properties that can be empirically observed
in the survey expectations data and providing a number of known and less well-
known stylized facts about the empirical behavior of exchange rates expectations.
In addition this chapter offers a reference point for these stylized facts, by showing
how they relate to the stylized facts that characterize spot and forward exchange
rates. The stylized facts that are discussed in this chapter are the following:
∗Part of this chapter is based on Jongen, Straetmans, and Versteeg (2009)
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1. Unit Root: The level of the expected exchange rate contains a unit root. The
first difference is stationary.
2. Cointegration: The expected exchange rate is cointegrated with the spot rate
with as cointegrating relation set,t+1 − st, the expected spot return.
3. News Dominance: The variation in the expected spot return is lower than the
variation in realized spot returns and the variation in the forecast error.
4. Excess volatility: The variation in the expected spot return is higher than the
variation in the underlying fundamentals.
5. Serial correlation: Expected spot returns show positive serial correlation; they
exhibit more serial correlation than realized spot returns, but are less persistent
than forward premia.
6. Fat tails: Expected spot returns, like realized spot returns and forward premia,
exhibit fat tails. They contain more outliers than would be expected under,
for example, a normal distribution.
7. Volatility clusters: The volatility of expected spot returns is not constant over
time; instead they are characterized by clusters of high volatility and clusters
of low volatility.
8. Conditional heavy tails: Expected spot returns are conditionally fat-tailed;
even after taking into account volatility clusters, the innovations have a fat-
tailed distribution. The conditional fatness of expected spot returns is lower
than in forward premia but higher than in realized spot returns.
9. Mixed expectations formations: Forecasters can be broadly split into two
groups: fundamentalists and chartists; moreover, most forecasters put some
weight on both fundamental and chartist techniques.
10. No predictability: Survey expectations are not able to outperform either the
random walk or the forward premium as a forecast for future spot rates.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 the data is outlined
and the survey exchange rate expectations that are used in this study are described.
Section 2.3 explains one by one the stylized facts that are outlined above. Section
2.4 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Data
Before the stylized empirical facts of survey exchange rate expectations can be dis-
cussed, the variable of interest has to be defined. At first sight it seems obvious
that the level of the survey exchange rate expectation, henceforth referred to as the
expected spot rate, itself should form the center of the analysis. This variable is of
central interest to importers and exporters, who need to make an estimate of the
price they will get for their goods in the future. However, there exists a consen-
sus that international capital movements are the dominant factor in exchange rate
markets, rather than trade related transactions. And in (international) finance, it
is not the (expected) exchange rate which is of central interest, but the expected
depreciation or appreciation of the exchange rate. These exchange rate returns will
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determine the performance of the invested portfolios. Thus most of the focus will
lie on the expected spot return.
This study also introduces benchmarks against which to compare the stylized
facts of expected spot rates. The spot foreign exchange rate constitutes the first
benchmark. The spot rate forms the natural benchmark against which to compare
the expected spot rate. The expected spot rate is a ‘derivative’ of the spot rate
itself; it tries to forecast the future spot rate. If the forecast is perfect, then the
time series of the expected spot will be equal to the time series of the spot rate
and their stylized facts. If expectations are not perfect but at least rational, they
are a composite of the realized spot rate, combined with a white noise forecast
error. The forward rate constitutes a second benchmark. Forward markets provide
contracts to trade the currency at an agreed price. The forward rate should thus be
related to the underlying future spot rate. Moreover, according to the unbiasedness
hypothesis of the forward market for foreign exchange, the forward rate should equal
the future expected spot rate (apart form a risk premium). Thus, according to the
unbiasedness hypothesis, forward rates reflect spot rate expectations of the market
participants. As benchmarks for the expected spot return the spot return and the
forward premium will be taken.
With regard to mathematical notations, the spot rate at time t is defined as st.
the survey expectation, formed at time t, of the future spot rate st+1 is denoted as
set,1; in the rest of the article this is referred to as the expected spot rate. The forward
rate, established at time t, for currency delivered at time t + 1 is defined as ft,t+1.
All variables have been transformed into natural logarithms to circumvent Siegel’s
paradox arising from Jensen’s inequality1, and to circumvent numerary conventions.
By analogue, the expected spot return is then defined as set,t+1−st, while the forward
premium is defined as ft,t+1 − st. The difference operator and the expectations
operator are represented by ∆ and E respectively.
The focus will be kept narrow in order to retain as much in-depth treatment of
the stylized facts as possible: This chapter will focus only on the one month ahead
forecasts of the three major currencies (euro, yen, and pound) and their associated
spot and forward rates. Related variables, such as interest rates, will only be covered
as the occasion arises. However, the stylized facts mentioned in this article extend
to a wide range of currencies and forecast horizons.
The survey expectations have been retrieved from Consensus Economics. Every
second Monday of each calendar month Consensus Economics of London publishes
1-, 3-, and 12-month-ahead expectations for a large number of exchange rates. The
Consensus Economics forecasts database constitute one fo the most comprehensive
sets of foreign exchange rate expectations currently available. Arround 150 expecta-
tions of individual market participants are gathered per currency. Next, the aggre-
gate (average) 1 month ahead expectations of the euro/US dollar (euro), Japanese
yen/US dollar (yen), and the British pound/US dollar (pound) are obtained.2
1i.e. 1
E(x)
6= E 1
x
2Prior to the introduction of the euro, expectations for the deutschemark/US dollar exchange
rate are used, from which the expectations are calibrated against the euro, using the official rate
of 1.95583 DEM/euro.
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Spot rates, forward rates, and other data used in this chapter are obtained
through DataStream. Although survey participants have a few days time to re-
turn their expectations, we learned that the vast majority send their responses by
e-mail one working day before the publication day (second Monday of the month).
This working day is considered as the day on which the expectations are formed.
On this day spot exchange rate series are obtained to match with the survey ex-
pectations. To verify that the information sets of market participants are not too
diverse, all of the analysis throughout this study were re-estimated by using spot
data from two or more working days prior to the publication day, yet the overall
results remained unchanged.
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 gives a graphical representation of the data used in this chapter.
When looking at the level series it can be seen that the expected spot rate set,t+1
closely follows the realized spot rate st+1 and the forward rate ft,t+1. The difference
in smoothness of the innovations becomes apparent when looking at the lower panels
of the figures, which depict the return series. The realized spot return ∆st+1 is
moving up and down most strongly, while the forward premium ft,t+1 − st moves
only very gently over time. The expected spot return set,t+1 − st fits somewhere in
between.
2.3 Stylized Facts
2.3.1 Unit Root Tests
By now, it is well known that many macro-economic time-series are non-stationary,
or exhibit a unit root. For example, Meese and Singleton (1982) already point out
that spot exchange rates and forward rates exhibit a unit root. This brings us to
the first stylized fact:
Fact 1 (Unit Root Property) The natural logarithm of the expected nominal bi-
lateral exchange rate is non-stationary, while its first difference will be stationary.
Expected spot returns and forward premia are also stationary.
Ignoring higher order dynamics for the moment, these properties are reflected by
the stochastic processes for {set,t+1}, its first difference {∆set,t+1}, the expected spot
return and the forward premium:
set,t+1 = φ1s
e
t−1,t + 1t , φ1 = 1,
∆set,t+1 = φ2∆s
e
t−1,t + 2t , |φ2| < 1,(
set,t+1 − st
)
= φ3
(
set−1,t − st−1
)
+ 3t , |φ3| < 1,
(ft,t+1 − st) = φ4 (ft−1,t − st−1) + 4t , |φ4| < 1,
(2.1)
and where the disturbance terms are stationary3. As the differences of set,t+1 are
stationary, set,t+1 is said to be integrated of order 1, in short I(1).
3Time trends or structural breaks are not detectable in the survey expectational data which
implies that stationary series are interpretable as consisting of a covariance stationary part (i.e.
with constant and finite unconditional first and second moments) and a deterministic part.
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Figure 2.1: Exchange rate data, Euro.
Panel A plots the level data: the spot rate,st, the expected spot rate, s
e
t,t+1, and the forward rate ft,t+1.
Panel B plots the return data: the realized spot return,∆st+1, the expected return, s
e
t,t+1 − st, and the
forward premium, ft,t+1 − st. The sample period runs from November 1995 to December 2007.
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Figure 2.2: Exchange rate data, Yen.
Panel A plots the level data: the spot rate,st, the expected spot rate, s
e
t,t+1, and the forward rate ft,t+1.
Panel B plots the return data: the realized spot return,∆st+1, the expected return, s
e
t,t+1 − st, and the
forward premium, ft,t+1 − st. The sample period runs from November 1995 to December 2007.
130
140
150
100
110
120
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Spot Expected Spot Forward
(a) Exchange Rates
0
0.05
0.1
‐0.15
‐0.1
‐0.05
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Spot Return Expected Return Forward Premium
(b) Returns
2.3 Stylized Facts 13
Figure 2.3: Exchange rate data, Pound.
Panel A plots the level data: the spot rate,st, the expected spot rate, s
e
t,t+1, and the forward rate ft,t+1.
Panel B plots the return data: the realized spot return,∆st+1, the expected return, s
e
t,t+1 − st, and the
forward premium, ft,t+1 − st. The sample period runs from November 1995 to December 2007.
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Table 2.1: Unit root tests on exchange rate expectations.
This table reports the results of the unit root tests. The columns marked ‘ADF’ contain the results of
the augmented Said-Dickey-Fuller test and ‘PP’ contain the results of the modified Phillips-Perron (NG
and Perron, 2001). The columns marked ‘level’ tests for a unit root in the level (e.g. set,t+1) and the
column ‘diff.’ tests for a unit root in the first difference (e.g. ∆set,t+1). Lag lengths of the tests have
been selected with the use of the Schwarz selection criterium. A *, **, *** denotes rejection of the null
of unit root at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance, respectively.
Level Difference
Currency Variable ADF PP ADF PP
Euro st −0.88 −0.72 −11.27∗∗∗ −5.46∗∗∗
set,t+1 −1.03 −0.88 −9.15∗∗∗ −5.83∗∗∗
ft,t+1 −0.89 −0.72 −11.38∗∗∗ −5.48∗∗∗
set,t+1 − st −5.27∗∗∗ −4.43∗∗∗
ft,t+1 − st −4.99∗∗∗ −4.27∗∗∗
Yen st −3.21∗∗ −1.35 −12.93∗∗∗ −2.83∗∗∗
set,t+1 −2.25 −1.12 −19.54∗∗∗ −6.44∗∗∗
ft,t+1 −2.17 −1.32 −5.71∗∗∗ −2.70∗∗∗
set,t+1 − st −8.09∗∗∗ −5.49∗∗∗
ft,t+1 − st −9.18∗∗∗ −5.75∗∗∗
Pound st −0.58 −0.14 −12.53∗∗∗ −5.50∗∗∗
set,t+1 −0.42 0.03 −10.09∗∗∗ −5.27∗∗∗
ft,t+1 −0.17 −0.14 −12.59∗∗∗ −5.50∗∗∗
set,t+1 − st −10.20∗∗∗ −5.70∗∗∗
ft,t+1 − st −9.38∗∗∗ −5.83∗∗∗
Table 2.1 reports test results for the null hypothesis that φ = 1 and for the
four time series considered in fact 1. With an eye towards some sensivity analysis,
The series are tested for the presence of a unit root using both the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Said and Dickey, 1984) as well
as the modified Phillips-Perron (PP) test (Ng and Perron, 2001).4 The tests are
also performed for the differenced series up to the point the series are found to be
stationary. The testing outcomes reveal that series are either stationary or integrated
of order 1: in contrast to the first differenced series (rejection of a unit root at the
1% significance level), the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected for the level series
of the expected exchange rate. The results for the spot and forward rates are very
similar and indicate that these variables are also I(1). Finally, both the expected spot
return, set,t+1 − st, and the forward premium, ft,t+1 − st are found to be stationary.
4By now there is a whole armada of unit root tests available which all slightly differ in terms of
small sample behavior (size, power and bias properties). For sake of simplicity we limit ourselves
to two of the most representative and prominent tests in the empirical unit root literature.
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2.3.2 Cointegration
The stationarity of the expected spot return and the forward premium found in
previous section’s table 2.1 relates to the next empirical stylized fact. The observed
nonstationarity of spot exchange rates and expected exchange rates and the intu-
itive observation that the two series are linked to each other, makes for a natural
progression to cointegration between the two series.
Recall the definition of stationarity from the previous section and the finding
that the level series set,t+1 are non-stationary in contrast to the first differenced series
(set,t+1− set−1,t). A linear combination of two (or more) non-stationary variables can
also be stationary. If this happens, the variables are said to be cointegrated.
The stationarity of the expected spot return indicate that such a stationary
linear combination indeed exists between the spot exchange rate and the expected
spot exchange rate. This constitutes the second fact.
Fact 2 (Cointegration) The expected exchange rate is cointegrated with the spot
rate with as cointegrating relation set,t+1 − st, the expected spot return.
The existence of the cointegration relation set,t+1 − st leads to a number of ad-
ditional inferences. First, consider cointegration between set,t+1 and ft,t+1. Slightly
rewriting the relation gives:
ft,t+1 − set,t+1 = (ft,t+1 − st)− (set,t+1 − st), (2.2)
Where (set,t+1 − st) is the original cointegration relation as stated in fact 2. Addi-
tionally it is well known in the literature that ft,t+1 and st also cointegrate with
vector [1,−1] De Vries (e.g. 1994). Thus, ft,t+1 − set,t+1 can be decomposed into
two stationary parts and the difference of two stationary variables is also stationary.
Therefore, set,t+1 and ft,t+1 are shown to cointegrate, with (ft,t+1 − set,t+1) as error
correction term.
Furthermore, the above fact also implies that set,t+1 is cointegrated with the
future spot rates, st+1. The proof is similar to the previous one; rewrite the relation
to obtain:
st+1 − set,t+1 = (st+1 − st)− (set,t+1 − st), (2.3)
Where (set,t+1− st) is once again the original cointegration relation and ∆st+1 is the
realized spot return, which has been shown to be stationary in the previous section5.
Both variables (ft,t+1−set,t+1) and (st+1−set,t+1) are regularly used in the litera-
ture. The first variable, (ft,t+1− set,t+1), is often used to proxy for the (unobserved)
risk premium. Alternatively, it has also been identified as the expected abnormal
return on forward rate speculation, by those who discard the existence of a risk
premium. The second construct,(st+1 − set,t+1), is commonly known as the forecast
error. It is used in tests for forecasting ability. Additionally, researchers have used
the forecast error to make statements about the rationality of expectations.
5Although the above shows that (st+1 − set,t+1) are cointegrated, it is not necessarily the case
that these relations can be well estimated, see for example Zivot (2000).
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The long run relations in themselves are not the only interesting facts that can
be deduced from the cointegration between set,t+1 and st+1. As the two variables
trend together in the long-run, that also means that at least one of the two has to
react to the other, to prevent them from moving away from each other too far, so
called error correction. If st+1 does not react to the error correction term, it is said
to be exogenous with respect to the (parameters of) the cointegrating relation.
The exogeneity of the spot rate has some interesting implications. First of all
it is clear evidence that in the short run, the expected spot rate is not an unbiased
predictor of the spot rate; this requires the adjustment speed to be equal to one
(and not zero). In addition it means that all the adjustment occurs through set,t+1:
this makes it reactive to st rather than predictive. That is, set,t+1 will probably not
only be biased, but in general be a bad predictor of st+1. A proposition which is
more formally tested in section 2.3.8.
We will test for cointegration by using both the bivariate Engle-Granger approach
((1987)) as well as the multivariate Johansen procedure ((1991; 1995)). The Engle-
Granger procedure starts by running the regression
set−1,t = βst−1 + t. (2.4)
and to test for cointegration. This is done by a performing an ADF test on the
residuals {t}. This test is similar to a normal ADF (albeit with different critical
values as given in MacKinnon (1991)). Conditional upon finding cointegration in
the first step, the short run error-correction dynamics are identified by means of the
regression:
∆set,t+1 = α(s
e
t−1,t − βˆst−1) + φ1∆set−1,t + φ2∆st−1 + νt, (2.5)
and where set−1,t − βˆst−1 correspond with the stationary residuals from the cointe-
gration regression.
The Johansen procedure is based on estimating a first order vector auto regression
(VAR)
∆yt = Πyt−1 + Φ∆yt−1 + t, (2.6)
and where yt =
(
set,t+1 ft,t+1 st
)′
. Furthermore, Π is decomposed into αβ′,
where α and β represent three by two matrices. In order to identify the parameters
α and β, the restrictions
αβ′ =
 α1,1 α1,2α2,1 α2,2
α3,1 α3,2
( 1 0 β1
0 1 β2
)
,
are imposed. This structure corresponds with the cointegrating relations (set,t+1 −
β1st) and (ft,t+1 − β2st). The VAR’s lag order has been chosen on the basis of
a likelihood-ratio (LR) test. This test can also not reject the hypothesis that the
(restricted) intercept equals zero. In addition, both the trace test and the Eigen-
value statistic confirm the null that two cointegration relations are present. Tables
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Table 2.2: Engle-Granger cointegration of exchange rate expectations.
This table reports the Engle-Granger cointegration results of the system ∆set,t+1 = αse (s
e
t−1,t −
βˆsest−1) + φ1∆set−1,t + φ2∆st−1 + νt. The long run parameter βˆse is estimated first with s
e
t−1,t =
βst−1 + t. The residuals are substituted in the above equation, which estimates the short run dynamics
α. Panel A reports the coefficients of the cointegration relation β and the short run adjustment α; φ has
been omitted for brevity. Panel B reports the results of several restrictions. The left column reports the
ADF unit root test for the residuals {t}, with the null of no-cointegration. The right column reports
the t-test on the restriction that the cointegrating vector β = 1. Critical Values for the CADF are based
on MacKinnon (1991). For other notes on the ADF test, see the notes in table 2.1. A *,**,*** denotes
rejection of the null at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance respectively.
Panel A: Cointegration
α
Currency Relation β ∆set,t+1 ∆f1t,t+1 ∆st
Euro (set−1,t − β1st−1) 0.998 −0.56 −0.19
(0.006) (0.18) (0.23)
(ft−1,t − β2st−1) 1.004 −2.83 −2.59
(0.001) (1.72) (1.71)
(set−1,t − β3ft−1,t) 0.993 −0.56 −0.15
(0.006) (0.18) (0.24)
Yen (set−1,t − β1st−1) 1.000 −0.25 −0.01
(0.000) (0.14) (0.22)
(ft−1,t − β2st−1) 0.999 −0.72 −0.11
(0.000) (1.22) (1.22)
(set−1,t − β3ft−1,t) 1.000 −0.23 −0.23
(0.000) (0.14) (0.14)
Pound (set−1,t − β1st−1) 0.998 −0.39 0.52
(0.002) (0.19) (0.26)
(ft−1,t − β2st−1) 0.998 −0.87 −0.20
(0.000) (1.44) (1.45)
(set−1,t − β3ft−1,t) 1.000 −0.38 −2.59
(0.002) (0.19) (1.71)
Panel B: Restrictions
Currency Relation CADF β = 1
Euro (set−1,t − β1st−1) −2.55∗∗ −0.39
(ft−1,t − β2st−1) −1.69∗ 6.46∗∗∗
(set−1,t − β3ft−1,t) −2.76∗∗∗ −1.09
Yen (set−1,t − β1st−1) −3.38∗∗∗ −1.00
(ft−1,t − β2st−1) −2.52∗∗ −14.21∗∗∗
(set−1,t − β3ft−1,t) −3.17∗∗∗ 1.17
Pound (set−1,t − β1st−1) −4.00∗∗∗ −0.96
(ft−1,t − β2st−1) −2.69∗∗∗ −7.53∗∗∗
(set−1,t − β3ft−1,t) −3.99∗∗∗ 0.17
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Table 2.3: Johansen cointegration of exchange rate expectations.
This table report the VECM results of the system ∆yt = αβ
′yt−1 + Φ∆yt−1 + t, with yt =(
set,t+1 ft,t+1 st
)′
. Panel A reports the coefficients of the long run parameters β and the short
run adjustment coefficients α(standard errors in brackets); Φ has been omitted for brevity. Panel B
reports several LR tests on overidentifying restrictions. The first column reports the test statistic for
the restrictions placed on α, as described below. The second and third column report the test results
on the restriction that βse and βf are equal to 1. The lower half shows the trace test with respect to
the number of cointegration equations (CE). A *,**,*** denotes rejection of the null at the 10, 5, and 1
percent significance respectively. The identifying structure of β′ and the restrictions αr imposed on α
look as follows:
β′ =
(
1 0 β1
0 1 β2
)
, and α′r =
(
α1 0 0
0 α2 0
)
Panel A: Cointegration
α
Currency Relation β ∆set,t+1 ∆f1t,t+1 ∆st
Euro (set−1,t − βsest−1) 1.008 −0.48 −0.00
(0.010) (0.07) (0.01)
(ft−1,t − βf st−1) 1.005 −2.06 −1.79
(0.002) (0.72) (0.72)
Yen (set−1,t − βesst−1) 1.000 −0.24 −0.01
(0.000) (0.06) (0.02)
(ft−1,t − βf st−1) 0.999 −0.22 −0.41
(0.000) (0.48) (0.47)
Pound (set−1,t − βesst−1) 1.000 −0.72 0.02
(0.002) (0.08) (0.02)
(ft−1,t − βf st−1) 0.998 −1.23 −0.59
(0.000) (0.63) (0.64)
Panel B: Restrictions
Overidentifying restrictions
α = αr βse = −1 βf = −1
Currency χ2(4) χ2(1) χ2(1)
Euro 7.04 0.41 7.03∗∗∗
Yen 1.54 0.25 24.25∗∗∗
Pound 4.80 0.05 14.90∗∗∗
Number of coint. equations
Currency CE = 0 CE ≤ 1 CE ≤ 2
Euro 55.93∗∗∗ 19.27∗∗∗ 0.37
Yen 55.93∗∗∗ 19.27∗∗∗ 0.36
Pound 55.44∗∗∗ 17.82∗∗∗ 0.04
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2.2 and 2.3 report the cointegration results of the Engle-Granger and Joh ansen
methodologies, respectively.
For both tables, the upper part reports the coefficients, while the lower panel
contains the results for the cointegration test and the parameter restrictions. The
CADF test in table 2.2 and the Eigenvalues and trace test in table 2.3 all indicate
that cointegration is present between all variables. Furthermore, the long run rela-
tions are very close to the hypothesized values. The relations between set,t+1 and st
and between ft,t+1 and st are all very close to [1,−1]. For the relation set,t+1 and
st this difference is also statistically insignificantly different from [1,−1] in all cases.
The tests do indicate, however, a significant difference from the relation [1,−1] for
ft,t+1 and st. However, as this difference is minute in absolute terms, it is almost
impossible to attribute economic significance to this difference.
The VECM results of table 2.3 also indicate that several restrictions can be
placed on the short run adjustments of the series. Perhaps unsurprisingly, α1,2 and
α2,1 are not significantly differently from zero indicating that there are no feedback
effects from (set,t+1−st) to ft,t+1 and from (ft,t+1−st) to set,t+1. Also the restriction
that α3,1 = α3,2 = 0 can neither be rejected. This indicates that the spot rate st is
weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters α and β6.
Moreover, the exogeneity of st and the fact that the adjustment speed of st is
less than one also implies that the error correction term (set,t+1 − st) will be serially
correlated — see also section 2.3.4. To see this point, consider the following system
describing set,t+1 and st:(
∆set,t+1
∆st
)
=
(
αse
αs
) (
set,t+1 − st
)
+
(
se,t
s,t
)
. (2.7)
Where the α′s are the short run adjustment factors to the cointegration relations.
If this is premultiplied by [1,-1], the cointegrating vector, then
(set,t+1 − st) = φ(set−1,t − st−1) + νt, (2.8)
with φ = 1 + (αse − αs) and νt = se,t − s,t. That is, the expected spot return
(set,t+1 − st) follows an AR(1) process, with parameter φ. As αs = 0 and αse > −1,
this implies positive serial correlation.
2.3.3 News Dominance and Excess Volatility
Now that the nonstationarity of the expected spot rate has been outlined, focus will
shift towards the (stationary) expected spot return. Recall figures 2.1 through 2.3;
they depict the historical data of the expected spot return,the realized spot return,
and the forward premium. Remember that the graph revealed that the expected spot
returns are less volatile than the realized spot returns, but not nearly as smooth as
the forward premium. Two stylized facts can be deduced from this graph: (1) the
6for a more detailed discussion of exogeneity in error correction models see Johansen (1995) or
Urbain (1993). Norrbin and Reffett (1996) explicitly investigate the exogeneity of st and ft,t+1
and find, like in this chapter, that st is exogenous with respect to the cointegration parameters
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Table 2.4: News dominance of exchange rate expectations.
This table shows the standard deviations of the exchange rate series (in Panel A). The lower half (Panel B)
contains the variance ratio tests comparing σ(∆st) to σ(s
e
t,t+1−st) and σ(set,t+1−st) to σ(ft,t+1−st). A
*,**,*** denotes rejection of the null of equal variances at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance respectively.
Panel A: Standard Deviations
Currency σ(∆st) σ(st+1−set,t+1) σ(set,t+1−st) σ(ft,t+1−st)
Euro 2.80% 3.25% 1.32% 0.14%
Yen 3.43% 3.84% 1.92% 0.30%
Pound 2.23% 2.38% 1.08% 0.16%
Panel B: Variance ratio test
Currency σ(∆st) > σ(set,t+1−st) σ(set,t+1−st) > σ(ft,t+1−st)
Euro
Yen
Pound
4.47 ∗∗∗
3.19 ∗∗∗
4.24 ∗∗∗
86.71 ∗∗∗
41.96 ∗∗∗
44.70 ∗∗∗
feature of news dominance and (2) the excess volatility of expectations. Let us start
with the feature of news dominance.
Fact 3 (News Dominance) The variation in the expected spot return is lower
than both the variation in the realized spot return and the exchange rate’s forecast
error.
To see the relevance of this observation that expected spot returns have much
smaller variances, it is insightful to decompose the realized spot returns into an
anticipated part and an unanticipated (or news) part:
∆st+1 = (set,t+1 − st) + (st+1 − set,t+1).
It follows that the variance of the realized spot return can be decomposed into
σ2 (st+1 − st) = σ2(set,t+1−st)+σ2
(
st+1 − set,t+1
)
+2cov
(
set,t+1 − st, st+1 − set,t+1
)
,
(2.9)
It turns out that the variance of the expected spot returns is much smaller than the
variance of the realized spot returns. Thus, only a small part of the change in the
exchange rate is anticipated and it is the news part that dominates the variance of
the realized spot returns.
In table 2.4 it is shown that the variance of the realized spot returns is approxi-
mately 4 times as large as the variance of the expected spot returns. The variance
of the forecast errors is approximately equal to the realized spot return variance.
Stated otherwise, only 25% of the change in the exchange rate is discounted in the
survey data.
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Table 2.5: Excess volatility of exchange rate expectations.
This table shows the standard deviations of several exchange rate fundamentals. m is the natural loga-
rithm of M1, y is the natural logarithm of real industrial output, i is the money market interest rate, and
pi measures CPI inflation. The superscript ‘US’ indicates US data, the rest is local data. Panel A reports
the monthly standard deviations of the series. Panel B reports the variance ratio test comparing the
variances of the fundamentals to the expected spot returns. A *,**,*** (†, ††, † † †) denotes significantly
smaller (larger) variance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance respectively.
Panel A: Standard Deviations
Currency σ(set,t+1−st) σ(∆(m−mus)) σ(∆(y−yus)) σ((i−ius)) σ(pi−pius)
Euro 1.32% 1.02% 0.98% 0.11% 0.05%
Yen 1.92% 1.18% 1.23% 0.14% 0.10%
Pound 1.08% 1.21% 1.01% 0.10% 0.09%
Panel B: Variance ratio test
Currency σ(∆(m−mus)) σ(∆(y−yus)) σ((i−ius)) σ(pi−pius)
Euro 1.67∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 155.53∗∗∗ 604.90∗∗∗
Yen 2.64∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 194.15∗∗∗ 374.10∗∗∗
Pound 0.80† 1.14 128.32∗∗∗ 148.08∗∗∗
The table also shows that the variance of the expected exchange rate movements
dominates the variance of the forward premium. Notice that the forward premium
can be seen as the expected change in the relative fundamentals of the two coun-
tries. For example, the Covered Interest Parity (CIP) condition equates the forward
premium to the interest differential. This brings us to the next stylized fact:
Fact 4 (Excess Volatility) The variation in the expected spot returns is higher
than the variation in the underlying fundamentals.
Even when it is assumed that the survey participants can fully predict the changes
in the fundamentals excess volatility is still present. Table 2.5 reports the variances
of relative (cross country) output growth, relative money growth (M1), relative
inflation, and relative short term interest rates. These fundamentals are the most
commonly used in exchange rate models. From the table it becomes clear that the
variance of the most volatile fundamentals (the change in relative money supplies
and the change in relative output) is still way below the variance of the expected
spot returns. For the pound the relative money supplies are actually slightly more
volatile than the expected spot return. The variances of the interest differentials
and the inflation differentials, on the other hand, are very small as compared to the
expected spot return variance.
The excess volatility feature of realized exchange rate returns is a long stand-
ing puzzle in international finance(see for instance Frankel and Rose, 1995). It is
interesting to see that expected spot returns also exhibit excess volatility. Many
models of expectations formation assume that forecasts are based on the underlying
fundamentals. Under rational expectations the part that is predictable should be
linked to the expected change in the fundamentals. However, the excess volatility
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feature implies that fundamentals only play a minor role in expectations formations,
and are dominated by other forecasting methods. This finding that expectations are
build on a composite of different models will be addressed more explicitly in section
2.3.7.
2.3.4 Serial Correlation
The previous section shows that the expected spot returns are in between realized
spot returns and forward premia. This section also reports a stylized fact in which
expected spot returns form an intermediate case between realized spot returns and
forward premia. In the literature it has been widely recognized that realized spot
returns exhibit none to very little serial correlation, (e.g. Yang, Su, and Kolari, 2008)
while forward premia are known to be very persistent over time (Baillie and Boller-
slev, 1994). It turns out that expected spot returns have some serial correlation, but
not as much as forward premia.
Fact 5 (Serial Correlation) Expected spot returns are positively serially corre-
lated; they exhibit more serial correlation than realized spot returns, but are less
persistent than forward premia.
Part of the exchange rate literature assumes that exchange rates behave like
martingale processes.7. That is, the conditional expectation of the future spot rate
equals the current spot rate. If spot rates follow a martingale, spot returns are said
to follow a martingale difference sequence and the conditional expectation of the
realized spot return equals zero8. Formally this boils down to:
E[st+1|Ωt] = st (2.10)
E[∆st+1|Ωt] = 0. (2.11)
Where Ωt is some information set. The series are said to be a Martingale with respect
to the information set Ωt.The martingale property is the cornerstone of the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis, with the form of efficiency depending on the information that
is contained in Ωt.9
The martingale hypothesis has often been tested by calculating and testing for
the presence of significant serial correlation in historical return series. The absence of
serial correlation is a necessary requirement for expected and realized spot returns
to be a Martingale with respect to their historical values. The first order serial
correlation of the expected spot returns, realized spot returns, and forward premia
are reported in table 2.6. The results show that there is no evidence that realized
7Some of the literature, instead, focuses on the ‘random walk’ hypothesis, which stipulates that
the realized spot returns are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Although related,
this concept is much more restrictive than the martingale hypothesis. The high persistence in
exchange rate volatility (see section 2.3.6) provides evidence against the random walk. We therefore
focus on the martingale hypothesis rather than the random walk hypothesis.
8The second requirement for a martingale is a bounded first moment.
9Weak form efficiency, for example, imply that exchange rates are a martingale with respect to
historical returns: it excludes the profitability of technical analysis and trading rules.
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spot returns have serial correlation. This confirms the consensus in the literature
that realized spot returns are well described by the martingale model. Expected
spot returns, on the other hand, are found to exhibit positive and significant serial
correlation. Otherwise stated, expected spot returns are not a martingale difference
sequence with respect to historical expected spot returns.
Table 2.6: Serial correlation of exchange rate expectations.
This table reports on the serial correlation in the exchange rate series. Panel A reports the first order
autocorrelation of the realized returns, the expected returns, and the forward premia. A *,**,*** denotes
rejection of the null of no serial correlation at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance respectively, using the
Ljung-Box Q-stat. Panel B reports the ARMA(1,1) estimations for the expected returns and the forward
premia.
Panel A: Autocorrelation
Currency ∆st set,t+1 − st ft,t+1 − st
Euro 0.06 0.34∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
Yen −0.09 0.37∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
Pound 0.04 0.16∗ 0.24∗∗∗
Panel B: ARMA
set,t+1 − st ft,t+1 − st
Currency AR MA AR MA
Euro 0.27 0.09 0.97∗∗∗ −0.69∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23) (0.02) (0.07)
Yen 0.93∗∗∗ −0.74∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
Pound −0.37 0.58∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.25) (0.06) (0.10)
The presence of serial correlation in expectational data is consistent with existing
theories on adaptive expectations formation, i.e., it seems that market participants
partly base next period’s spot return expectation on last period’s expectation, see
also Frankel and Froot (1987). The adaptive nature of the exchange rate expecta-
tions is also evidence against the assumption of rational expectations. Modeling the
expected spot returns as an ARMA(1,1) is found to be an effective and parsimonious
way to model the serial correlation that is present in the data, the results of which
are shown in the lower half of table 2.6. Ljung-Box tests do not find any evidence
that there serial correlation left in the residual series, indication that almost all of
the serial correlation is captured by the ARMA(1,1) specification
The table also reveals that forward premium autocorrelations largely dominate
expected and realized spot return autocorrelations. Moreover, upon comparing
higher order correlations of expected spot returns and forward premiums, one ob-
serves a much slower correlation decay for the forward premium, a phenomenon often
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dubbed ”long memory” or ”fractional integration” in the literature10. As the serial
correlation of the expected spot returns drops much quicker to zero for increasing
lags, one may safely conclude that the latter series are not fractionally integrated.
In conclusion, the expected spot returns behave significantly different with re-
spect to serial correlation than both benchmarks. On the one hand, expected spot
returns have significant serial correlations and are clearly not a martingale differ-
ence sequence like realized spot returns. At the same time, they do not have the
long-memory feature that seems common to forward premia.
2.3.5 Fat Tails
Fact 6 (Fat Tails) Expected spot returns, like realized spot returns and forward
premia, exhibit fat tails. They contain more outliers than would be expected under,
for example, a normal distribution.
Like other financial returns, exchange rate returns are fat tailed and extreme
returns can be best described by a Pareto law instead of an exponential tail decline
like the normal distribution. Loosely speaking, a hevay tail this implies that periods
of excessively positive or negative low returns occur much more often than what the
normal distribution predicts. The large number of currency crises observed in the
last decades - both over time and across countries - provides some casual evidence.
Expected spot returns are not different in this respect. Market participants much
more often foresee a large currency depreciation or appreciation than they would if
they had based their expectations formation on the assumption of normality. The
heavy tail feature feature both characterizes the unconditional and the conditional
distribution of the expected spot returns. This section will start with evidence on
the former.
Extreme value theory provides a natural statistical framework to formalize the
concept of heavy tails. More specifically - and in analogy with the Central Limit
Theorem for averages - it enables one to come up with the limit distributions of
extreme returns. Under fairly general conditions there exists a limiting asymptotic
d.f. G(x) that characterizes extreme values. More specifically, random variables
that exhibit fat tails, like expected spot returns, are characterized, in the limit, by
a Fre´chet distribution:
G(x) =
{
0 , x ≤ 0
e−x
−α
, x > 0.
where α represents the tail index. The lower the value of this tail index α, the slower
the probability density’s decay as one moves further in the tail. This indicates a
higher probability mass concentrated in the tails, i.e., fatter tails. Additionally, the
tail index α can be interpreted as the maximum amount of bounded moments11.
10Unfortunately, the graphs of the yen and the pound are atypical as compared to most other
currencies.
11Consequently, a tail index lower than 2 implies that the 2nd moment (variance) of the uncon-
ditional distribution function does not exist.
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Note that different heavy tailed distributions all exhibit this common limiting be-
havior, e.g. the class of symmetric stable distributions (α < 2), the student-t distri-
bution or the GARCH process. However, when studying the tail behavior, it is not
necessary to know which parametric heavy tailed model is effectively valid over the
full distributional support.
Let X(1) < ... < X(n−m) < ... < X(n) represent the ascending order statistics of
a return series X. To estimate the tail index α, the popular Hill (1975) estimator
will be used, which is defined as
αˆn =
 1
m
m−1∑
j=0
(
lnX(n−j) − lnX(n−m)
)−1 , (2.12)
with m the number of highest order statistics used in the estimation and X(n−m)
the tail cut off point. The serial correlation present in the data has been removed
by means of an ARMA(1,1) process, and the number of order statistics m are cho-
sen on the basis of the algorithm provided by Beirlant, Dierckx, Goegebeur, and
Matthys (1999). Further details on the Hill estimator are provided in Embrechts,
Klu¨ppelberg, and Mikosch (1997).
Table 2.7: Tail exponents of exchange rate expectations.
This table reports the tail exponents of the unconditional distribution. Panel A contains the coefficients
of α, estimated with the Hill estimator. The Beirlant(1997) algorithm has been used to obtain the optimal
number of tail observations m to estimate α, which are reported in Panel B. Serial correlation has been
removed prior to estimating the tail exponents.
Panel A: Tail estimates
Currency ∆st set,t+1 − st ft,t+1 − st
Euro 4.22 4.10 1.70
Yen 2.90 2.17 1.33
Pound 3.63 4.00 2.02
Panel B: Number of tails observations
Currency ∆st set,t+1 − st ft,t+1 − st
Euro 18 23 23
Yen 36 37 37
Pound 19 15 50
The results, given in table 2.7, show that the tail exponent of the expected spot
returns lies approximately between 2 and 4 which is very similar to the degree of
tail fatness of the realized exchange rate. Moreover, this is also in line with most
previous studies, see (e.g. De Vries, 1994). From the point estimates for α it also
follows that the variance of these series is finite, but their kurtosis might not be
well defined . In contrast, the forward premium exhibit tail indexes mostly below 2,
which suggests that a finite variance does not exist.
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2.3.6 Volatility Clusters
Fact 7 (Volatility Clusters) The volatility of expected spot returns is not con-
stant over time; instead they are characterized by clusters of high volatility and
clusters of low volatility.
Like fat-tailedness, volatility clusters are common to financial times series, in-
cluding realized spot returns and forward premia. These clusters have already been
recognized by Mandelbrot (1963). However, it was the introduction of generalized
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH), in the middle of the eight-
ies, which has revived interest in this feature of the data. In a GARCH model, the
variance of a random variable is conditional on its own past. This way of modeling
directly captures the stylized fact that future volatility is dependent on the currently
observed volatility12. Formally the GARCH(1, 1) model can be written as follows:
t|Ωt−1 ∼ D(0, ht) (2.13)
ht = ω0 + ω12t−1 + ω2ht−1. (2.14)
Where t are the innovations conditional on some information set Ωt−1, and D(0, ht)
is some distribution function with mean 0 and conditional variance ht.
In this case, both a normal and a student-t distribution have been used to ap-
proximate the distribution function D.13 The residuals have been conditioned on the
past of the series, by means of an ARMA(1,1)14. Table 2.8 shows that the GARCH
parameters are significantly different from 0. They also sum up to numbers very
close to 1. These results show that volatility clustering is clearly present in the data
and that those clusters are very persistent over time.
Conditional heteroskedasticity is an important explanation for the fat-tailedness
in the unconditional distribution described in the previous fact. For instance, even
if the conditional innovation is normally distributed, the mixture of normal dis-
tributions with different variances will create a fat-tailed distribution. However,
volatility clusters can still not adequately account for the degree of fat-tailedness
in the unconditional distribution of the expected spot returns. To fully account
for the fat-tailedness, it is still necessary to impose a fat-tailed distribution on the
conditional innovations.
Fact 8 (Conditional Fat Tails) Expected spot returns are conditionally fat-tailed;
even after taking into account volatility clusters, the innovations have a fat-tailed
distribution. The conditional fatness of expected spot returns is lower than in forward
premia but higher than in realized spot returns.
12There exist other ways to model (conditional) heteroskedasticity. However, as GARCH is
currently the most popular, attention will be focused on this method.
13Both the conditional and the unconditional return distributions exhibit heavy tails. Thus,
the popular assumption of conditional normality in GARCH modelling is overly simplistic. We
therefore also consider GARCH models with conditional heavy tails (student-t distribution).
14Only a constant has been included for the realized spot returns, as they have no signs of serial
correlation
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Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) propose modeling the conditional innovation of the
GARCH with a t-distribution to account for the remaining fat-tailedness. The right
part of table 2.8 reports the GARCH(1,1) results when a conditional studentized
distribution is used, instead of the assumption of conditional normality. The esti-
mated degrees of freedom ν are reported in the last column. First, note that the
GARCH parameters themselves stay relatively unchanged between the two estima-
tions. Second, the expected spot returns still have some conditional fat-tailedness
remaining: the degrees of freedom ν lie around 20 for the euro and the pound and
around 4 for the yen. The parameter ν can be interpreted as a parametric estimate
of the (conditional) tail index α, discussed in the previous section. Compared to the
values of α between 2 and 4, that where found for the unconditional distribution,
these numbers are already substantially higher, showing the effect of the volatility
clusters themselves on the unconditional fatness.
Now look at the results for the realized spot rates and the forward premium. The
conditional fatness for the expected spot returns is considerably higher than for the
realized spot returns, but not nearly as fat as for the forward premia. The realized
spot returns actually show little sign of conditional fatness: the estimates for ν are
larger than 100 in two out of three cases, making it next to indistinguishable from a
normal distribution. The forward premia on the other hand still have very fat tails
for the conditional distribution. The estimates of ν come very close to 2 in some
instances.
Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) observed that GARCH effects and conditional fat
tailedness are much more pronounced for data measured on a daily or weekly level,
rather than on the monthly level. Therefore, it can be expected that the results
reported here are a conservative estimate of the volatility clusters and conditional
fat-tailedness of expectations that are formed at a higher frequency.
2.3.7 Expectations Formation
Most of the facts reported so far indicate that the time series properties of expected
spot returns are a mixture between realized spot returns and forward rates. An
explanation to this general finding can be sought in how market participants form
their expectations. As it turns out, forecasters are heterogeneous; there are large
differences between the models used by different market participants. Moreover,
each market participant herself tends to use more than one model to form her ex-
pectations.
Fact 9 (Mixed Expectation Formation) Forecasters can be broadly split into
Fundamentalists and Chartists. Moreover, most forecasters use both fundamental
models and chartist techniques in forming their expectations.
The possibility that market participants hold fundamentally different opinions
on market movements has received considerable attention in the literature. Model-
ing heterogeneous agents offers an interesting avenue to provide new insights into
some of the anomalies that are identified in the financial economics literature; see
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Hommes (2006) for an overview. The view that the foreign exchange market is dom-
inated by two different types of participants — fundamentalists and chartists —
has been popularized by Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990). Fundamentalists make use
of structural economic models to calculate the fundamental value of the exchange
rate, upon which they base their expectations. Chartists use technical analysis and
base their expectations predominantly on past movements of the exchange rate it-
self. Forecasts based on fundamental models are likely to behave similar to forward
rates, which themselves are closely linked to interest rate differentials by Covered
Interest Parity. Forecasts based on technical analysis are likely to behave similar to
the realized exchange rate returns from which they draw their information. Thus the
combination of these two forecasting techniques will lead to a ‘composite’ time se-
ries with properties that partially match those of realized spot returns and partially
those of forward premia. Exactly what has been found throughout this chapter.
Two further important remarks can be made about the heterogeneity of fore-
casters. First, in general a single agent cannot be described as either purely funda-
mentalist nor as purely chartist. In several surveys that have been taken amongst
foreign exchange forecasters it has been found that most agents use a combination
of both fundamentalist and chartist techniques to form their expectations about fu-
ture exchange rates (Liu and Mole, 1998; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Menkhoff and
Taylor, 2007; Allen and Taylor, 1990; Taylor and Allen, 1992). Allen and Taylor
(1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) show that for short forecast horizons typically
90 percent of market participants place some weight on technical analysis. Second,
the weight that forecasters attach to a particular technique is not constant over time.
Agents update their beliefs about chartist and fundamentalist techniques and tend
to switch to the techniques that have performed relative well in the past (De Grauwe
and Grimaldi, 2005, 2006). Furthermore, they tend to put more weight on funda-
mentalist techniques when they perceive that exchange rates have drifted further
away from their ‘fundamental’ values (Reitz and Westerhoff, 2003). Liu (1996) pro-
vides evidence, however, that the weight on fundamentalist techniques has never
surpassed 40 percent in the recent history. Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990) further-
more provide evidence that the share of market participants that can be identified
as fundamentalists has decreased over time in the favor of chartists. They propose
that this can explain the bubble behavior of the dollar in the 80’s as well as the
large increase in the volume of foreign exchange trading that took place in the same
period. On longer forecast horizons fundamentalist techniques regain some of their
importance, however, in forecasting (Jongen, Verschoor, Wolff, and Zwinkels, 2009).
2.3.8 Forecasting
Fact 10 (No predictability) Survey expectations are not able to outperform ei-
ther the random walk or the forward premium as a forecast for future spot rates.
Survey expectations are based on a mixture of fundamental and technical forecast
models, as shown in the previous section. Both these techniques independently have
been shown to not work very well as forecasts. Therefore the bad performance of
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the surveyed forecasters is neither an exception, nor very surprising. The failure of
structural exchange rate models to explain currency movements has since long been
widely acknowledged. (Meese and Rogoff, 1983a,b) and (Meese, 1990) exhaustively
tested different theoretical models and concluded that all of them performed worse
than a naive random walk assumption, the one month forecasts performing the worst
of all horizons. Moreover, it has been shown previously that exchange rates are a
Martingale with respect to their own past. Chartist models based on past exchange
rate movements therefore also perform badly as forecasts for future exchange rate
movements. Therefore, it is natural to extrapolate this bad forecast performance to
the individual survey forecasters themselves.
Table 2.9: Forecasts based on exchange rate expectations.
This table reports on the forecast performance of the expected spot exchange rate versus the current spot
rate and the forward rate. Panel A contains the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of st, s
e
t−1, and ft
as forecasts of st+1. Panel B contains the modified Diebold-Mariano(1997) that compares the forecast
performance of set−1 against st(left) and ft(right). A *,**,*** denotes rejection of the null that s
e
t−1 is
at least equally good at forecasting as the respective benchmark, at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance
respectively.
Panel A: RMSE
Currency st set,t+1 ft,t+1
Euro 0.028 0.033 0.028
Yen 0.034 0.038 0.034
Pound 0.022 0.024 0.022
Panel B: Diebold-Mariano test
Currency st ft,t+1
Euro 3.53∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗
Yen 2.47∗∗ 2.18∗∗
Pound 2.12∗∗ 1.89∗
Table 2.9 shows the performance of aggregate survey expectations as forecasts for
future exchange rates. This performance is compared with the forecasts given by the
random walk hypothesis (na¨ıve expectation) and the forward rate (which can be seen
as the markets expectation of the future exchange rate). The survey expectation is
significantly the worst predictor of the three forecasts and the random walk comes
out as the best forecast. This result is typical and corroborates with previous results
about forecaster performance. MacDonald and Marsh (1994); Macdonald and Marsh
(1996) look at a set of individual forecasters that forecasts 3-month-ahead movements
in the D-mark, pound, and yen exchange rate versus the dollar and find that almost
none of them is able to beat either the random walk or the forward rate. Elliott and
Ito (1999) look at 1-, 3-, and 6-month ahead forecasts of yen/dollar movements by
Japanese exporters and also report that almost none of the forecasters can beat a
naive random walk. The evidence is a bit more mixed if looked at a trading rule.
Elliott and Ito (1999) define a trading rule in which the forecaster takes a fixed
long (short) forward position in the foreign currency if she believes the forward rate
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undervalues (overvalues) the value of the foreign currency. They show that in this
setup a majority of the forecasters outperform the random walk in terms of profits.
This finding, however, is tempered by Marsh and Power (1996). By taking also risk
into account, in addition to only returns, they return to the sober conclusion that
almost none of the forecasters could beat the random walk.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter describes a set of stylized facts and time series properties that charac-
terize the empirically observed nature of survey exchange rate expectations. These
stylized facts largely overlap with the stylized facts that are known about realized
spot returns and forward premia, such as the presence of unit roots, volatility clus-
ters and fat tails. Moreover, when the characteristics of realized spot returns and
forward premia diverge from each other, for example in the case of excess volatil-
ity, serial correlation, or conditional fat-tails the expected spot returns are found
to take an intermediate position. Expected spot returns are less volatile than real-
ized spot returns, but more so than forward premia. Unlike realized spot returns
expected spot returns exhibit serial correlation, yet they are less persistent than
forward premia. The conditional fat-tailedness is less than forward premia but more
than realized spot rates. A possible explanation for this phenomenon lies in the
way that market participants form their expectations. They base their expectation
on a mixture of chartist techniques, which are based on realized spot returns, and
fundamental models, which we argue share many characteristics with the forward
premia.
The stylized facts mentioned above should be seen as general statements, mostly
of a qualitative nature. They do not impose specific models or specific parametric
specifications on the data. Rather, the stylized facts can be seen as a set of con-
straints; a good theoretical or empirical model on exchange rate expectations should
be able to account for these facts. They also serve to create awareness about the
limitations of most estimation techniques used. Most models succeed in incorporat-
ing several of the facts outlined above, but rarely are they able to account for all
them simultaneously.
Although this chapter has linked the observed stylized facts to some of the ex-
isting economic interpretations and the relevance to practitioners, this coverage is
far from complete. For example, the question whether the fat tails in exchange rate
expectations are only caused by the nature of the underlying series, the realized
spot returns, or are also partly due to (irrational) forecasting behavior of the mar-
ket participants is not answered in this paper. Questions like these are relevant and
deserve the attention of researchers, but fall outside the scope of this study. It is
left to future research to provide answers to these questions and to develop models
that can fully account for the observed nature of survey exchange rate expectations
as outlined above.
Part II
Financial Liberalization and
Exchange Rates
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Chapter 3
Are Capital Controls in the
Foreign Exchange Market
Effective?∗
3.1 Introduction
One of the largest puzzles in international finance is the apparent failure of both
forward premia and interest differentials to predict future spot exchange rates over
the post-Bretton Woods period, i.e., the so-called forward discount bias puzzle or
rejection of Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP)1.
Another topic that received recent interest from both the academic community
and policy makers is the issue of capital controls and financial liberalization. The
shockwave that was sent through the international financial system when the Asian
tigers - most of them recently liberalized - crashed, led to a change in the debate
on capital controls. Nowadays, a significant fraction of the academic community
supports controls on specific situations, see e.g. Krugman (1999b) or Rodrik (1998).
As for the IMF, it stresses the importance of a good phasing out of controls to limit
the stress liberalization puts on a financial system (Fischer, 1998).
The two topics are intertwined in the sense that one of the main reasons to impose
controls is to insulate an economy from international forces (Ariyoshi, Habermeier,
Laurens, Otker-Robe, Canales-Kriljenko, and Kriljenko, 2000). Governments may
choose for the freedom to pursue a fixed exchange rate together with (limited) mone-
tary freedom, at the cost of imperfect capital mobility. If monetary freedom is indeed
achieved together with a stable fixed exchange rate, this implies that international
parity conditions have to be violated.
∗Part of this chapter is based on Straetmans, Versteeg, and Wolff (2008)
1Some of the most influential early work in this field are Frankel (1976), Fama (1984), Frankel
and Froot (1987), and McCallum (1994) amongst others. Recent surveys include Chinn (2006),
Engel (1996), and Taylor (1995).
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In order to evaluate the impact of capital controls on monetary freedom, we in-
vestigate whether capital control proxies can explain (part of) the forward discount
bias. The suggestion that there might be a connection between capital controls and
the rejection of Uncovered interest Parity is not new, see e.g. Chinn and Mered-
ith (2005); Dahlquist and Gray (2000); Frankel and Poonawala (2006); Gros (1992);
however, the former papers do not contain explicit tests for the presence of a ‘capital
control effect’. The few studies look at controls specifically have mixed results. Con-
trols were found to be partially effective in Germany (Dooley and Isard, 1980) and
Argentina (Phylaktis, 1988) but at best marginally in Chile (De Gregorio, Edwards,
and Valdes, 2000; Valdes-Prieto and Soto, 1998).
Whether capital controls enable policymakers to reduce the link between ex-
change rates and interest rates (monetary freedom) is not the only motivation for
this research. Capital controls are costly and should be abolished if they do not
achieve the desired goal. Finally, insofar as parity conditions such as UIP reflect the
benchmark of financial integration, deviations from these parity conditions due to
capital controls imply imperfect integration and reduced risk sharing opportunities.
Anticipating on the results, we find very little evidence for a capital control effect
on the observed forward discount bias and this irrespective of whether one consid-
ers developed currencies or emerging currencies. The remainder of this chapter is
structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains a literature review and discusses some
previous evidence on the effect of capital controls. Section 3.3 describes the choice
and construction of two capital control variables. In section 3.4 we report forward
premium regressions augmented with the capital control proxies to measure the po-
tential effect on the forward premium slope. The chapter ends with some concluding
remarks (section 3.5).
3.2 Overview
If foreign exchange markets are processing information efficiently, investors should
not be able to realize systematically abnormal returns. Conditional upon the ex-
istence of a forward market for foreign exchange (a condition not always fulfilled
in emerging countries), the efficient market hypothesis for foreign exchange can be
expressed in two alternative ways:
Etst+1 − st = (ft,1 − st), (3.1)
Etst+1 − st = (rt,1 − r∗t,1), (3.2)
With E the expectations operator, st and ft,1 the natural logarithm of the spot
and 1-month forward rate, and r, r∗ the 1-month nominal interest rates on similar
domestic and foreign securities, respectively.
Equation 3.2 holds when speculators drive the (market) expected spot rate to
the forward rate. Otherwise stated, the forward rate (or alternatively the forward
premium) is an unbiased predictor of the future exchange rate (or alternatively the
change in the future exchange rate). Similarly, Uncovered Interest Parity (equation
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3.2) holds when investors require identical returns on similar investment at home
and abroad.
Many papers impose the Covered Interest Parity (CIP) relation which results in
the equivalence of equation 3.2 and equation 3.2. Although there is strong empirical
support for CIP, it may break down when there are limits to arbitrage2.
As the empirical evidence is not very supportive for the twin hypotheses of for-
ward unbiasedness and UIP, a large number of extensions has emerged to explain
their apparent failure. One way is to augment equations (1-2) with time varying risk
premia (see e.g. Fama, 1984; Cavaglia, Verschoor, and Wolff, 1994; Wolff, 1987).
Learning (Lewis, 1989), Deviations from rationality (Frankel and Froot, 1987) or
peso problems (Kaminsky, 1993; Flood and Rose, 1996) constitute a second class of
literature. More recently, evidence has been presented that the severity of the bias is
decreasing with the maturity of the forward contract (Lothian and Wu, 2003; Chinn
and Meredith, 2005).
Insofar as they potentially limit arbitrage and speculation, capital controls may
also partly cause distortions in the parity relations (1-2). Capital controls and their
effects - if any - remain a controversial topic. Opinions on the usefulness of controls
seem to swing like a pendulum. The argument dates back as far as the mercantilists
who sought to control flows of bullion. This ideological school was subsequently
denounced by Adam Smith in favor of free markets. The 20th century saw a large
revival of capital controls, driven by the war effort of both world wars. Afterwards
the Bretton Woods system combined capital controls with fixing exchange rates.
Keynes - revived by Tobin (1978) - considered capital controls as an important
cornerstone of Bretton Woods, i.e., guaranteeing its stability. The meltdown of
the Gold Exchange Standard induced a liberalization wave that lasted through the
nineteen-nineties.
Recently the pendulum seems to be at a turning point. The widespread financial
consequences of the 1997 Asian crisis reoriented the debate on the virtues and vices
of capital controls. The countries that applied capital account liberalization recipes
were hit hardest, while Malaysia, China, and India - all three relying on capital
controls to weather the storm - seemed to suffer less from the 1997 fallout. Some
prominent authors publicly supported Malaysia in its imposition of capital controls
(Stiglitz, 2002; Krugman, 1999b; Eichengreen, 2004; Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002).
The argument for capital controls focuses on the theory of the second best. We
live in an imperfect world, and examples of market failures are plenty. In such a
world, introducing an additional distortion such as a capital control might work
welfare enhancing by offsetting some of the other distortions. This is especially true
if markets are incomplete and exhibit asymmetric information, as is often the case
in emerging markets (see e.g. Stiglitz, 2002). In the absence of a solid institutional
framework, controls on inflows can ration capital to limit the negative effects of
capital controls.
Capital controls are often used as a tool to influence exchange rate movements,
more specifically to dampen their volatility. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994)
2As this study is specifically looking at the possible effects of capital controls, care is taken to
test separately for both conditions, without relying on the CIP condition to hold.
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point out that capital controls can play a role in sustaining fixed exchange rate
regimes. The same authors also argue that the potential gain in monetary freedom
due to capital controls can be valuable to national governments as it allows them to
use both the monetary and fiscal instruments to guide the economy.
However, capital controls remain a distortion and as such should only be main-
tained if the benefits outweigh the costs. The latter can be sizeable. The direct
administrative costs alone are not negligible: for a control to remain effective, it has
to be revised often to close the loopholes exploited by investors; time and resources
have to be expended to execute the controls; authorizations have to be given and
taxes collected etc.
The economic effects can also be large although a clear link with economic growth
has not been established (Rodrik, 1998). Controls also limit the potential for portfo-
lio diversification and decrease the amount of risk that can be shared and diversified
(Voth, 2003). Thus the cost of capital increases for local firms (Bekaert and Harvey,
2000a)3. There is even some evidence that capital controls might actually worsen the
problems they try to solve. The volatility of exchange rates might be exacerbated by
capital controls (Glick and Hutchison, 2005) and they can increase the probability of
a currency crisis (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria, 2001). Dorn-
busch (1998) even warns against the possibility of capital control induced contagion.
Thus an accurate cost-benefit analysis of capital controls provides important input
to policymakers who have to decide whether they want to keep controls or liberalize
them.
Yet it is difficult to pin down precisely the theoretical and empirical effects of
capital controls for several reasons. First of all, their variety is close to innumerable.
Loosely speaking, capital controls can be divided into administrative controls such
as outright bans, and market-based controls such as taxes; controls that aim to curb
short-term capital flows versus long-term capital flows; or controls on inflows versus
controls on outflows.
A second problem with the measurement of the effects of capital controls is
its inherent “fungibility”, see e.g. Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1998) and De Gregorio,
Edwards, and Valdes (2000). Loosely speaking, the fungibility property of capital
controls means that clever and imaginative speculators always find ways to (legally)
circumvent capital controls. For example, investors can shift capital into sectors or
financial products that are not taxed, such as derivatives. The use of transfer pricing
is another example. By artificially changing the prices charged to subsidiaries, capi-
tal flows can be disguised as trade flows and thus shifted from the (controlled) capital
account to the liberalized current account. Moreover, it can be expected that in-
vestors become more adept at circumventing the controls over time, which decreases
capital control effectiveness even further, unless the government continually keeps
closing loopholes.
Although the above suggests that it is difficult to determine how large the effect
of capital controls are, it is clear in which direction the effect should go. As the
controls are directed at distorting UIP and forward unbiasedness, we hypothesize
3Forbes (2005) summarizes a number of other costs that capital controls impose on a microeco-
nomic level.
3.3 Data and Methodology 39
that effective controls should drive the coefficients in equations 1 and 2 away from
unity. Moreover, the effect is expected to be negative in sign, as most countries
want to dampen the movement of the exchange rate to create some exchange rate
stability. This corresponds with the stylized fact that slope estimates of regressing
spot returns on lagged forward premiums (or alternatively lagged interest differen-
tials) are typically found to fall below 1.5. Even when capital controls are unable to
explain part of the bias phenomenon, controls may still increase monetary freedom
provided the absolute value of the forward premium slope comes closer to zero when
capital controls are in place. The forward premium regression testing framework
will be further discussed in the methodology section 3.3.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Data
Traditionally information on capital controls has been limited to annual data on the
capital account provided by the IMF. More specifically, the IMF publishes an annual
dummy variable in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER). Previous attempts to measure the effect of capital controls
have typically used this IMF dummy4.Although the dummy is available for a large
number of countries, the binary character implies that is a rather crude measure
(are there capital controls in place: yes or no?).
Several attempts have been made to improve on the measurement and dating of
capital account liberalizations. Edison and Warnock (2003) and Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad (2005) developed indices that date the liberalization of equity market
liberalization. However, indices that reflect the liberalization of the capital account
as a whole (i.e., including controls on forward exchange markets, fixed income secu-
rities and bank deposits) are more interesting for the current study that focuses on
the foreign exchange market. Good examples of these measures are the indices of
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Miniane (2004).
This study uses both the IMF dummy as well as the more refined Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2003) and Miniane (2004) measures. Notice that the latter indices are
not available for emerging economies. The liberalization dates have been summarized
in table 3.1.
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) (denoted by K & S in the rest of the chapter)
have extracted information from a variety of sources (including the IMF) to date the
liberalization of capital markets. For each year they indicate whether a market is
either ‘repressed’, ‘partially liberalized’, ‘or fully liberalized’. The extent of control
on the capital account is measured by looking at regulations on offshore borrowing,
multiple exchange rate regimes, and controls specific to capital outflows. A market
is deemed ‘fully liberalized’ if there are no multiple exchange rates or restrictions on
outflows, and only minor impediments to offshore borrowing.
4for example Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Chanda (2001), Epstein and Schor
(1992), Garret (1995), Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Leblang (1995), Milner (1996), Razin and
Rose (1994), and Rodrik (1998) all use the IMF dummy in their studies.
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Table 3.1: Liberalization dates of capital controls.
Panel A: K & S and Miniane refer to liberalization measured according to (Kaminsky and Schmukler,
2003) and (Miniane, 2004), respectively. IMF Dummy refers to the position as reported in the IMF An-
nual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. As Miniane and the IMF only report
on capital controls annually, all liberalizations are set at the beginning of the year of the liberalization.
Panel B: The left column indicates the state of the capital account at the beginning of the sample, which
runs from March 1984 to November 2006. liberalizations and closings refer to the position as reported in
the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. As the IMF only report
on capital controls annually, all liberalizations and closings are set at the beginning of the year of the
liberalization.
Panel A: Developed countries
Country K & S Miniane IMF Dummy
Denmark September 1988 1988 1988
France December 1989 1989 1993
Italy December 1991 1988 1993
Norway December 1987 1989 1995
Austria n/aa 1991 1991
Portugal July 1992 1991 1993
Spain December 1992 1992 1994
Sweden December 1988 1989 1993
Panel B: Emerging countries
Country Begin Sample Closings Liberalizations
Indonesia Liberalized 1997
Jamaica Closed 1997
Kuwait Liberalized 1997
Lebanon Liberalized 1998
Venezuela Liberalized 1985 1997
2003
a Kaminsky and Schmukler do not have Austria in their sample.
This capital control proxy measures de facto capital controls, as opposed to the
de jure nature of e.g. the IMF proxy. In contrast to de jure measures which only
capture the official information of the government, de facto measures attempt to
capture the extent to which capital controls are actually enforced. As governments
do not necessarily enforce the restrictions they put in place, large discrepancies
between de facto and de jure proxies for capital controls may exist5.
In this study, the date of liberalization for the K & S proxy is taken to be the
first month that the capital account is classified as ‘fully liberalized’. Formally the
variable CAPK&Si,t is defined as follows:
CAPK&Si,t =
{
0, if KS = ‘fully liberalized’;
1, else. (3.3)
5Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) have shown that the difference between de jure and de
facto measures can make a big difference by comparing their de facto exchange rate regimes, with
the IMF’s de jure exchange rate regimes.
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In the sample under investigation there have been no temporary controls; all coun-
tries started with a (partially) closed market and have then moved to a liberalized
market, without reimposing controls on the capital account later on.
Another capital control proxy has been derived by Miniane (2004) who devel-
oped an index based on the new post-96 capital control classification of the IMF6.
The latter classification reports the existence of capital controls for 13 financial
market segments including capital markets, direct investment, financial institutions,
and multiple exchange rate systems. The Miniane index equals the proportion of
segments that have capital controls. This proxy has a de jure character and does
not measure the severity of the capital controls. However, it contains a lot more
information than the IMF variable because is based on 13 different financial market
segments.
A score of 0 indicates a fully liberalized market, and a score of 1 a fully closed
market. As none of the countries achieves a score of 0 (the US for instance has a
score of 0.29) and there seem to be two modes around 0.2 (open) and 0.8 (closed),
the cutoff point should lie between those two modes. Therefore we have classified
all economies with a score of less than 0.5 as open, and economies with scores equal
to or above 0.5 as closed7. Mathematically, the variable CAPMinianei,t is defined as
follows:
CAPMinianei,t =
{
0, if Miniane < 0.5
1, if Miniane ≥ 0.5 (3.4)
Exchange rate data on both spot and 1-month forward rates are obtained from
Thomson DataStream. All exchange rates are expressed in local currency units per
US Dollar. Forward rates are sampled on the last trading day of the month. As
for 1-month money market and deposit rates, they are taken from the International
Financial Statistics database in the middle of each month; consequently spot rates
also have to be sampled in the middle of the month if one wants to test parity
condition (2). We let the sample start in 1983 because the Miniane capital control
proxy only runs from that date onwards. The year 1983 also hallmarks the end
of domestic interest controls in the United States, the so-called regulation Q. Thus
the starting date ensures that the nume´raire currency is free of both domestic and
international controls on capital, isolating the effect of the controls to those employed
by the domestic countries.
We measure the capital control effects for a developed (European) and an emerg-
ing currency panel. The first currency panel focuses on the capital market liberaliza-
tions that took place in Western Europe. The selection of countries is based on two
simple criteria. A country is included if it has data available on the liberalization
date for at least two out of three capital control proxies considered, and the liberal-
ization took place within the sample period. We let the European sample end with
6Before 1996, the IMF only reported the aforementioned binary variable indicating the existence
of capital controls. The new AREAER has expanded the coverage on capital controls. In a
tabulated format they report on controls in 13 main segments; most are even further disaggregated.
7The results are not very sensitive if the cut-off point is varied between 0.45 – 0.55.
42 Are Capital Controls in the Foreign Exchange Market Effective?
the introduction of the Euro in December 1998, also for those European currencies
that are not part of the eurozone.
As for the emerging currency panel, the countries are selected so as to reflect
sufficient heterogeneity in geographic location and economic development. Emerging
country data run from March 1984 until November 2006. Data for 1983 have been
omitted due to limited interest rate availability in that year.
Descriptive statistics (table 3.2) already reveal some of the stylized facts known
in the literature. First of all it can be noted that the emerging economies have
much larger interest rate spreads than the European countries, and consequently
also have on average sizeable depreciations versus the dollar. Furthermore the sign
of the average exchange rate movement is not in all cases equal to the sign of the
corresponding forward premium and interest differential, indicating that for some
countries the UIP coefficient will be negative rather than equal to 1.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics.
All exchange rates are expressed in local currency units per U.S. Dollar. st+1− st is the monthly change
in the spot exchange rate expressed in local currency units per Dollar; it − i∗t is the money market rate
differential vis-a-vis America; ft − st is the 1 month forward premium; . All variables are expressed as
monthly percentages and st is defined at the end of the month. Panel A contains the European sample,
and Panel B the emerging economies. The emerging sample does not have forward rates available.
Panel A: Developed countries
st+1 − st it − i∗t ft − st
Country Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Austria -0.19 3.28 0.19 0.26 -0.06 0.24
Denmark -0.14 3.25 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.29
France -0.10 3.22 0.44 0.23 0.14 0.25
Italy 0.10 3.20 0.29 0.30 0.39 0.25
Norway 0.04 3.02 -0.06 0.24 0.26 0.30
Portugal 0.33 3.25 0.55 0.38 0.83 1.07
Spain 0.06 3.24 0.42 0.29 0.45 0.36
Sweden 0.05 3.06 0.30 0.50 0.26 0.34
Panel B: Emerging countries
st+1 − st it − i∗t
Country Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Indonesia 0.83 6.98 0.95 0.58
Jamaica 1.09 4.65 0.98 0.69
Kuwait 0.00 1.38 0.03 0.14
Lebanon 1.97 8.56 0.70 0.29
Venezuela 1.94 7.55 1.36 1.10
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3.3.2 Methodology
To test the effect of capital controls on the parity conditions in equations 3.2-3.2 we
make use of the standard specification used in the forward discount bias literature:
∆sl/$i,t+1 = αi + βi(ii,t − i$i,t) + t+1, (3.5)
where ∆sl/$i,t+1 is the change in the spot exchange rate, (ii,t− i$i,t) the interest differ-
ential between the local currency and Dollar 1-month money market rate, and i,t+1
the error term. For the speculative efficiency hypothesis, the interest differentials
are replaced by the forward premium (f l/$i,t,1 − sl/$i,t ). To test for the effects of capital
controls on these equations, a cross-term with a dummy indicating the presence of
capital controls is added.
∆sl/$i,t+1 = αi + βi(ii,t − i$i,t) + γiIcapi,t (ii,t − i$t ) + t+1, (3.6)
where Icapi,t is the dummy indicating the existence of capital controls, and i,t+1 the
error term. Icapi,t represents either the dummy based on Kaminsky and Schmukler
(2003)(K & S), Miniane (2004), or the IMF.
The whole system is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) esti-
mation, allowing for correlation between the cross-sectional error terms. Correlation
between the different exchange rates can be expected, especially in the European
sample as most of these countries took part in the European Monetary System
(EMS). These correlations make SUR preferable over OLS. More specifically the
system is estimated using feasible GLS, with panel corrected standard errors for the
covariance structure. Fixed effects have been included in the estimation; F-tests
cannot, in the majority of cases, reject the null that all the α′s are equal to zero, so
these results have been suppressed for brevity.
Next to the unrestricted results, we also report the results when βi is restricted
to be equal across the cross-sections.
In the results section we test against the alternative hypothesis that capital con-
trols increase monetary freedom. Monetary freedom is increased by capital controls
if they drive the forward premium slope estimate to zero. This boils down to the
alternative hypothesis |β| > |β+γ| > 0 . Under the null hypothesis of a zero capital
control effect, the absolute levels of the slope estimates should be equal with and
without capital controls, i.e., |β| = |β+γ| . This joint null hypothesis can be split in
two parts: either the signs of β and β + γ are equal. If however the signs of the co-
efficient alters after liberalization, the testable hypothesis changes to: β = −(β+ γ)
or 2β + γ = 0.{
γ = 0, if the signs of β and β + γ equal
2β + γ = 0, if the signs of β and β + γ different (3.7)
In the first case, regimes with capital controls have lower absolute levels of the
coefficients, implying lower sensitivity to interest rates (designated Ha+). In the
second case controls actually increase the sensitivity to interest rates (designated
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Ha−).
H0 : |β| = |β + γ|
Ha+ : |β| > |β + γ| (3.8)
Ha− : |β| < |β + γ|
3.4 Results
3.4.1 European Liberalizations
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the regression results for the UIP and forward premium
regressions, respectively. Regression results for the three capital control proxies are
reported separately in three vertical panels. The first column in each panel shows the
results for the standard regression specifications without dummy. As expected, we
replicate the stylized fact of the downward slope bias in βˆ . Notice that the goodness-
of-fit (R2 ) is generally found to be higher for the forward premium regressions.
Moreover, interest differentials have much less to say about future spot changes than
forward premiums: the restricted SUR coefficient for UIP almost equals 0 whereas
the restricted forward premium slope is 0.36 and significantly different from zero.
The remaining columns in each vertical panel report estimates of the direct capital
control effect γ as well as the slope value under the presence of capital controls
(β + γ). For capital controls to have the effect of giving some monetary freedom,
(β + γ) should be smaller than β. If capital controls have no effect, then the two
should be equal, implying that γ is equal to zero.
The inclusion of the capital control dummy hardly leads to any significant results.
In the sample based on Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003)(K & S), only Sweden seems
to be able to drive the UIP away from 1 (albeit insignificantly). Italy and Spain
also have a negative γ, which is much smaller in size than the 0.77 of Sweden. The
other countries exhibit positive coefficients. France forms the outlier on the other
side with a coefficient of 1.07, the other countries again have coefficients close to
zero. Jointly, the capital control variable turns out to be insignificant. Looking
at β, also nothing surprising happens. One additional country (Portugal) shows a
negative coefficient, the others are slightly lower than their initial values; UIP can be
rejected for 6 out of 7 countries. These results correspond (by construction) to the
small positive loadings on the capital controls. The opposite is the case for ((β+γ);
values are on average slightly closer to one, and for France the UIP hypothesis can
no longer be rejected. Overall, this set of results supports the view that capital
controls are not effective. Perhaps a rather bleak - but to many not unexpected -
message for governments considering the imposition of controls in the hope it will
give some autonomy. However, the following results, that do show some effects of
capital controls, are even less positive for those governments.
The second set of results using the Miniane (2004) index rejects the null of no
effects of capital controls. The aggregate coefficient of γ stays rather constant at an
insignificant 0.22 (versus 0.20). This would indicate that the capital controls have
different effects on different countries.
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Spain is able to (significantly) dampen the effect of interest differentials on ex-
change rates. Italy and Sweden have insignificant negative values for γ. All other
countries show a UIP coefficient that is rather higher when capital controls are in
place, than in a liberalized market. For example, Portugal scores a β of -0.20 when
liberalized, but comes as high as 0.77 when controls are still in place, a difference
of 0.97. France also shows a big difference from -0.79 in liberalized markets to 0.67
when capital controls were still in place. Both are significant changes at the 5% level
and are now insignificantly different from 1. Norway again switches sign of β. Spain
and Italy, which have negative γ’s ,however, show very high coefficients for β, even
up to 0.92 for Italy.
The set of results with the IMF dummy gives the strongest evidence against the
effectiveness of capital controls. The restricted value for γ is significantly positive,
yet the joint test cannot reject that the γ’s are equal to zero. Except for Norway,
all countries show positive γ’s. The fact that the γ of Norway goes from positive
to negative, is somewhat surprising and not repeated in the following samples. Also
the standard errors of the estimates of Norway are much bigger than those of the
other countries. Spain and Sweden also show modestly positive values for gamma.
The results for Forward Unbiasedness (table 3.4) are similar to those of the of
the UIP results for the Miniane sample. They are only more pronounced. The
results again reject the hypothesis that capital controls have no effect on forward
unbiasedness. However, the restricted coefficient shows that γ is positive, rather than
negative as was hypothesized. Thus capital controls are driving the results towards
forward unbiasedness, not away from it. Both K & S and Miniane show a coefficient
of around 0 (0.09 and -0.16 respectively) in the absence of capital controls, and 0.44
otherwise. Moreover, the restricted capital control coefficient is now significant in
both samples, at 5% and 1%.
The tests also reveal that the effects are not homogeneous across countries. In
general it can be noted that the dispersion of the coefficients is larger compared to
the UIP regression. The absolute size of the coefficients is bigger than those of the
UIP regressions. The standard errors on the other hand stay relatively similar in
size, pushing up the significance level. In the case of France, the existence of capital
controls even pushes the sum of β and γ above unity.
Looking at the results, the same pattern emerges as for the UIP. On one side,
Spain, Sweden, and Italy have negative coefficients in the samples of K & S and
Miniane. Of the negative γ’s only the one of Spain in the sample based on Miniane
is significant. This is also the only instance in the entire sample where the liberalized
UIP coefficient scores above 1.
In short, the forward regressions only reinforce earlier results; there is hardly any
evidence that countries can use capital controls to drive exchange rates away from
parities. Instead the little evidence that is there, points in the opposite direction,
showing that exchange rates are actually more sensitive to forward premia when
capital controls are in place.
The results of testing for the absolute effects of capital controls(table 3.5) give
slightly more support for the effectiveness capital controls than the previous results,
but still do not give much hope for countries that plan to use capital controls.
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Table 3.5: The impact of capital controls on parity conditions in absolute values.
This table reports the f-tests associated with the Wald test of the hypothesis that capital controls drive
coefficients to zero, indicating monetary independence. Under the null |β| = |β+γ|, under the alternative
capital controls drive coefficients either to zero (+), or away from zero (-). Uncovered Interest Parity
refers to the coefficients from table 3.3 and Forward Premia refers to the coefficients from table 3.4. The
columns represent the capital control dummy based on respectively Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003)(K
& S), Miniane (2004), and the IMF dummy. ∗(†), ∗ ∗ (††), ∗ ∗ ∗(† † †), indicates that |β| is significantly
larger(smaller) than |β + γ| at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Uncovered Interest Parity
K & S MINIANE IMF DUMMY
Country F-test +/− F-test +/− F-test +/−
Denmark 0.07 + 0.93 + 0.00 +
France 0.92 + 0.02 + 0.28 +
Italy 0.20 + 0.96 + 0.24 -
Norway 0.14 + 0.05 + 0.35 +
Austria 0.82 + 0.48 +
Portugal 0.17 - 1.11 - 0.34 -
Spain 0.02 + 0.45 + 0.00 -
Sweden 1.17 - 1.01 - 0.16 +
Sign test: 69.6% ∗of the cases has |β| > |β + γ|
Panel B: Forward Premia
K & S MINIANE IMF DUMMY
Country F-test +/− F-test +/− F-test +/−
Denmark 3.23∗ + 4.89∗∗ + 0.01 -
France 2.12 - 4.03†† - 0.45 -
Italy 0.08 + 0.92 + 0.03 -
Norway 0.91 + 1.70 + 0.08 +
Austria 5.71∗∗ + 0.09 -
Portugal 2.46 - 1.81 - 0.70 -
Spain 0.23 + 7.75∗∗∗ + 0.02 +
Sweden 0.00 - 0.02 - 0.01 -
Sign test: 47.8% of the cases has |β| > |β + γ|
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No single country is able to significantly change the absolute sensitivity to interest
rates. The only consolation to be found is the fact that, at least for a majority of
the countries, the effect goes in the correct direction, as shown by the sign test. Of
specific interest are the results of Sweden. While these results for Sweden were most
supportive of capital controls in the previous test, they now show that in an absolute
sense capital controls have been ineffective.
The results for the forward rates yield more significant results, mainly resulting
from lower standard errors, rather than the size of the coefficients. The countries that
have significant shifts in their absolute responsiveness are slightly skewed in favor of
capital controls. Denmark, Austria and Spain had effective controls. The controls of
France have been counter-productive in creating exchange rate stability. The overall
count, however, is slightly less than 50% in favor of capital controls, mainly caused
by the results for the AREAER dummy, which are much more negative than the
other results.
3.4.2 Emerging Countries
Frankel and Poonawala (2006) find that on average, UIP holds better in emerging
countries than in developed countries. Combined with the stylized fact that emerg-
ing countries are more prone to the use capital controls, this tentatively leads to
the conclusion that capital controls might not be one of the prime driving factors
behind the observed deviations in UIP. Intuitively, if capital controls are one of the
explanations of the deviation from UIP, then those countries that primarily employ
them should have larger deviations, not smaller ones. However, the data set allows
for formal testing of the implications that flow from their results.
Table 3.6 reports the results for the emerging countries. The standard Fama
specification reveals few surprises. Again the coefficients are far below 1 and some
are negative. The results do not replicate the finding of Frankel and Poonawala
(2006) that UIP holds better in emerging countries than in developed economies.
The restricted β for the emerging economies (0.30) is not much different from the
restricted coefficients for the UIP and FP results of the European countries (0.08
and 0.36 respectively). Surprising is the large and positive coefficient of 2.22 for
Lebanon. Still, this coefficient is neither significantly different from 1 nor from 0,
implying that the deviant result probably has little economic interpretation.
Adding the IMF capital control dummy to the specification shows that, also
here, results are not much different from the European sample, although only one
capital controls proxy can be used rather than three. For Indonesia and Jamaica,
the imposition of capital controls drives the β up towards zero, pushing it slightly
above zero in the case of Jamaica. Lebanon and Venezuela experience the opposite
effect; imposing capital controls again drives β towards zero, but given the positive
coefficient in liberalized markets, this means that it is driven down. Lebanon also
shows the most extreme change between regimes, with the coefficient changing by
more than 5 in absolute value; the only coefficient that is significantly different from
zero.
Changing the focus from the deviations from parity towards the sensitivity of
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the exchange rate to interest differentials does not change the picture. In this re-
spect there is very little reason to believe that emerging countries behave differently
than developed countries. Although, yes, they are more active in establishing and
abolishing capital controls and tinker more with the regulations in place, the effect
of those controls are not more effective than the ones in the European countries.
Table 3.6: The impact of capital controls on uncovered interest parity in emerging countries.
∆s
l/$
i,t+1 = αi + βi ∗ (ii,t − i$i,t) + γi ∗ Icapi,t ∗ (ii,t − i$t ) + t+1, ∆sl/$i,t+1 is the change in the spot exchange
rate, (ii,t − i$i,t) the interest differential between the local and Dollar 1 month deposit rate, Icapi,t the
dummy indicating the existence of capital controls measured by the IMF dummy, and i,t+1 the error
term. (standard errors in brackets). Data is middle of the month. The column ‘plain’ is the baseline
specification without the inclusion of a capital control proxy.
The rightmost columns reports the f-tests associated with the hypothesis that capital controls drive
coefficients to zero, indicating monetary independence. Under the null |β| = |β+γ|, under the alternative
capital controls drive coefficients either to zero (+), or away from zero (-).
∗(†), ∗ ∗ (††), ∗ ∗ ∗(† † †), indicates a significant difference from 0(1) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Sample period: March 1984 to November 2006.
Plain IMF DUMMY Absolute
Country β β γ β + γ +/− F-test
Indonesia −0.57 −1.22 0.64 −0.58 + 0.53
(0.74) (1.14) (0.88) (0.74)
Jamaica 0.37 −1.16 1.29 0.13 + 1.52
(0.41) (1.30) (1.04) (0.45)
Kuwait −0.11 −0.09 −0.39 −0.48 - 0.04
(0.60) (0.63) (2.03) (1.94)
Lebanon 2.22 0.60 −5.17∗∗∗ −4.56 - 0.71
(1.77) (1.85) (1.94) (3.08)
Venezuela 0.57 0.62 −0.04 0.58 + 0.00
(0.42) (0.68) (0.63) (0.43)
R2 0.041 0.043
Restricted 0.30 0.23 0.08 0.31 - 0.05
(0.25) (0.39) (0.36) (0.25)
R2 0.038 0.034
∀αi equal 1.81 2.94∗∗
∀βi equal 0.88 0.72
∀γi equal 2.29∗
∀γi = 0 1.84
3.4.3 Cross-Rates
Normally, the two specifications tested above should be nume´raire-invariant (Schot-
man, Straetmans, and De Vries, 2005). However, it cannot be excluded that the
effects of capital controls differ across countries. In the sample at hand, most coun-
tries were part of the EMS. Thus it might be interesting to look at the interaction
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Table 3.11: The impact of capital controls on parity conditions in absolute values, Pound.
This table reports the f-tests associated with the hypothesis that capital controls drive coefficients to
zero, indicating monetary independence. Under the null |β| = |β + γ|, under the alternative capital
controls drive coefficients either to zero (+), or away from zero (-). Uncovered Interest Parity refers
to the coefficients from table 3.7 and Forward Premia refers to the coefficients from table 3.9. The
columns represent the capital control dummy based on respectively Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003)(K
& S), Miniane (2004), and the IMF dummy.
∗(†), ∗ ∗ (††), ∗ ∗ ∗(† † †), indicates that |β| is significantly larger(smaller) than |β + γ| at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Uncovered Interest Parity
K & S MINIANE IMF DUMMY
Country F-test +/− F-test +/− F-test +/−
Denmark 2.16 + 0.62 + 0.95 +
France 2.60 + 0.39 + 0.90 +
Italy 0.11 + 0.10 + 0.45 +
Norway 2.21 + 1.24 + 0.34 +
Austria 1.50 + 5.17∗∗ +
Portugal 0.00 - 0.38 - 0.34 -
Spain 0.02 - 0.25 + 0.75 +
Sweden 0.46 - 0.52 - 0.11 +
Sign test: 73.9% ∗∗of the cases has |β| > |β + γ|
Panel B: Forward Premia
K & S MINIANE IMF DUMMY
Country F-test +/− F-test +/− F-test +/−
Denmark 0.86 + 5.73∗∗ + 5.01∗∗ +
France 23.19††† - 1.57 - 0.37 +
Italy 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.36 +
Norway 4.80∗∗ + 4.42∗∗ + 0.37 +
Austria 13.50∗∗∗ + 12.21∗∗∗ +
Portugal 0.24 - 0.02 - 0.80 -
Spain 6.18∗∗ + 7.77∗∗∗ + 0.16 -
Sweden 2.15 + 2.91† - 1.94 +
Sign test: 60.9% of the cases has |β| > |β + γ|
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Table 3.12: The impact of capital controls on parity conditions in absolute values, Deutsche
Mark.
This table reports the f-tests associated with the hypothesis that capital controls drive coefficients to
zero, indicating monetary independence. Under the null |β| = |β + γ|, under the alternative capital
controls drive coefficients either to zero (+), or away from zero (-). Uncovered Interest Parity refers
to the coefficients from table 3.8 and Forward Premia refers to the coefficients from table 3.10. The
columns represent the capital control dummy based on respectively Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003)(K
& S), Miniane (2004), and the IMF dummy. ∗(†), ∗ ∗ (††), ∗ ∗ ∗(† † †), indicates that |β| is significantly
larger(smaller) than |β + γ| at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Uncovered Interest Parity
K & S MINIANE IMF DUMMY
Country F-test +/− F-test +/− F-test +/−
Denmark 2.16 + 0.69 + 0.18 +
France 1.36 + 1.01 + 0.42 +
Italy 0.14 + 0.36 + 3.07∗ +
Norway 0.70 + 0.14 + 0.03 +
Austria 1.38 + 1.06 +
Portugal 1.44 - 0.01 - 0.16 -
Spain 1.01 - 0.13 + 1.90 +
Sweden 0.47 - 0.46 - 2.26 +
Sign test: 73.9% ∗∗of the cases has |β| > |β + γ|
Panel B: Forward Premia
K & S MINIANE IMF DUMMY
Country F-test +/− F-test +/− F-test +/−
Denmark 46.10∗∗∗ + 36.77∗∗∗ + 36.58∗∗∗ +
France 1.01 - 0.64 - 0.22 -
Italy 0.07 + 0.04 + 5.52∗∗ +
Norway 1.04 + 2.79∗ + 0.28 +
Austria 0.92 + 0.97 +
Portugal 1.51 - 0.23 - 1.28 -
Spain 0.09 + 10.94∗∗∗ + 0.72 +
Sweden 0.16 - 0.81 + 3.85∗∗ +
Sign test: 69.6% ∗of the cases has |β| > |β + γ|
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with two most influential currencies within Europe, the Pound Sterling and the
Deutsche Mark (DM). The DM was seen by many as the unofficial leading currency
within the EMS. Making the German financial markets an important anchor for the
local governments. The Pound plays a less central role in the EMS, as England
decided to step out of the exchange rate mechanism after the peg was broken in
1992. Still, it represents one of the major currencies in the world and the second
largest economy in the EU. On a side note, both currencies were liberalized before
1983, isolating the effect of capital account liberalization in the host countries in the
sample.
The results for the Pound and Mark regressions can be seen in tables 5 to 8. The
cross rates show no significantly different story compared to the previous two tables.
Most coefficients change only moderately. For the plain regressions without capital
controls, the restricted coefficients are very much alike. The difference between the
lowest and highest estimate is less than 0.15. The differences are somewhat bigger for
the regressions that include the capital control variables. For the UIP regressions, the
dispersion in the coefficients is smaller for the cross-rates than against the Dollar;
most coefficients are closer to zero. For the forward unbiasedness regressions the
opposite is the case. The coefficients are further away from zero, compared to the
Dollar results. This is the case for both the negative values and positive values.
There are slight variations in the direction in which the capital controls work,
but in most cases the direction is the same. Austria has a negative loading in
the forward regression against the DM, versus positive coefficients elsewhere, while
Italy has positive gamma’s against the DM. For the other countries there is little
evidence that capital controls have different effects on the exchange rates against
different countries. The absolute value tests also yield very similar results to those
of the dollar specification (tables 3.11 and 3.12; For the majority of the sample the
results point towards slightly productive, but insignificant, capital controls. Even
those results that are significant also point towards the (limited) effectiveness of
capital controls.
As the three countries investigated represent three of the most important curren-
cies in the sample, there is also little reason to assume that there are other currencies
for which the results would differ. Therefore it seems that also under capital controls,
the specifications are numraire-invariant. The gist of the results remains the same.
There are some countries that may be able to create lower responsiveness of their
exchange to interest rate differentials and forward rates with capital controls (Spain,
Sweden, and Italy), but more countries actually experience a larger responsiveness.
The latter group is also more pronounced in terms of size of the coefficients and
significance. For the forward regressions, the average restricted γ is about 0.80.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate the link between capital controls and UIP and forward
unbiasedness. One of the important reasons for governments to use capital controls
is to maintain a degree of monetary independence. If capital controls indeed allow for
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monetary freedom and exchange rate regulation simultaneously, this should result
in deviations from parity conditions.
The results show that capital controls are not able to drive interest rates and
forward rates (further) away from parity conditions. Instead there is slight evidence
that capital controls increase the responsiveness of exchange rates to those variables.
Moreover, there is also limited evidence that capital controls have a significant effect
on the absolute responsiveness.
This is in contrast to the hypothesized effect of capital controls on exchange
rates. Moreover it is in contrast to the objectives of the governments that employ
capital controls. The results of this chapter show that governments might even have
less room to set monetary policy if capital controls are employed, as shown by the
coefficients that lie closer to parity conditions and further away from 0. Moreover,
the results show that there is little to no difference between developing countries
and developed countries in the effects of the capital controls. This is in line with
other papers that find that capital controls might actually reach the opposite effect
than what they are implemented for. Glick and Hutchison (2005) find for instance
that capital controls increase the likelihood of a speculative attack and a currency
crisis; this while many governments employ controls in the hope they insulate their
economy from currency crises.
These results once more accentuate that governments should not overestimate
the effects of capital controls and even consider that they can backfire. Recent
history has provided us with just such an example where capital controls backfired;
the capital controls imposed by Thailand in December 2006 come to mind. Thailand
was forced to back down on its newly imposed controls within a day, after the Thai
stock market crashed. This works as a reminder to those considering capital controls:
’caveat emptor’, or let the user of capital controls beware.
Chapter 4
The Effect of Capital
Controls on Exchange Rate
Risk∗
4.1 Introduction
Recent history has shown that large swings in the exchange rate are not uncom-
mon: from the Asian tigers to Russia and Argentina, most emerging markets have
experienced a currency crash during the last decade of the 20th century. However,
investors and policymakers typically dislike large and abrupt exchange rate fluctua-
tions. Especially large depreciations of the domestic currency are met with concern.
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) document an endemic ‘fear of floating’. Although many
countries officially moved away from a fixed exchange rate to a floating regime, they
find that many countries still actively use policy measures to control the exchange
rate movements. This ‘fear of floating’ is rooted in the fact that large exchange rate
swings come at a cost. Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001)
have calculated that the average currency crisis entails a cost of around 8 to 9% of
GDP for the second half of the twentieth century.
Imposing capital controls constitutes one of the most far reaching policy measures
to control exchange rate movements. Capital controls enable governments to directly
limit the possibility to speculate on the currency. Although capital controls might
seem a tool too heavy to use to smooth exchange rate returns, many countries do
seem to use them for — at least partly — this reason. (De Grauwe, 2000; von Hagen
and Zhou, 2005)
This chapter investigates to what extent capital controls succeed in curbing ex-
treme currency fluctuations. There is already a body of literature on the effectiveness
of capital controls. However, earlier studies mainly focused on Chile (see for instance
∗Part of this chapter is based on Versteeg and Straetmans (2008)
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De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes, 2000; Edwards and Rigobon, 2005; Herrera and
Valdes, 1999)1. These papers established that the effects of the Chilean capital con-
trols on the exchange rate were limited. Taking a wider cross-section of countries
that includes both developed and emerging markets constitutes a first contribution
of this study. The second contribution constitutes the application of statistical ex-
treme value analysis (EVT) to measuring the impact of capital controls on the tail
behavior of currency returns (extreme events). It is well known that financial re-
turns — forex returns do not constitute an exception — are nonnormally distributed
and exhibit “heavy tails”, see e.g. Mandelbrot (1963) for an early reference. Loosely
speaking, the heavy tail feature implies that the empirical distribution of exchange
rate returns contains more probability mass in the tails than under the normal. The
tail decay of heavy tailed processs is typically characterized by a Pareto law whereas
the tail probabilities of normally distributed processes decline exponentially to zero.
The parameter governing the Pareto tail decline is the well known “tail index” and
fluctuates between 2 and 4 for most financial returns. For earlier applications of
EVT to the tails of exhange rate returns, see e.g. Koedijk, Schafgans, and De Vries
(1990); Koedijk, Stork, and De Vries (1992) or Hols and De Vries (1991). More recent
applications of EVT in the economic literature include the identification of currency
crises (Pozo and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2003; Haile and Pozo, 2006) and the measure-
ment of extreme linkages between markets (Straetmans, Verschoor, and Wolff, 2008;
Quintos, Fan, and Phillips, 2001).
Although extreme value analysis has gained ground in the literature, studies that
tests for the structural stability of tail risk are relatively rare. Koedijk, Schafgans,
and De Vries (1990) tested whether the introduction of the European Monetary
System had a dampening effect on forex tail risk. More recently, Candelon and
Straetmans (2006) apply an endogenous structural change test to find out whether
breaks in the tail index coincide with shifts in foreign exchange rate regimes. Struc-
tural breaks in forex tail risk around periods of financial liberalization constitute
relevant info for both policymakers and investors. To governments, breaks signal
whether their policies were effective and desirable. To investors, breaks in tail risk
imply that that they need to update their information on the Value-at-Risk (VaR)
of their currency trading portfolio’s.
Anticipating on the results, we find that capital controls are not effective in
reducing the potential for extreme forex depreciations. Instead, periods of capital
controls are associated with larger exchange rate depreciations. The rest of this
chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 the EVT and the tail and quantile
estimators are described. The dataset is explained in section 4.3. All the results are
presented in section 4.4 and 4.5 ends with the concluding remarks.
1The unremunerated reserve requirement of Chile is, together with the Malaysian controls, the
most well-known example of capital controls.
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4.2 Theory
Consider a stationary sequence X1, X2, . . . , Xn of independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) random variables with a cumulative distribution function F (c.d.f.
F). Define the maximum of this sequence of random draws by:
Mn = max (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) . (4.1)
The probability that this maximum is below an arbitrary level x is given by
P {Mn ≤ x} = Fn(x). (4.2)
Extreme value theory studies the limiting distribution of the (appropriately scaled)
order statistic Mn. Under fairly general conditions there exists a limiting asymptotic
d.f. G(x) that characterize extreme values:
P{an(Mn − bn) ≤ x} w−→ G(x), (4.3)
This “extreme value” d.f. G(x) can take three functional forms: one has thin tails
(Gumbel), one is bounded from above (Weibull), and one is characterized by fat tails
(Fre´chet) . Exchange rate returns do exhibit fat tails and are in principle unbounded,
which leaves the Fre´chet distribution as the only relevant distribution:
G(x) =
{
0 , x ≤ 0
e−x
−α
, x > 0.
(4.4)
Where α represents the tail index. The lower the value of the tail index α, the slower
the probability density’s decay as one moves further in the tail. This indicates a
higher probability mass concentrated in the tails and hence fatter tails. Additionally,
the tail index α can be interpreted as the maximum amount of bounded moments2.
Different heavy tailed distributions all exhibit this common limiting behavior, e.g.
the class of symmetric stable stable distributions (α < 2), the student-t distribution
or the GARCH process. However, when studying the tail behavior, we do not
need to know which parametric heavy tailed model is effectively valid over the full
distributional support.
To estimate the tail index α, we will employ the popular Hill (1975) estimator.
Let X(1) ≤ X(2) ≤ . . . ≤ X(n) be the ascending order statistics of the sequence of
r.v. X1, X2, . . . , Xn. The Hill statistic is then defined as:
αˆn =
 1
m
m−1∑
j=0
(
lnX(n−j) − lnX(n−m)
)−1 , (4.5)
where m is the number of highest order statistics. Further details on the Hill esti-
mator and related procedures to estimate the tail index are provided in Jansen and
2Consequently, a tail index lower than 2 implies that the 2nd moment (variance) of the uncon-
ditional distribution function does not exist.
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De Vries (1991) or the monograph by Embrechts, Klu¨ppelberg, and Mikosch (1997).
Notice that the estimation approach is semi-parametric in nature in the sense that
we only have to know the value of the threshold parameter m and the order statistics
in order to calculate the estimator.
The selection of the number of highest order statistics m constitutes an important
problem in extreme value analysis. Loretan and Phillips (1994) and Embrechts,
Klu¨ppelberg, and Mikosch (1997) suggest to pick m in a region where the estimate
of α is more or less stable. One knows that such a region exists because of the well
known bias-variance tradeoff for tail estimators like the Hill statistic More formally,
one chooses m such that the asymptotic mean-squared error (AMSE) of the estimate
is minimized (Goldie and Smith, 1987). This study uses the Beirlant, Dierckx,
Goegebeur, and Matthys (1999) algorithm to select m3.
Upon knowledge of the tail index estimate α̂, we would also like to estimate
the accompanying quantiles at the boundary of the historical sample or beyond.
Given a very small exceedance probability p ∼ 1/n, the tail quantile estimator q̂ (p)
formulated in de De Haan, Jansen, Koedijk, and De Vries (1994) reads
q̂ = X(n−m)
(
m
pn
) 1
α̂
, (4.6)
and where the “tail cut-off point” Xn−m,n is the (n−m)-th ascending order statistic
(or loosely speaking the m-th smallest return) from a sample of size n such that
q > Xn−m,n. At first sight, the quantile results may seem redundant once the tail
index has been reported. However, looking at definition (4.6) it can be seen that
qp is both a function of the tail index α as well as of the scale parameter X(n−m).
Estimators of the tail index, such as the Hill estimator used here, are scale invariant,
however. Thus it might very well be that there are no significant shifts in α while
there are shifts in qp, or vice versa4.
We are not only interested in the values of the tail indexes and quantiles them-
selves, but rather the parameter stability over the two different capital account
regimes. Temporal constancy tests for (4.5) and (4.6) are fairly easily established
upon knowing he asymptotic behavior of these two estimators. Asymptotic normal-
ity has been established for both estimators under fairly general conditions (mainly
the requirement that return series are identically and independently (i.i.d.) dis-
tributed and thus do not exhibit any nonlinear dependence over time). More specif-
ically, for m/n → 0 as m,n → ∞, it has been shown that the tail index statis-
3Loosely speaking, this technique requires running an exponential regression model (ERM) on
the basis of the scaled log-spacings between the subsequent extreme order statistics from a Pareto-
type distribution. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) that can be run on this data returns the
empirical AMSE for different values of m. Where m will be chosen at the minimum of the empirical
AMSE.
4Intuitively this makes sense. Lets consider two sequences of i.i.d. student-t distributions with
the same degrees of freedom ν1 = ν2 = ν, but with σ21 > σ
2
2 . Both will be characterized with the
same value of the tail index α, which is given by ν. At the same time X(n−m),1 will be larger than
X(n−m),2, given the larger variance of the first s.r.v.; ergo, qp,1 > qp,2. The converse also holds
true. If σ21 = σ
2
2 , but ν1 < ν2, qp,1 will also be larger than qp,2.
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tic
√
m (α̂− α) and tail quantile statistic
√
m
ln( mpn )
[
q̂(p)
q(p) − 1
]
are both asymptotically
normal, see e.g. Hall (1982) or Haeusler and Teugels (1985) for the former result
and De Haan, Jansen, Koedijk, and De Vries (1994) for the latter result. Structural
change tests for estimates of the tail index α and the tail quantile q can now be
based on the following statistics
Tα =
αˆ1 − αˆ2√
αˆ21
m1
+ αˆ
2
2
m2
, (4.7)
and
Tq =
ˆqp,1 − ˆqp,2√[
1
α1
√
m
qp,1 ln
(
m1
pn1
)]2
+
[
1
α2
√
m
qp,2 ln
(
m2
pn2
)]2 . (4.8)
One can safely assume that the above test statistics come sufficiently close to normal-
ity for the relatively large empirical sample sizes employed in this study, see e.g. Hall
(1982), Embrechts, Klu¨ppelberg, and Mikosch (1997) or Hartmann, Straetmans, and
De Vries (2004).
4.3 Data
We use nominal bilateral exchange rates for European and emerging currencies
against the US $. Data are downloaded from Datastream. The European currency
data start on January 1st 1973 and ends at December 31st 1998 (introduction of the
euro)5. The starting point of the emerging country data differs from currency to
currency due to unavailability of data. The data runs until December 31st 2006, the
last year for which we have capital control data available. Table 4.2, in the results
section, reports the exact number of observations available for the complete sample
and both subsamples.
We date financial liberalization using the annual dummy from the IMF Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). It is the
most widely used capital control proxy. After 1996, the IMF replaced the dummy
variable by a new type of proxy that extends their coverage of capital controls. As
an alternative, we therefore follow the procedure of Mody and Murshid (2005) and
Chinn and Ito (2006) to complete the dummy series for the post-1996 era.
As for the European countries we employ the more detailed liberalization datings
of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Miniane (2004). Data limitations prevent
the use of those two indices for the emerging economies. The liberalization dates
are summarized in table 3.1.
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003)(henceforth K & S) indicate, for each year,
whether a market is either ‘repressed’, ‘partially liberalized’, or ‘fully liberalized’.
The degree of control on the capital account is measured by monitoring regulations
5Given that most countries in the European sample are part of the Euro, post 1998 data do not
exhibit much cross-sectional variation.
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on offshore borrowing, multiple exchange rate regimes, and controls specific to capi-
tal outflows. A market is deemed ‘fully liberalized’ if there are no multiple exchange
rates or restrictions on outflows, and only minor impediments to offshore borrowing.
For this study we date the liberalization as the periods in which the markets are
classified ’fully liberalized’.
CAPK&Si,t =
{
0, if KS = ‘fully liberalized’;
1, else. (4.9)
Miniane (2004) has developed an index comprised of 13 segments, which include
capital markets, direct investment, financial institutions, and multiple exchange
rates. The liberalization score is given by n13 , with n the number of controls in
place. A score of 0 indicates a fully liberalized market, and a score of 1 a fully closed
market. None of the countries achieve a score of 0 (the US for instance has a score
of 0.29) and the capital control proxy’s histogram exhibits two modes around 0.2
(open) and 0.8 (closed). We therefore classify all economies with a score of less than
0.5 as open, and economies with scores equal to or above 0.5 as closed (equation
4.10)6:
CAPMinianei,t =
{
0, if Miniane < 0.5
1, if Miniane ≥ 0.5. (4.10)
Like the dummy variable, Miniane (2004) is based on the AREAER and only reports
annually. We therefore make the simplifying assumption that all liberalizations
reported have taken place at January 1st
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Unconditional Volatilities
As a benchmark for the rest of the analysis we start with reporting unconditional
standard deviations for liberalized and controlled periods of the capital account.
Table 4.1 reports annualized standard deviations of daily exchange rate returns
under both regimes, together with the Goldfeldt-Quandt test for heteroskasticity
(the null hypothesis being that the unconditional standard deviation stays constant
across subsamples). The emerging countries have on average a higher annualized
standard deviation than the European countries, which is not surprising given the
fact that emerging countries are more prone to currency crises, and tend to have
larger swings in inflation and interest rates.
When looking at the temporal changes in standard deviations, almost all markets
show larger movements in returns when markets are controlled. All European cur-
rencies experience a drop in volatility after liberalization around 2 percent. As for
the emerging market volatilities, only Lebanon, Malaysia, and Mexico experienced
lower volatility when capital controls were in place.
6The results are not sensitive to varying the cut off point over the interval [0.45; -0.55]
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Table 4.1: The impact of capital controls on unconditional variances.
This table reports reports the unconditional standard deviations for the daily exchange rate returns. The
two left columns report the annualized standard deviation of the daily exchange rate returns; the left
column representing the controlled regime and the right column the liberalized regime. For each country,
the regime with the highest standard deviation is marked with a dagger. The two right columns report
the variance ratio and the Goldfeld-Quandt test for heteroskedasticity. A *, **, or *** indicates rejection
of homoskedasticity at a 10, 5, or 1 percent significance level respectively.
Panel A: Developed Countries
Country Std. Con. Std. Lib. Variance Ratio
Austria 12.87% † 11.70% 1.21 ∗∗∗
Denmark 12.16% † 11.44% 1.13 ∗∗∗
France 12.58% † 10.72% 1.38 ∗∗∗
Italy 12.42% † 10.70% 1.35 ∗∗∗
Norway 11.14% 11.36% † 1.04
Portugal 13.99% † 11.00% 1.62 ∗∗∗
Spain 13.02% † 10.56% 1.52 ∗∗∗
Sweden 15.82% † 13.12% 1.45 ∗∗∗
Panel B: Emerging Countries
Country Std. Con. Std. Lib. Variance Ratio
Chile 17.72% † 9.49% 3.48 ∗∗∗
Ecuador 23.45% † 14.52% 2.60 ∗∗∗
Egypt 12.42% † 6.95% 3.19 ∗∗∗
El Salvador 18.96% † 5.26% 12.00 ∗∗∗
Gambia 18.48% † 13.43% 1.89 ∗∗∗
Guyana 39.57% † 11.55% 11.74 ∗∗∗
Honduras 25.80% † 16.15% 2.55 ∗∗∗
Indonesia 31.12% † 15.54% 4.01 ∗∗∗
Jamaica 28.93% † 11.64% 6.18 ∗∗∗
Jordan 14.84% † 1.13% 171.20 ∗∗∗
Lebanon 1.40% 30.41% † 469.58 ∗∗∗
Malaysia 7.61% 15.77% † 4.29 ∗∗∗
Mexico 8.57% 32.77% † 14.62 ∗∗∗
Trin. & Tob. 20.88% † 10.03% 4.34 ∗∗∗
Uruguay 27.21% † 19.60% 1.93 ∗∗∗
Venezuela 32.55% † 29.96% 1.18 ∗∗∗
Zambia 44.85% † 17.08% 6.89 ∗∗∗
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At first sight the finding that exchange rate volatility is higher under regimes of
capital account regulation might seem counterintuitive; indeed when a capital tax
is included in standard theoretical models of the exchange rate such as the Dorn-
busch model, capital controls are shown to have a decreasing effect on exchange rate
volatility (Frankel, 1996; Frenkel, Schmidt, Stadtmann, and Nickel, 2002). However,
other empirical studies also find higher exchange rate risk in the presence of capi-
tal controls. Capital controls increase the probability of a currency crisis occurring
(Glick and Hutchison, 2005). A study on the Chilean Unremunerated Reserve Re-
quirement (URR) also shows that for this control the unconditional exchange rate
volatility increases with the size of the control (Edwards and Rigobon, 2005).
The problem with standard deviations as a measure of exhange rate risk is that
they assume tail symmetry of the forex return distribution. However, the incidence
of extreme appreciations and depreciations is not necessarily the same which might
distort measures that equally weight upward and downward movements like the
standard deviation. Moreover, we know that exchange rate returns are nonnormally
distributed and exhibit more tail probability mass than under the normal. Given the
interpretation of the tail index as reflecting the maximal number of distributional
moments that is defined and bounded (cf. theory section), it follows that processes
with α below 2 do not exhibit finite variance; but tail characteristics like the tail
index and resulting extreme quantiles can still be calculated.
4.4.2 Tail Indices
Table 4.2 reports Hill-estimates for the data set of emerging and developed currency
returns. The reported α̂ refer to the right tail of the return distribution, i.e., the
extreme depreciation tail. We further distinguish between full sample and subsample
(controlled and liberalized) results. As concerns the full sample results, the European
countries show tail indexes between 3.0 and 4.1, while the emerging countries have
estimates ranging between 1.5 and 2.3. These results are in line with previous studies
such as Koedijk, Stork, and De Vries (1992). Strikingly, emerging countries exhibit
lower tail indices than developed currencies and often even falling below 2 which
suggests that the variance for these series may not be defined.
The European currency tail indices significantly increase after liberalization at
the 1% level for a majority of cases. The jumps in α also seem economically sig-
nificant: on average the α′s increase with almost 2 units. In the controlled period
the developed currency average is 3.3 — almost equal to the lowest observation in
the complete period; whereas the average jumps to 5.3 in the liberalized period.
Moreover, the result is robust to the choice of the liberalization variable. Using the
more advanced measures of Miniane (2004) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003),
the signs of the differences do not change, and the magnitude and significance levels
are also roughly similar, with most countries still showing a significant change at
the 1% level (the results are given in table 4.5 in the appendix).
In the emerging sample the evidence is more mixed. Lebanon, Malaysia, and
Mexico show higher values of the tail index, i.e. thinner tails, when capital controls
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Table 4.2: The impact of capital controls on the tail index.
This table reports the tail index estimates α based on the Hill-estimator. The complete sample is split
into the part with capital controls — con —, and the liberalized sample — lib. Sample sizes n and the
number of order statistics m used to calculate the Hill-estimator are reported in the first four columns.
m is calculated on the basis of Beirlant et al. (1999). The t-statistic ταcon=αlib tests for the equality of
the tail index in both samples. A *, **, or *** refers to the rejection of the null at a 10, 5, or 1 percent
significance level respectively.
Panel A: Developed Countries
ncon mcon nlib mlib α αcon αlib ταcon=αlib
Austria 4695 116 4393 60 3.73 3.61 4.97 -1.88 ∗∗
Denmark 3913 63 5175 148 3.86 3.72 4.51 -1.33 ∗
France 5218 112 3870 70 3.45 3.37 6.39 -3.65 ∗∗∗
Italy 5218 171 3870 85 3.50 3.01 5.90 -4.24 ∗∗∗
Norway 5739 113 3349 140 3.09 3.21 4.20 -2.12 ∗∗∗
Portugal 5218 179 3870 85 3.02 2.53 5.01 -4.31 ∗∗∗
Spain 5479 160 3609 64 3.19 2.89 6.22 -4.11 ∗∗∗
Sweden 5218 164 3870 63 3.80 3.73 5.51 -2.36 ∗∗∗
Panel B: Emerging Countries
ncon mcon nlib mlib α αcon αlib ταcon=αlib
Chile 7306 463 781 20 1.87 1.75 6.15 -3.19 ∗∗∗
Ecuador 3150 66 1304 58 1.04 1.73 1.73 0.01
Egypt 2107 38 2607 91 2.01 3.25 2.03 2.13 ∗∗
El Salvador 1847 110 2607 42 2.12 2.10 1.86 0.69
Gambia 542 47 3912 110 1.84 1.55 1.92 -1.25
Guyana 1847 159 2607 88 1.70 1.75 1.29 2.36 ∗∗∗
Honduras 3150 153 1304 129 1.43 1.57 1.40 0.93
Indonesia 2607 249 6262 184 1.87 1.38 2.68 -6.04 ∗∗∗
Jamaica 4692 320 2607 51 1.46 1.39 3.19 -3.96 ∗∗∗
Jordan 3388 193 2346 151 1.13 2.22 1.78 2.01 ∗∗
Lebanon 2346 39 6523 647 1.31 4.13 1.21 4.41 ∗∗∗
Malaysia 6262 222 2607 49 1.98 3.03 2.09 2.60 ∗∗∗
Mexico 2868 82 6001 583 1.55 3.08 1.43 4.77 ∗∗∗
Trin. & Tob. 4170 364 3129 153 1.73 2.01 1.70 1.76 ∗∗
Uruguay 2869 216 6000 176 1.61 1.51 2.33 -4.01 ∗∗∗
Venezuela 4173 127 4696 270 1.99 2.30 1.69 2.69 ∗∗∗
Zambia 6262 331 2607 118 1.65 1.60 2.33 -3.16 ∗∗∗
68 The Effect of Capital Controls on Exchange Rate Risk
are in place which seems in line with previous results on standard deviations7.
On the other hand, and similar to the European outcomes, Chile, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Uruguay, and Zambia all have thinner tails in the liberalized period (sig-
nificant at the 1% level). Prior to liberalization all values for these countries were
below 2, while after liberalization, they increase to levels above 2. In the case of
Chile the tail index even rises above 6, indicating thinner tails than most devel-
oped countries. Egypts, Guyana, Jordan, and Venezuela are mixed cases with both
significantly fatter tails and lower standard deviations after liberalization.
The results point into the same direction as those of Koedijk, Stork, and De Vries
(1992) :they found that exchange rate returns have fatter tails under fixed exchange
rate regimes than under floating exchange rate regime, both for a sample of EMS
currencies as well as a number of emerging countries.
Although pegging the currency is not identical to imposing capital controls, both
policy measures constitute an attempt by the government to exert (direct) control
on the currency exchange. Through this control over the exchange market, the
government increases the costs of investors to speculate in the exchange rate market
and make it unattractive for speculators to arbitrage away small deviations from
perceived equilibrium levels. However, once the exchange rate misalignment exceeds
a critical level, a sudden large shift can be expected. In other words, exchange rate
control may replace frequent small movements by infrequent large movements: tails
become fatter.
4.4.3 Quantile Estimates
The unconditional variance and the tail index are useful intermediary concepts to
express the risk that is present in the currency returns; but in the end what matters
most to investors is how likely an extreme movement in the exchange rate of a given
magnitude will be or, conversely, how large a sudden sharp drop in the exchange
rate with a given probability of occurrence will be. The latter problem amounts to
estimating the quantile of the unconditional distribution of exchange rate returns
(One can also think of it as the unconditional Value-at Risk of an open position
in forex). As we are interested in extreme movements of the exchange rate, we
want to calculate quantiles close to the boundary of the historical sample. The
marginal exceedance probabilities (or significance levels) are set equal to 1/0.5n,
1/n, and 1/2n (i.e., corresponding with extreme quantiles that are in-sample, at the
boundary of the sample and out-of-sample, respectively).
For the developed countries, the number of observations per sub sample varies
between 3,600 and 5,500. The probability levels are calibrated to approximately
1
2,500 ≈ 10.5n , 15,000 ≈ 1n , and 110,000 ≈ 12n , which corresponds to 0.04%, 0.02%, and
0.01% respectively. The sub samples sizes of the emerging countries are much more
7The results for Malaysia, however, might be due to the IMF classification of capital controls.
According to the IMF AREAER, Malaysia was liberalized at the time of the Asia crisis, when it
experienced most volatility; however, Malaysia did reimpose temporary controls during the crisis;
in fact it is one of the most quoted examples of the use of controls on outflows. This makes the
interpretation of the results for this country very difficult.
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heterogeneous, making it more difficult to pick probabilities that lie close to the
historical sample boundary. The emerging country significance levels are set to 11,000
(0.1%), 12,500 (0.04%), and
1
10,000 (0.01%)
8.
The full sample and subsample quantile estimates for developed and emerging
currencies are given in tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Table 4.6 in the appendix
reports estimate developed currency quantiles using two alternative liberalization
dates9. As an example how to interpret the numbers, consider the quantiles esti-
mated for Austria. Given a probability of 0.04%, the quantile of Austria is 3.97% for
the whole sample. That is, a daily (log) depreciation larger than 3.97% is observed
with a probability of only 0.04%, i.e., once every (1/0.0004)/360 ≈ 7 years.10 Unsur-
prisingly the (full sample) quantiles for the emerging countries (table 4.4) are much
larger than those of the European countries. For the full sample and p = 0.04%
the developing currency quantiles fluctuate between 7.5% (Malaysia) and 116.3%
(Ecuador), while the European currency quantiles hoover in between 3.78% (Den-
mark) and 5.12% (Portugal).
If one compares the ‘controlled’ and ‘liberalized’ quantiles one clearly sees that
most countries exhibit a stronger propensity towards extreme depreciations when
capital controls are present. For all European countries, quantiles significantly drop
after financial liberalization (table 4.3 and 4.6. For quantiles further in the tail, the
statistical significance of the structural change test results is less striking but still
present. Furthermore, the tables and figure 4.1 illustrate the economic significance of
the break. First, for the European countries, the quantiles for a 0.01% probability
in a liberalized period are still below the quantiles for a 0.04% probability when
markets were controlled. Thus an extreme event which occurred on average only
once every 28 years in liberalized markets, happens more than once every 7 years if
capital controls are in place. Alternatively, if the probabilities are kept constant, a
once in 7 years downward movement is slightly less than twice (1.9 on average) as
large before liberalization compared to the period after liberalization. This ratio only
becomes larger as we move further in the tail, as the tails are fatter pre liberalization.
Interestingly enough, it seems that the countries that have the highest exchange rate
risk before liberalization, such as Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, are amongst those
with the lowest risk after liberalization, i.e., financial liberalization does not seem to
have the same effects on all countries.
For the sample of emerging countries (given in table 4.4 and figure 4.1) more
than half of the countries show significant lower quantiles when the capital controls
are liberalized. This result is somewhat tempered when we move further in the
tail, but for most countries the drop in quantiles remains significant at the 1%
level. The extent to which the risk drops after liberalization is remarkable. Looking
8The first probability is a proxy for 1/n for the smallest samples (2 samples have n < 1, 000),
while 1
10,000
proxies for 1/n for the largest sample (n = 7306). In addition, two of the three
probabilities chosen correspond to those chosen for the developed countries in order to facilitate
comparisons between the two samples.
9As for emerging countries, there was only one proxy available for capital controls.
10As for the emerging currency quantiles, the reported quantile estimates are extreme events that
are expected to occur once every 3.5(0.1%), 14(0.02%), and 28(0.01%) years.
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at an event happening with an 0.1% probability (roughly speaking: once every 3
years) the expected depreciation decreases (on average) from 12.7% to 9.5%, or
roughly 25%. Mexico and Lebanon stand out from the other countries and remain
puzzling. These two countries have significantly higher quantiles after liberalization.
In comparison to the other developing countries they show both very low quantiles
before liberalization and amongst the highest quantiles after liberalization.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of financial liberalization on exchange rate risk.
As many investors and regulators are particularly worried about sudden large ex-
change rate depreciations, we decided to exploit extreme value analyis (EVT) to
proxy exchange rate risk by extreme depreciation quantiles that reflect small prob-
ability events. This study applies the EVT methodology to a wide cross-section
of countries, spanning both European (developed) markets and emerging markets
covering all continents.
The use of extreme value analysis (EVT) in empirical finance has steadily gained
in popularity because it requires no distributional assumptions other than that the
return tails contain more probability mass than the normal distribution, i.e., the
‘heavy tail’ feature. The performed quantile analysis enables one to distinguish
between appreciations and depreciations, i.e., one does not need to impose tail sym-
metry as with the standard deviation. Moreover, foreign exchange return tails can
contain so much probability mass that the variance is no longer defined (finite). In
the latter case, an extreme depreciation quantile provides a proper alternative as a
forex risk measure11.
The results suggest that financial liberalization is associated with lower extreme
depreciation quantiles and this for both developed and emerging economies. As a
matter of fact, extreme quantiles are almost twice as high under capital controls as
compared to the liberalized capital account regime. Not surprisingly, the drop in
tail risk after liberalization is more spectacular for those countries that exhibited
the fattest tails when capital control restrictions were still in place. The results are
robust to different definitions of financial liberalization.
The results corroborate with previous empirical studies. Capital controls have
been found to increase the probability of a currency crisis (Glick and Hutchison,
2005), which typically coincide with the most extreme currency fluctuations. Other
forms of exchange rate control are also associated with thicker tails. Koedijk, Stork,
and De Vries (1992) find that any degree of ’fixity’ of the exchange rate is associated
with lower values of α.
Thus, although many countries exhibit a fear of floating, their control over the
exchange rate market does not decrease the incidence of big depreciations (or deval-
11More specifically, if the tail index α falls below 2, the variance is no longer defined but the
quantiles calculated with EVT are still valid. Estimates of α for emerging currencies were often
found to lie below 2, i.e., the reported standard deviation analysis is suspect and needed to be
complemented with a methodology that explicitly takes into account the fat tailness of foreign
exchange rate returns.
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uations) of their currency. Even worse, the likelihood for large depreciations seems
to increase. It is true that capital controls can be implemented to achieve other goals
than curbing exchange rate risk. However, this study shows that capital controls are
not a good instrument to decrease the risk of extreme depreciations.
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Table 4.5: The impact of capital controls on the tail index, alternative proxy.
This table reports the tail index estimates α based on the Hill-estimator. Panel A contains the results with
the liberalization dates based on the Miniane index, while panel B reports the results for the liberalization
dates based on the Kaminsky & Schmukler index. The complete sample is split into the part with capital
controls — con —, and the liberalized sample — lib. Sample sizes n and the number of order statistics
m used to calculate the Hill-estimator are reported in the first four columns. m is set at 2.5% of the
sample size. The t-statistic ταcon=αlib tests for the equality of the tail index in both samples. A *, **,
or *** refers to the rejection of the null at a 10, 5, or 1 percent significance level respectively.
Panel A: Miniane Index
Country ncon mcon nlib mlib α αcon αlib ταcon=αlib
Austria 4695 116 4393 60 3.73 3.61 4.97 -1.88 ∗∗
Denmark 3913 63 5175 148 3.86 3.72 4.51 -1.33 ∗
France 4174 100 4914 118 3.45 3.08 4.69 -3.03 ∗∗∗
Italy 3913 125 5175 160 3.50 3.15 3.69 -1.32 ∗
Norway 4174 266 4914 232 3.09 2.65 3.58 -3.23 ∗∗∗
Portugal 4695 295 4393 127 3.02 2.34 3.96 -4.30 ∗∗∗
Spain 4956 263 4132 136 3.19 2.75 3.92 -3.13 ∗∗∗
Sweden 4174 283 4914 112 3.80 3.09 4.98 -3.75 ∗∗∗
Panel B: Kaminsky & Schmukler Index
Country ncon mcon nlib mlib α αcon αlib ταcon=αlib
Denmark 4109 68 4979 141 3.80 3.69 4.65 -1.62 ∗
France 4434 103 4654 112 3.45 3.17 4.74 -2.88 ∗∗∗
Italy 4956 146 4132 125 3.50 3.24 3.75 -1.18
Norway 3913 249 5175 124 3.09 2.63 4.00 -3.45 ∗∗∗
Portugal 5109 344 3979 101 3.02 2.37 3.96 -3.82 ∗∗∗
Spain 2999 124 6089 154 3.19 2.18 4.39 -5.46 ∗∗∗
Sweden 4174 283 4914 112 3.80 3.09 4.98 -3.75 ∗∗∗
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Chapter 5
Capital Controls and
Economic Growth: How
Controls on Inflows and
Outflows are Different∗
5.1 Introduction
The spate of financial crises that hallmarked the 1990’s has brought about a revival
of the literature investigating the effect of financial liberalization. Many of the
countries that were hit by crises, had just recently liberalized their capital account,
casting a shade on the presumption that open capital markets were the way to go
for emerging economies. At the same time several other countries showed good
economic performance in the presence of or, in part, thanks to capital controls. This
has caused many academics to take a more cautious stance on financial liberalization,
and has brought
Out of many countries that use capital controls, two examples stand out. Fol-
lowing the onset of the Asia crisis, Malaysia took the bold step to implement capital
controls on outflows. Rather than stepping to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF; like Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand), and engaging in a policy of aus-
terity, Malaysia chose to take an unorthodox path. In September 1998, it fixed its
exchange rate and forced down interest rates to reflate the economy. To prevent
a flight of capital the country imposed sweeping controls on outflows of portfolio
capital and put a halt to all off-shore currency trading in the Ringgit. In effect,
the capital controls bought Malaysia time to stabilize its economy and prevent it
from gliding from a ‘good’ equilibrium to a ‘bad’ equilibrium, much like described
in the third generation crisis model by Krugman (1999a). Indeed, after the country
∗Part of this chapter is based on Versteeg (2008)
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recovered, Malaysia removed most of the controls in 1999 and 2001, leaving only the
imposed ban on offshore trading in place.The evidence shows that the controls were
indeed effective in sharply reducing off-shore trading in the Ringgit, and reducing
the domestic interest rates (Doraisami, 2004) . Moreover, Kaplan and Rodrik (2002)
provide some evidence that the Malaysian controls were effective in recovering the
economy faster from the financial crisis than would have otherwise been the case.
At the other end of the spectrum, Chile imposed controls on capital inflows
from 1991 to 1998, in the form of an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR).
Rather than fearing capital outflows, Chile was faced with large amounts of capital
flowing into the country in the late 80’s and early 90’s. Chile formed an attractive
destination as it maintained high interest rates as part of a disinflation program.
Faced with these large flows, Chile introduce the URR and through time continued
to tweak these controls to close loopholes that were exploited by investors. The
controls were imposed with the objective to decrease capital inflows and increase
the maturity structure of these inflows; through this altered inflow of capital, the
government aspired to create monetary autonomy and to limit the real appreciation
of the currency. Although the controls were not effective in reducing the flow of
capital, they did help the government to tilt maturity structure of the flow and
affect the real exchange rate and interest rate differentials (De Gregorio, Edwards,
and Valdes, 2000).
Besides these two examples, what does theory predict for financial liberalization
and economic growth? From a neoclassical perspective, in a world with perfect
capital markets, the case for international financial integration is clear. Free capi-
tal markets allow for a larger scope of diversification and thus lower portfolio risk
for investors (Voth, 2003). In addition they lower the cost of capital for domestic
firms and thus stimulate higher levels of investment (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000a)1.
Moreover, most emerging economies have relatively low stocks of physical capital.
The increase in capital — and subsequent increase in output — following financial
liberalization, should make liberalization even more attractive to them.
However, the few papers that try to measure the welfare effects of the inflow of
capital following liberalization find that the effects are rather modest at best. Men-
doza and Tesar (1998a) report that for developed countries the welfare benefits of
integration are less than 0.5% of permanent consumption. Even for emerging coun-
tries, which stand to gain most by financial integration, the effects are reported to lie
around only 1% (Gourinchas and Tornell, 2004). When adding market distortions
to the model, such as credit imperfections, the gains are even smaller (Matsuyama,
2004) or are even completely reversed (Boyd and Smith, 1997a).
The implication is that the indirect effects of liberalization are much more im-
portant for welfare creation than the increase in capital itself; it is the efficiency
with which the capital is used that drives welfare, not the level of the capital stocks
1Combined with the simple observation that almost all of the developed world underwent fi-
nancial liberalization, it is also not surprising that there are very little studies that postulate that
capital controls are a first-best policy. One exception would be the paper by Brecher and Diaz-
Alejandro (1977).
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itself2. If this holds true, it makes sense for a country stimulate those types capital
streams that can be allocated efficiently, whilst at the same time discouraging the
types of capital that are deemed destabilizing to the economy.
However, the empirical literature has fared poor in trying to determine the effect
of capital controls. Most of the studies that have investigated the effect of capital
controls on economic growth have yielded inconclusive results4. In many cases the
inclusion of capital controls yielded no significant results at all, while at other times
different papers led to contradictory results. This has resulted in a situation where
both proponents and opponents of capital controls cannot be satisfied with the
results.
A lot of academics blame the lack of empirical results on the difficulty to get good
data proxies available to measure capital controls. Many believe that the lacklustre
results that have been obtained so far are not in itself a sign that capital controls
have neither positive or negative effects, but rather that the current proxies fail to
measure the capital controls that matter. Not surprisingly many academics have
voiced the need for better measures to test the relationship between capital controls
and growth.
This study addresses the problem by constructing a more precise measure of
capital controls based on the new IMF annual report on exchange arrangements and
exchange restrictions (AREAER). The measure developed in this chapter improves
over older measures by specifically distinguishing between controls designated to
deter capital inflows and those designed to deter capital outflows. Moreover, the
capital control index can distinguish between capital controls on different types of
capital, such as equity flows. The results show that the effect of capital controls on
economic growth is dependent on the type of controls used by a country. Capital
controls on capital inflows, such as used by Chile, have on average a positive effect on
economic growth, while controls on outflows and equity markets are detrimental to
economic growth. As previous studies did not disaggregate between these different
types of controls, this is an explanation why they were not able to find significant
effects.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the method-
ology used, while section 5.3 expands on the construction of the capital control vari-
able as well as the rest of the data. section 5.4 reports on the results, and section
5.5 concludes .
2In the words of the debate on international growth convergence, it is total factor productivity
that drives income differences rather than factor accumulation. This also leads to the conclusion
that capital account liberalization fits into a bigger program of financial market reforms which
should be ‘sequenced’3, and capital markets are generally seen as the last market that should
be liberalized (Mishkin, 2001). Capital markets can only efficiently allocate capital if first fiscal
imbalances are removed (Edwards, 1999), an efficient tax system is created (Drazen, 1989), trade
markets are liberalized (McKinnon, 1973, 1991), corruption is brought under control (Bai and Wei,
2000), and a sound institutions are established (Mishkin, 2001).
4For a survey see Edison and Warnock (2003) and Eichengreen (2004)
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5.2 Methodology
The growth effects of capital controls are tested within a neo-classical framework,
based on the Swan-Solow and Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans models. In a pinch, the neo-
classical growth framework predicts that the (log of) effective per capita output,yEi,t,
of all economies converges from their initial states yEi,0 to the equilibrium level y
E
i,∞.
yEi,t = (1− e−λt)yEi,∞ + e−λtyEi,0, (5.1)
where λ is the rate of convergence across countries towards the equilibrium, and yEi,t
(and by analogy yEi,t is defined as (yi,t − ai,t), the GDP per capita (yi,t) per unit of
technology (ai,t).
By replacing yEi,t by (yt − ai,t) and subtracting y0, the specification changes to:
yi,t − yi,0 = (at − a0) + (1− e−λ)a0 + (1− e−λ)yi,∞ − (1− e−λ)yi,0, (5.2)
γi = α− βiyi,∞ + βiyi,0, (5.3)
where the second equation is the reduced form of the structural model. The growth
of technology (at−a0) and initial level of technology a0 are subsumed in the intercept
α and β equals −(1 − e−λ). Classical models assumed that yi,∞ was equal across
countries, as production factors would shift from country to country until marginal
productivity per unit of labor and thus growth converges to the equilibrium, i.e.
absolute convergence. The implication that λ is positive, and β negative, lies at the
center of the economic growth literature.
Under the assumption that output follows a three sector Cobb-Douglas function
involving, next to labor, also physical (K) and human (H) capital, βiyi,∞ can be
proven (see Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple, 2005) to be a loglinear function of sK,i
and sH,i, leading to the reduced form for the basic growth equation, with error term
appended:
γi = α+ γyi,0 + φ1sK,i + φ2sH,i + i. (5.4)
However, there are more factors that influence economic growth due to their
impact on the gi. In other words, not every country is expected to grow at the same
rate, even when they are growing at their equilibrium level. There are a number
of factors, say Zi, that can have an influence both on the equilibrium growth rate,
but also on the initial level of production technology in a country. This extends the
model further to:
γi,t = α+ βyi,0 + φXi + piZi + i, (5.5)
with Xi the vector containing sK,i and sH,i
Barro (1991), amongst others, has done a lot of work in exploring the factors that
lead to differences in the equilibrium growth path, including geographical, political,
and economical factors into the standard neoclassical framework. The inclusion of
these factors can help to bridge the discrepancy between the theory that countries
should converge to each other and the empirical fact that many developing countries
have lower growth rates than rich countries. In addition to using secondary school
5.2 Methodology 83
enrollment as a proxy for human capital, he also introduced the regional dummies for
Latin America ,South-East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. We follow this convention
by also including those variables. Of the other variables that have been introduced
in the growth literature, one is of extra importance to this study: institutional
development. As low levels of institutional development are likely to coincide with
high levels of capital controls, this variable is also added to the list of controls. The
different types of capital controls are added to this specification to test for their
effect on economic growth, leading to the following general specification, with CAPi
being the vector containing the capital control variables:
γi,t = α+ βyi,0 + ΦXi + piZi + ψCAPi + i. (5.6)
In the sequencing literature the focus lies on the reasons why capital cannot be
efficiently allocated by the domestic financial system. Thus it is primarily the inflow
of foreign capital into the country that will be affected by the distortions present.
Capital controls on inflows can help a country to protect its domestic capital market
from the building up of lending booms associated with the inefficient allocation of
capital and excessive risk taking of underregulated banks (Mishkin, 2001).
Controls on outflows on the other hand do not help a country to sequence its
reforms, nor does it protect the domestic market against the misallocation of re-
sources due to the distortions. On the other hand, they do foster corruption and
limit the risk diversification of domestic investors. Also, controls on outflows are not
very effective in stopping financial crises (Edwards, 1999)5.
Next to the clear distinction between the effects of controls on inflows and out-
flows, there has been a consensus in the literature that long-term capital is preferable
to short term capital. Additionally, large capital flows to the banking sector also lead
to financial fragilities and increased probabilities of financial crises (Bordo, Eichen-
green, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria, 2001). As Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2005) point out, equity markets do not suffer from these drawbacks. Combined
with the positive effects developed equity markets have on economic development,
controls on equity markets are much more likely to have negative effects on economic
welfare than other capital controls.
It is possible, however, that the causation is not only running from capital con-
trols to growth but also vice versa. It is not implausible that emerging countries
adjust their capital account policies towards the economic growth they experience
in a country. Generally it can be stated that countries seem to open up their capital
accounts when experiencing high growth and closing them when experiencing low
growth. For example prior to the Asian crisis, when most East Asian countries were
experiencing economic booms, many of those economies decided to liberalize. Con-
versely, Argentina activated new restrictions on their capital account following both
the economic problems in the eighties and again after the 2001 crisis. To address this
possible endogeneity problem the equation will be estimated using a two stage least
5Even here, controls on capital inflows are probably more effective in preventing financial crises
as they slow the buildup of lending booms and thus the very financial fragility that might trigger
a financial crisis
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square estimator, with the lagged levels of the controls as instruments, together with
the lagged values of initial GDP, schooling, investments, institutions, as well as four
location dummies. These lagged values are highly correlated with the initial levels
of the controls, whilst predetermined with respect to current economic growth6.
Secondly, cross-sectional growth regressions have been criticized for suffering from
possible multicollinearity (e.g. Mankiw, 1995). Therefore, for each model the vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) of the variables is calculated. The VIF is a measure
of multicollinearity and expresses the extent to which collinearity amongst the re-
gressors leads to imprecision of the parameter estimates. VIF in excess of 10 are
normally seen as indications of multicollinearity (Myers, 1990). As the VIF of the
estimations stays below this threshold of 10, we conclude that multicollinearity is
not a serious issue in the models used.
5.3 Data
Up until now there is little consensus about the best way to measure capital controls.
Although several data sets have been developed, none of them has thus far succeeded
in creating a proxy that is both complete and available over a wide range of countries
for a prolonged period of time. The data seem to be falling short in two areas.
Firstly, the old indexes used were binary in nature and could not measure the
intensity of controls in place. Yet there are large dispersions in the extent to which
countries employ capital controls. Even most developed countries keep some mini-
mal controls in place, designed to lock foreigners out of strategic sectors. Italy for
instance has long tried, like many other countries, to prevent foreigners in taking a
majority stake in national banks, and most European countries keep a strong con-
trol over foreign ownership in utilities and aviation companies. On the other hand,
countries like China have an extensive range of capital controls in place that covers
almost all capital transactions, ranging from differential equity classes to completely
forbidding transactions in some classes of derivatives.
Secondly, most of the older proxies of capital controls do not fully account for
controls on inflows (Magud and Reinhart, 2006). More specifically the old IMF
binary variable focuses mainly on capital controls on outflows. At the same time the
policy debate focuses more and more on the differences in effects between controls
on inflows and outflows. Especially in relation to institutional development.
Even though the IMF dummy is limited and often criticized, it has been used
extensively in the literature7. In response to the dummy several authors have tried
to extend the IMF dummy to measure the intensity of the controls. The most no-
table extensions are the works of Quinn (1997), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003),
Miniane (2004), and Abiad and Mody (2005). These data sets form a huge im-
provement over the simple IMF dummy. Not only do they succeed in creating the
6The idea of using lagged controls to instrument the growth regression against endogeneity
problems is described in Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004)
7for example Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Chanda (2001), Epstein and Schor
(1992),Garret (1995), Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Leblang (1995), Milner (1996), Razin and
Rose (1994), and Rodrik (1998) all use the IMF dummy in their studies
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first step to measuring the intensity of the capital controls, they also make an ex-
plicit distinction between different types of financial repression. However, with the
exception of Miniane (2004), these different types of financial repression do not all
refer to capital controls. Quinn (1997) bases half of his proxies on restrictions on
the current account (i.e. trade restrictions), whilst Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003)
and Abiad and Mody (2005) focus predominantly on domestic financial repression
such as interest rate ceilings, rather than international financial repression (capital
controls). Moreover, as mentioned before, these data sets also make no distinction
between controls on inflows and outflows.
There are also several authors that try to proxy for capital controls by looking at
outcome variables. For instance Frankel and MacArthur (1988) propose to use on-
and off-shore interest differentials or covered interest (CIP) deviations; Kraay (1998)
and Swank (1998) use proportions of capital inflows and outflows to GDP; Bekaert
(1995) proposes stock return differences between markets. The problem with such
de facto measures is that it is uncertain that they actually capture the presence
of capital controls. It is equally likely that the perceived deviations are caused by
other factors, or that the capital controls are simply ineffective and do not show any
deviation in the proxy, even though controls are present. (Straetmans, Versteeg,
and Wolff, 2008) report for instance that the presence of capital controls has very
little bearing on the uncovered interest parity or speculative efficiency hypothesis.
The latest and best de facto proxy of capital controls, measures the proportion of
stocks that is unavailable to non-residents, such as reported by the International
Finance Corporation and used by, amongst others, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock
(2004), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), and Edison and Warnock (2003).
This study extends the coverage of the previous studies by, in addition to equity
markets, looking at other types of capital controls as well. As Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2005) make a strong case that the liberalization of equity markets is of
paramount importance for the development of a country, it will be interesting to see
how the effects of these controls compare to other controls.
The only studies that were able to investigate capital account liberalization in
great detail were case studies of specific countries. Although these case studies have
shed much light on the process of capital account liberalization, they are lacking in
the sense that they cover only a very limited number of countries. Only a handful of
the most well-known countries that use capital controls are covered, such as Malaysia
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002), Chile (De Gregorio, Edwards,
and Valdes, 2000; Edwards, 1998, 1999), or Brazil (Miles, 2004). Given their limited
scope, it might be difficult to extrapolate these findings to other countries as noted
by (Magud and Reinhart, 2006). The data sets relaxes this constraint by taking into
account a wide range of countries.
Actually the data set can be seen as a natural evolution out of the other data
sets that have been developed in other studies as it is also based on the AREAER,
but is to the knowledge of the author the first to make the overt distinction between
controls on inflows and controls on outflows in addition to distinguishing between
several types of capital streams, for a large cross-section of countries.
For a total of 26 categories, we have coded the absence or presence of controls.
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The capital control variables are then constructed as the proportion of categories
that have capital controls in place.
CONi =
∑K
k=1 CONi,k
K
, (5.7)
Where CONi is the capital control variable for country i, CONi,k the dummy indi-
cating the presence of capital controls for country i and category k and K the total
number of categories. This creates variables on the interval [0, 1]with completely
liberalized market scoring a 0 and completely closed markets scoring a 1. The vari-
ables measuring controls on inflows (CON. IN.) and outflows(CON. OUT) are each
composed of 13 categories, while the control on equity markets (CON. STOCK) is
composed of 4 categories. The exact details of how the variables are constructed can
be found in the appendix.
The core of the rest of the data for the growth regression comes from the Penn
World Tables 6.2, compiled by Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). More specifically
the real per capita growth rates, geographic location and investment rates. This
data set on economic growth is the most commonly used in the economic growth
literature. The other standard control variables are obtained from the Barro-Lee
data set.
Additional to the standard controls institutional quality is added. The measure of
institutional quality is retrieved from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
that is published each year by Political Risk Services (PRS) . Their ’Law and Order’
index was found to be the best indicator of institutional quality (Knack and Keefer,
1995) and is most prevalent as institutional measure in studies on capital controls
(for instance Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz, 2001; Chanda, 2001; Kraay, 1998).
The law and order index of the ICRG measures to what extent a rule of law is
present in a country and is scored from zero to six, with high scores indicating a
better rule of law and low scores indicating a malfunctioning rule of law.
5.4 Results
To assess the effects of capital controls on growth a baseline regression is performed
to compare the results of this data set with other cross-sectional growth studies.
The results are given in table 5.2. This specification includes the (log of) the initial
level of GDP, A schooling variable proxying for human capital, the Investment ratio,
a dummy separating developed countries from emerging countries and the variable
proxying for institutional quality. The two leftmost columns give the results which
are instrumented through two stage least square, while the two rightmost columns
give the ordinary least square(OLS) results. An additional split is made between the
full sample, consisting of 63 countries, and the sample consisting only of emerging
countries, consisting of 44 countries. In general it can be seen that the regressions
that are performed on only the emerging countries seem to have a better explanatory
power, as portrayed by the R2, than the complete sample.
The results are as expected in line with previous growth research. The initial
level of GDP enters with a negative sign, indicating growth convergence. At the
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Table 5.2: Baseline growth regression.
Neoclassical growth model, with as dependent variable real GDP growth per capital from 1998 to 2004.
‘Ln GDP’ is the log of initial real GDP per capita in 1998, ‘Schooling’ the ratio of upper secondary
schooling attainment in 1999, ‘Investment’ the Investment share of GDP, and ‘Institutions’ the ICRG
measure of rule of law. Models (1) and (2) portray the 2SLS results with the lagged 1996 levels as
well as geographical dummies (Developed, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South East Asia) as
instruments. models (3) and (4) give the OLS results. The standard errors are given in brackets below
the point estimates. *(10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) indicate significance at their respective levels.
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
2SLS OLS
Complete Emerging Complete Emerging
Constant 5.66 5.12 1.92 2.56
(4.78) (4.88) (3.77) (3.82)
Ln GDP −0.95 −0.95 −0.33 −0.53
(0.72) (0.74) (0.56) (0.57)
Schooling 6.21∗∗∗ 7.86∗∗∗ 5.73∗∗∗ 7.29∗∗∗
(1.77) (2.12) (1.87) (2.24)
Investment 5.02 7.40 3.96 6.20
(6.73) (7.59) (6.35) (6.91)
Developed −0.56 −0.82
(0.92) (0.91)
Institutions 0.40 0.31 0.08 0.15
(0.33) (0.32) (0.24) (0.25)
N 63 44 63 44
R2 9.81% 17.38% 12.93% 18.53%
same time, schooling, investment and law & order enter with positive signs. This
implies that better institutions and better investment in human and physical capital
does lead to a higher balanced growth path. Also, schooling is by far the most
significant contributor to a higher economic growth, something that is witnessed by
several other studies as well. Moreover, the results do not seem to change a lot
between the complete sample and the emerging sample, as well as between the OLS
and 2SLS results. All the signs remain the same, and statistical significance remains
unchanged as well. The point estimates seem to be more pronounced in case of the
2SLS, with both the level of convergence and the impact of schooling portrayed to
be larger in the case of the 2SLS.
5.4.1 Capital Controls and Growth
The next step in the analysis consists of adding the new capital control variable to
the growth specification. The results are given in table 5.3. Firstly, as expected, the
inclusion of the capital control variable does not qualitatively change the results of
the baseline regression (table 5.2). The evidence for growth convergence is slightly
more marked, and the effects of schooling and institutions remain at the same order
of magnitude, only the level of investment shows little robustness.
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Table 5.3: The impact of capital controls on economic growth.
This table shows the effects of capital controls on economic growth. The dependent variable is the real
GDP growth per capital from 1998 to 2004. ‘Ln GDP’ is the log of initial real GDP per capita in 1998,
‘Schooling’ the ratio of upper secondary schooling attainment in 1999, ‘Investment’ the Investment share
of GDP, ‘Institutions’ the ICRG measure of rule of law, and ‘Capcon’ the capital control variable, with
0 being fully open and 1 fully closed. Models (1) and (2) portray the 2SLS results with the lagged 1996
levels as well as geographical dummies (Developed, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South East
Asia) as instruments. models (3) and (4) give the OLS results. The standard errors are given in brackets
below the point estimates. *(10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) indicate significance at their respective levels.
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
2SLS OLS
Complete Emerging Complete Emerging
Constant 8.08∗ 8.16∗ 6.29∗ 6.79∗
(4.19) (4.17) (3.69) (3.83)
Ln GDP −1.49∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗ −1.00∗ −1.19∗∗
(0.60) (0.58) (0.52) (0.54)
Schooling 6.63∗∗∗ 8.29∗∗∗ 6.51∗∗∗ 8.15∗∗∗
(1.86) (2.29) (1.83) (2.21)
Investment 2.68 6.41 −0.38 1.55
(7.08) (7.39) (6.08) (6.74)
Developed 2.04∗ 1.89∗
(1.06) (1.01)
Institutions 0.49∗ 0.48∗ 0.11 0.22
(0.29) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21)
Capcon 3.87∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗
(1.21) (1.24) (0.88) (0.92)
N 63 44 63 44
R2 33.81% 42.61% 39.09% 46.86%
The addition of the capital control variable suggests that there is a significant
positive effect of capital controls on economic growth, present in all four specifica-
tions. The coefficients indicates that a country with a fully closed capital account
experiences, ceteris paribus, between 3.01% and 3.87% percent higher growth than
a country that is fully open. Although it is in theory possible that a country does
liberalize from a fully closed capital account (1) to a fully open capital account (0),
in reality the coefficient might overestimate the effect. This because the vast ma-
jority of countries does not have a fully open or closed economy; rather it is more
reasonable to state that ‘open’ economies have controls of say around 0.2, whilst
closed economies tend to have a capital control index of around 0.8. Taking those
numbers as an example, the average difference would lie around 0.8 - 0.2 = 0.6,
implying a difference in growth of between 1.8% and 2.3% (calculated as 0.6 times
the parameter estimates).
The finding of significant positive effects of capital controls is somewhat surpris-
ing, given that most previous studies fail to find significant effects of capital controls
on economic growth or find mixed effects at best. This can be interpreted as a first
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sign that a better and more detailed measurement of the capital control index does
indeed lead to a clearer outcome. Indeed as stated before, data quality of capital
controls has been a constantly mentioned limitation in previous literature on the
topic. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) also describe that the effects of capi-
tal controls become more pronounced in growth regression, when the index is more
finely measured.
As stated, most of the previous indicators failed to take into account controls on
capital inflows, and focused mainly on capital outflows. Taking into account that
this new capital controls index does explicitly take into account controls on capital
inflows, this can be seen as tentative evidence that capital controls on inflows do
indeed have larger (positive) effects than controls on outflows8.
The next step involves splitting the capital control index into the part that
constitutes controls on inflows and the part that measures controls on outflows to
directly measure the effect of both types of controls. Table 5.4 shows that the effects
of controls on inflows and controls outflows are different from each other and both
have their hypothesized signs.
Controls on outflows have a negative, albeit insignificant, effect. This supports
the literature in two aspects. On the one hand the negative sign is an indication
that controls on capital outflows are detrimental to the welfare of the economy. Even
more so for the emerging sample than for the complete sample. Tentatively it is in
line with the thesis that controls on outflows are inducing corruption and bribery,
especially in societies with heterogenous ethnic groups (Chanda, 2001). Arguably,
the scourge of corruption is larger in emerging countries than in most developed
countries. On the other hand, the fact that the magnitude of the effect of controls
on outflows is much smaller than that of controls on inflows, combined with the fact
that the coefficient itself is insignificant is supporting of the argument of Edwards
(1999) that especially controls on outflows tend to be ineffective. Especially non-
residents can be assumed to be much more willing to spend effort to get their money
back out of the country than to force their way into a country when they can also
invest in other countries.
At the same time, the controls on inflows show a positive effect on long-run
economic growth, thus driving the overall positive effect of capital controls as found
in table 5.3. Again, the positive effect is larger in the emerging sample compared to
the complete sample. This finding lends support to the theory of the second best;
as the direct effects of capital account liberalization are relatively small, opening
up the capital account is only useful if the domestic conditions are good enough
for the indirect effects to kick in. Arguably these conditions are more likely to be
found in developed countries versus emerging countries, explaining the larger effects
of capital controls in the pure emerging sample.
8Another explanation could be sought in the fact that China is included in the sample. It is well
known that not only does China exhibit phenomenal growth rates, they are also employing a wide
array of capital controls, thereby possibly distorting the results as an outlier. However, removing
China from the sample does not significantly change the results. This also holds true for the results
given in the other tables. As the results remain qualitatively unchanged by removing China, the
output has been suppressed for brevity.
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Table 5.4: The impact of inflow- and outflow-controls on economic growth.
Neoclassical growth model, with as dependent variable real GDP growth per capital from 1998 to 2004.
‘Ln GDP’ is the log of initial real GDP per capita in 1998, ‘Schooling’ the ratio of upper secondary
schooling attainment in 1999, ‘Investment’ the Investment share of GDP, ‘Institutions’ the ICRG measure
of rule of law, and ‘Cap. In’ and ‘Cap. Out’ the capital controls in inflows and outflows respectively, with
0 being fully open and 1 fully closed. Models (1) and (2) portray the 2SLS results with the lagged 1996
levels as well as geographical dummies (Developed, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South East
Asia) as instruments. models (3) and (4) give the OLS results. The standard errors are given in brackets
below the point estimates. *(10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) indicate significance at their respective levels.
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
2SLS OLS
Complete Emerging Complete Emerging
Constant 7.86 8.78 5.69 6.16
(4.96) (5.27) (3.84) (4.02)
Ln GDP −1.49∗∗ −1.71∗ −0.94∗ −1.13∗
(0.70) (0.74) (0.53) (0.56)
Schooling 6.38∗∗∗ 8.64∗∗∗ 6.25∗∗∗ 7.99∗∗∗
(2.25) (2.90) (1.84) (2.24)
Investment 2.77 7.02 −0.94 0.74
(8.14) (9.53) (6.21) (7.02)
Developed 2.23∗∗ 1.88∗
(1.09) (1.04)
Institutions 0.50 0.45 0.15 0.27
(0.31) (0.30) (0.21) (0.21)
Cap. In 8.12∗ 9.82∗ 3.61∗ 3.83∗
(4.36) (4.99) (1.85) (2.00)
Cap. Out −3.34 −5.03 −0.18 −0.49
(3.71) (4.24) (1.69) (1.90)
N 63 44 63 44
R2 29.69% 34.24% 39.91% 48.18%
5.4.2 Stock Market Liberalization and Growth
Another type of capital controls that deserve specific attention are controls on equity
markets. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) report that equity market liberal-
izations tend to lead to a robust average increase in growth of over 1%. At the
same time they repeat the known fact that all other, older, capital control measures
do not turn up with significant effects on economic growth. Indeed, Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2003) show in one of their tables that the majority of countries tend to
liberalize the stock market before the other sectors considered in their studies9. As
the data set used here also contains an indicator of stock market controls (taking the
values 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1), it is useful to compare the results to those of Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lundblad (2005)
9Both do not differentiate between investments by nonresidents into the stock market and is-
suance of stocks in foreign markets by domestic firms.
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Table 5.5: The impact of stock market controls on economic growth.
Neoclassical growth model, with as dependent variable real GDP growth per capital from 1998 to 2004.
‘Ln GDP’ is the log of initial real GDP per capita in 1998, ‘Schooling’ the ratio of upper secondary
schooling attainment in 1999, ‘Investment’ the Investment share of GDP, ‘Institutions’ the ICRG measure
of rule of law, and ‘Capcon’ and ‘Cap. Stock’ the overall capital controls variable and the variable
measuring controls on equity markets respectively, with 0 being fully open and 1 fully closed. Models (1)
and (2) portray the 2SLS results with the lagged 1996 levels as well as geographical dummies (Developed,
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South East Asia) as instruments. models (3) and (4) give the
OLS results. The standard errors are given in brackets below the point estimates.
*(10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) indicate significance at their respective levels.
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
2SLS OLS
Complete Emerging Complete Emerging
Constant 6.83 7.45∗ 6.12∗ 6.71∗
(4.47) (4.34) (3.64) (3.79)
Ln GDP −1.29 −1.50∗∗ −0.98∗ −1.18∗∗
(0.65) (0.62) (0.51) (0.54)
Schooling 5.59∗∗∗ 7.61∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗∗ 7.98∗∗∗
(1.85) (2.35) (1.88) (2.29)
Investment 1.24 5.35 −0.23 1.62
(7.26) (7.51) (6.27) (6.96)
Developed 0.47 1.88∗
(0.31) (0.99)
Institutions 2.11∗∗ 0.48 0.12 0.21
(1.04) (0.28) (0.21) (0.22)
Capcon 6.96∗∗∗ 5.63∗∗ 3.87∗∗ 3.41∗
(2.13) (2.22) (1.59) (1.71)
Con. Stock −3.12 −1.82 −0.79 −0.42
(1.97) (1.78) (1.38) (1.53)
N 63 44 63 44
R2 31.64% 41.80% 39.09% 46.86%
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the results of the inclusion of the stock market controls
into the growth regressions. Again the results are supportive of the arguments put
forward. Indeed, equity market liberalization seems to have a positive effect on
economic growth; or, more correctly in the context of this specification, controls on
equity markets are detrimental to economic growth. Moreover, controls on outflows
seems to have a less negative effect on growth when controlled for controls on equity
markets.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter uses new data to investigate the effect of capital controls on economic
growth and to assess the hypothesis that different types of controls have differential
effects. We contribute to the literature by creating a new capital control measure
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Table 5.6: The impact of stock market controls on economic growth, cont’d
Neoclassical growth model, with as dependent variable real GDP growth per capital from 1998 to 2004.
‘Ln GDP’ is the log of initial real GDP per capita in 1998, ‘Schooling’ the ratio of upper secondary
schooling attainment in 1999, ‘Investment’ the Investment share of GDP, ‘Institutions’ the ICRG measure
of rule of law, and ‘Cap. In’,‘Cap. Out’, and ‘Cap. Stock’ the capital controls on inflows,outflows, and
equity markets respectively, with 0 being fully open and 1 fully closed. Models (1) and (2) portray the
2SLS results with the lagged 1996 levels as well as geographical dummies (Developed, Latin America,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and South East Asia) as instruments. models (3) and (4) give the OLS results. The
standard errors are given in brackets below the point estimates. *(10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) indicate
significance at their respective levels.
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
2SLS OLS
Complete Emerging Complete Emerging
Constant 6.48 7.81 5.46 6.01
(5.28) (5.28) (3.74) (3.93)
Ln GDP −1.27∗ −1.55∗∗ −0.91∗ −1.11∗
(0.75) (0.74) (0.52) (0.55)
Schooling 5.15∗∗ 7.55∗∗ 5.89∗∗∗ 7.73∗∗∗
(2.51) (3.24) (1.83) (2.26)
Investment 1.20 5.56 −0.80 0.81
(8.17) (9.11) (6.41) (7.26)
Developed 2.35∗∗ 1.86∗
(1.07) (1.02)
Institutions 0.48 0.44 0.16 0.27
(0.32) (0.30) (0.21) (0.22)
Cap. In 10.00∗ 10.89∗ 4.16∗∗ 4.22∗
(5.44) (5.80) (1.96) (2.23)
Cap. Out −1.46 −3.14 0.16 −0.29
(3.91) (4.03) (1.87) (2.04)
Cap. Stock −3.77∗ −2.99 −0.91 −0.60
(2.14) (2.05) (1.40) (1.56)
N 63 44 63 44
R2 27.11% 34.47% 40.43% 48.39%
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that covers a much larger scope of controls than previous measurements, allowing
to (i) measure the intensity of existing controls and (ii) differentiate into controls
on inflows and outflows, and (iii) using recent econometric techniques to deal with
some of the statistical problems that were present in older studies.
This study shows that the improved measure of capital controls is indeed better
able to pick up the effects on economic growth. In the sample of 63 countries
investigated with several econometric techniques, the results show a robust positive
effect of capital controls on economic growth. Moreover, splitting the capital control
index shows that this positive effect is driven by the controls on inflows that are
in place. Especially in the samples with only emerging countries, the effects are
surprisingly large.
Additionally this study is able to confirm the results of Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2005), who postulate that controls on equity markets have a detrimental
effect on financial development and economic growth. The negative effect of equity
controls is larger than that of all other controls on outflows. This corroborates and
supports the stylized fact that countries tend to liberalize their equity markets before
opening up the other capital markets.
Still the results of this chapter should be interpreted with some caution. As the
time span under investigation is limited, this study was not able to utilize panel
techniques to further eliminate some of the statistical problems, such as the possi-
ble presence of unobserved heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. Moreover,
although we find that this capital control measure is much more informative than
older de jure measures of capital controls, it is still an approximation of the real poli-
cies in place. Although it is unlikely that capital account policies can be measured
completely without error, it is important to at least approximate them as good as
possible. Further study on the difference between controls on inflows and outflow
on other aspects of economic and financial development, needs to be undertaken to
further validate the hypothesis that controls on inflows are more effective.
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5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Construction of the Capital Control Variable
The capital control variables used in this chapter are based on the IMF Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The
information on capital controls in the AREAER is structured in a tabular format,
with each entry describing the capital controls present in a specific category. Table
5.7 outlines all the categories that are used in constructing the variables; these
categories cover a wide array of controls both on inflows and outflows. Although
information is also available on the controls On banks and institutional investors,
these controls cannot be properly split into controls on inflows and controls on
outflows and have been excluded from the construction of the capital control indexes
in this chapter.
Each category is coded either ‘1’ if the IMF AREAER reports capital controls
were present and ‘0’ otherwise. During the coding no attention was paid to the
motivation of the controls, whether these controls were restrictive or not or what
type of controls were employed (e.g. direct or indirect controls). Although these
factors would be very valuable for research, the IMF yearbooks do not always provide
enough information on those factors to draw meaningful conclusions for the whole
cross-section of countries. In general any mention in the AREAER of a control in a
specific category is coded as a 1.
However, certain exceptions have been made to this rule. Specifically a lim-
ited set of regulations were not counted as capital controls for the purpose of this
measure, namely: (i) reporting requirements, specified to be for statistical purposes
only, (ii) regulations that are specifically stated never to have been actually enforced,
(iii) inward controls on real estate and foreign direct investment that meet the fol-
lowing criterium: those that are specifically aimed at strategic (border) locations
and strategic sectors (transportation, utilities, and media) were excluded, and (iiii)
equity controls limiting participation in sectors, if already counted as a control on
inward FDI.
Entries that showed either to be not regulated (n.r.) or not available (n.a.) were
coded according to the information in the adjoining years. If no information is
available for these years either, the category is deemed to be free of capital controls
and coded with a 0. Categories for which all transactions, including domestic, are
forbidden, are deemed closed and coded with a 1. This last rule had to be applied
for a limited number of cases, mainly for derivatives markets in Middle Eastern
countries as well as some money market instruments in China.
The indices for controls are calculated as the number of controls in place on the
specific type of controls divided by the total number of possible controls of that spe-
cific type. For instance, if a country has controls on inflows in 7 out of 13 categories,
the variable for that country will be 7/13 = 0.54. This creates variables which are
scaled between 0 (completely open) and 1 (completely closed capital account).
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Table 5.7: The definition of the capital control variables.
This table reports on the categories of capital controls that are reported in the IMF AREAER. Bold and
Italic lines indicate the sectors; the other lines indicate the categories of controls for each sector. The
left column refers to controls that are classified as controls on inflows, while the right column indicates
controls that are classified as controls on outflows. In total this study measures 26 types of controls
measured(13 on inflows and 13 on outflows). Each individual category of control is classified as either
present(1) or liberalized(0).
Inflows Outflows
Capital and Money Markets
Capital Markets
Purchase locally by nonresidents Sale or issue locally by nonresidents
Sale or issue abroad by residents Purchase abroad by residents
Money market instruments
Purchase locally by nonresidents Sale or issue locally by nonresidents
Sale or issue abroad by residents Purchase abroad by residents
Collective investment securities
Purchase locally by nonresidents Sale or issue locally by nonresidents
Sale or issue abroad by residents Purchase abroad by residents
Derivatives and Other Instruments
Purchase locally by nonresidents Sale or issue locally by nonresidents
Sale or issue abroad by residents Purchase abroad by residents
Credit Operations
Commercial credits
To residents from nonresidents By residents to nonresidents
Financial credits
To residents from nonresidents By residents to nonresidents
Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities
To residents from nonresidents By residents to nonresidents
Direct Investment
Inward direct investment Outward direct investment or Liquidation
Real Estate Transactions
Purchase locally by nonresidents Sale or issue locally by nonresidents or
Purchase abroad by residents10
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5.A.2 Capital Controls Variables
Capital Controls on Equity markets, CON. STOCK: This variable consists
of the 4 categories that are classified ‘capital markets’ table 5.7. For the
1998 data, the AREAER reports separately on equity and bond markets. To
keep the consistency of the CON. STOCK variable over time, these two are
aggregated again into capital markets. For each of the 4 categories (2 on
inflows, 2 on outflows) in table 5.7, the maximum of the two values for the
corresponding categories in equity markets and bond markets is taken.
Capital Controls on inflows, CON. IN: The index measuring capital controls
on inflows comprises all 13 categories in the left column of table 5.7, includ-
ing 2 categories on capital markets, 6 on other financial markets, 3 on credit
operations, and 2 on direct and real estate investment. The 2 categories that
comprise capital markets are constructed in the way described under CON.
STOCK.
Capital Controls on outflows, CON. OUT: The index measuring capital con-
trols on outflows comprises all 13 categories in the right column of table 5.7,
including 2 categories on capital markets, 6 on other financial markets, 3 on
credit operations, and 2 on direct and real estate investment. The 2 cat-
egories that comprise capital markets are constructed in the way described
under CON. STOCK. For real estate, the two AREAER categories ‘Sale or
issue locally by nonresidents’ and ‘Purchase abroad by residents’ have been
combined as one category in this measure to give equal weight to real estate
in the CON. OUT variable as in the CON. IN variable
Capital Controls, CON: This index comprises of both the 13 categories measur-
ing controls on inflows and the 13 categories measuring controls on outflows.

Chapter 6
Project Finance as a Driver
of Economic Growth in
Low-Income Countries∗
6.1 Introduction
Which type of finance is the optimal driver of economic development in developing
countries? Already as early as 1911 Schumpeter stressed the importance of financial
markets in understanding economic development. Ever after countless studies have
been undertaken to exactly understand the link between finance, economic devel-
opment and growth. According to one school of thought, financial development is
an “overstressed determinant of economic growth” (Lucas, 1988, p.6). Miller (1998,
p.14), voicing the opinion of the second school of thought, counteracts the statement
“that financial markets contribute to economic growth is a proposition too obvious
for serious discussion”. To the supporters of the latter view, the correct question
should not be if, but how financial development can affect economic growth. Fi-
nancial development leads not only to an increase in the quantity of capital but,
more importantly, also to an improvement in the quality of capital. It is through
the quality of capital that finance contributes to growth.
In this study we provide new insights regarding whether and how financial devel-
opment can affect economic growth by focusing on one specific financial instrument:
project finance. Project finance is unique in its contractual structure which can
substitute for underdeveloped financial markets. We thus perceive project finance
as a high-quality financial instrument that leads to better investment management
and governance and, ultimately, to more economic growth. The use of project fi-
nance has grown dramatically over the years from $ 12.5 billion (bn) per annum
in 1991 to $ 113.4 bn in 20051. Financing almost 4,000 projects in 113 countries
∗Part of this chapter is based on Kleimeier and Versteeg (2009)
1As reported by LPC Dealscan. The dollar amounts are nominal and reflect the debt portion
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the total amount of project finance raised between 1991 and 2005 amounts to $
1,077 bn. While the US with $ 186.4 bn accounts for most project finance (followed
by Australia and the UK), this form of financing has also been used extensively in
emerging economies: such as in Taiwan ($ 64.2 bn), China ($ 58.9 bn) and Malaysia
($ 46.5 bn). Compared to other regions, Asia Pacific attracts most project finance
(combined: $ 459.8 bn). As this region is also characterized by strong economic
growth, it is surprising that no study has yet investigated project finance as a driver
of economic growth.
Project finance is designed to reduce of transaction costs, in particular those
arising from a lack of information on possible investments and capital allocation,
insufficient monitoring and exertion of corporate governance, risk management, and
the inability to mobilize and pool savings. The impact of project finance should
therefore be especially clear in low-income countries, where financial development
is shallow. The empirical analysis of 90 countries from 1991 to 2005 confirms this
hypothesis. Project finance is found to be a strong driver of economic growth in
low-income countries where transaction costs are particularly high but not in mid-
or high-income countries where financial markets are more developed. Controlling
for initial conditions and other economic factors, a move from the 25th to the 75th
percentile in project finance will increase annual growth by 0.67 percentage points for
low income countries. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section
2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical evidence of financial development as
a driver of economic growth and motivates why project finance should be particularly
effective in low-income countries as a driver of growth. Section 3 presents the data
and methodology while section 4 discusses the results of the empirical analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
6.2 Financial Development, Project finance, and
Economic Growth
6.2.1 Theory and Evidence on the Finance-Growth Nexus
In the classical literature the link between finance and growth is through capital ac-
cumulation or the quantity of capital: economic growth is the result of increases in
innovation, human capital and physical capital. As finance develops, it increases the
quantity of capital and thereby creates economic growth. However, as Schumpeter
(1911) pointed out, this view ignores a very important channel. In his perception,
finance stimulates growth not by creating more savings and thus increasing the quan-
tity of capital, but rather by allocation savings better and stimulating technological
innovation: increasing total factor productivity (TFP), e.g. improving the quality
of the capital. Confirmation of Schumpeter’s view is provided in a recent study by
Hasan, Koetter, and Wedow (2009), who measure the relative importance of the
quality of finance and the quantity of finance in Europe. An increase in the effi-
in the financing of the projects.
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ciency (i.e. quality) of bank finance creates up to five times more growth than a
corresponding increase in the quantity of bank finance.
In theory, financial markets can stimulate the quality of capital in several ways
(Levine, 1997). Firstly, well-developed markets improve resource allocation and al-
low easier access to capital for entrepreneurs, thus lowering their financial constraints
and financing costs (Tobin and Brainard, 1963; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Secondly,
financial markets play a vital role in corporate governance by dealing with agency
costs and informational asymmetries (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Thirdly, markets
facilitate the pooling and sharing of risks. Through financial markets, investors can
diversify their portfolios and minimize idiosyncratic risk. In addition, markets allow
not only for the insurance of liquidity risk through banks but even for intergener-
ational consumption smoothing through pension funds. Fourthly, markets mobilize
and pool savings. Fifthly they ease the exchange of goods and services. Empirical
evidence supports the view that financial markets stimulate economic growth. King
and Levine (1993a,b) show that economic growth increases as the financial system
develops and deepens while Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998) document that larger
and better developed stock markets contribute directly to economic growth.
There are, however, few guidelines on how to develop financial markets when they
are still nascent. This gives cold comfort to the large group of emerging economies
that have yet to develop their financial markets. One solution is to import the capital
from abroad. International capital can provide many of the advantages of a domestic
market: it can supplement (low levels of) domestic capital stocks, lower the costs
of capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000b) and increase the scope of risk diversification
(Voth, 2003).
For international capital, like for domestic financial markets, it is the quality
that matters, not the quantity. The direct quantity-effects of internationalization
itself are quite small2.At the same time financial liberalization often leads to finan-
cial crises, which can severely destabilize the local economy (Allen and Gale, 1999;
Krugman, 1999a). In this respect, not all capital is equal. ‘Hot money’ in the form
of short-term foreign currency denominated debt, for instance, is far more risky
than long-term local currency denominated equity3.Liberalization should therefore
be carefully sequenced (McKinnon, 1991; Edwards, 1990) Therefore, an economy
should first focus on those relatively safe capital flows. Only when its domestic
markets are developed enough can it benefit from other riskier types of capital.
The question remains, however, which types of ‘safe’ capital are suitable for
emerging economies when domestic financial markets are nascent and international
capital flows are risky. Two candidates have been put forward in the literature:
Portfolio equity investments and foreign direct investment (FDI). International eq-
uity inflows are known to reduce the cost of capital for domestic firms, increase risk
2Benefits are approximated to amount to only a 0.5% permanent increase in consumption for
developed economies (Mendoza and Tesar, 1998b) and a 1% increase for emerging economies (Gour-
inchas and Jeanne, 2006). If markets are distorted this benefit is further reduced (Matsuyama, 2004)
or can even become negative (Boyd and Smith, 1997b).
3Short-term foreign debt relative to foreign exchange reserves has actually been identified as the
single most important predictor to financial crises by Rodrik and Velasco (1999).
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sharing and stimulate the improvement of corporate governance (Claessens, Dooley,
and Warner, 1995). However, a country can only receive equity inflows if the do-
mestic stock market is well developed. As most developing countries have at best a
fledgling and still illiquid equity market (Knight, 1998), this puts severe limitations
on the use of international equity financing. FDI, like equity, is long-term in nature
and minimizes currency- and maturity-mismatches. It is also beneficial in terms of
transfers of technology, managerial skills and labor practices, access to new mar-
kets and production networks and the import of corporate governance. Importantly,
FDI does not rely on the existence of a well-developed domestic financial market
and firms can in part substitute the domestic financial market through FDI (Haus-
mann and Ferna´ndez-Arias, 2000). Through FDI a firm exerts direct control over
the operations, reduces informational asymmetries and can thus alleviate some of
the problems associated with inadequate contract enforcement and poor protection
of intellectual property rights.
Given the long list of benefits, it is not very surprising that FDI has been found
to have a positive effect on economic growth (see e.g. Reisen and Soto, 2001).
However, most studies do not find an unambiguously positive relation between FDI
and growth. The effectiveness of FDI appears to be contingent on the economic
and financial development of the domestic country indicating that even FDI is only
beneficial if a certain threshold of development has been reached. Lack of human
capital (Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee, 1998), underdevelopment of financial
markets (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek, 2004), lack of institutions
(Durham, 2004) and trade restrictions (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford,
1996) can all prevent the positive effects of FDI to be disseminated to the local
economy.
One of the positive quality effects of FDI, for example, is that FDI can stimu-
late the ‘import’ of good corporate governance. However, FDI can only do so when
certain legal standards are present in the host country. During the Asian crisis,
countries with better disclosure requirements had better stock price performance
(Mitton, 2002) and the countries with the weakest outsider investor protection ex-
perienced the largest stock market and currency crashes (Johnson, Boone, Breach,
and Friedman, 2000).
In general, Blo¨mstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) show that FDI provides posi-
tive growth effects only for high-income countries but not for low-income countries.
Similarly, De Mello (1999) shows that only OECD countries are able to benefit from
positive spillover effects of FDI as measured by TFP gains. In contrast, the gains
of FDI to developing countries are limited to quantity effects. The potentially more
substantial quality effects do not materialize in these countries.
In sum, it is the quality and not the quantity of finance that matters. Finance
creates spillover effects in terms of TFP gains that foster economic development
and growth. Foreign sources of capital such as portfolio equity finance or FDI can
also create positive spillovers, in the best case compensating for the absence of well-
functioning domestic markets. Yet even FDI, though generally considered one of the
safest and most beneficial types of foreign capital, is not very effective in the least
developed markets. In the next section we set out to argue that the unique properties
6.2 Financial Development, Project finance, and Economic Growth 103
of project finance make it well suited to underdeveloped domestic financial markets,
where other types of finance fail. Project finance succeeds because it can — at least
to some degree — substitute for the lack of local financial development
6.2.2 The Growth-Enhancing Properties of Project Finance
Project finance can be defined as “the creation of a legally independent project
company financed with equity from one or more sponsoring firms and non-recourse
debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset” (Esty, 2007). Project finance is
generally used for new, stand-alone, complex projects with large risks and massive
informational asymmetries. Nevertheless, sponsors’ equity contributions are small
and the bulk of the financing is provided in form of non-recourse, syndicated loan
tranches. The lead banks become project insiders through working with the project
sponsors during the initial screening and structuring phase and are responsible for
funding the loan in the global syndicated loan market by attracting other banks to
become members of a loan syndicate (Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni,
2008). As these loans are non-recourse — e.g. they finance the project company
with no or only limited support from the sponsors — the syndicate bears much of
the project’s business risk. Given the project’s high leverage, business risk must
be reduced to a feasible level. Here lies one of the key comparative advantages of
project finance: It allows the allocation of specific project risks (i.e., completion and
operating risk, revenue and price risk, and the risk of political interference or expro-
priation) to those parties best able to manage them (Brealey, Cooper, and Habib,
1996). Thus, project finance comprises not only financial arrangements dominated
by non-recourse debt funded in the global syndicated loan market but also a large
set of contractual arrangements aimed at risk management.
These specific characteristics of project finance enable it to substitute under-
developed financial markets and emulate, in part, the desirable features of a well-
developed market. Like any other type of finance, project finance is of course most
successful in a transparent environment where contracts are respected because ad-
justing the structure of project finance to deal with market failures will be costly and
imperfect (Ahmed, 1999). The important point is, however, that project finance still
functions relatively well in the least developed countries (LDCs). Most other types
of capital, such as FDI, are not very effective in substituting the market, making
project finance an attractive choice for LDCs.
As stated earlier, the five main functions of a financial market are: (1) ex-ante
information production and efficient allocation of capital, (2) ex-post monitoring of
investments and exerting corporate governance, (3) facilitation of diversification and
management of risk, (4) mobilization and pooling of savings and (5) facilitation of
transactions (Levine, 1997). If markets are underdeveloped and do not function well
in these areas the transaction costs of capital increase. For each of the five functions,
we will show how the structure of project finance allows it to substitute the domestic
market and control transaction costs. The advantages are especially pronounced in
the fields of information production and corporate governance4.
4In contrast, Esty, Lysy, and Ferman (2003) develop a framework for assessing the development
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First, consider transaction costs arising from a lack of information on possible
investments and inefficient capital allocation. Ex-ante evaluation of investments is
costly for individual investors. Financial intermediaries reduce the costs of acquir-
ing and processing information and thereby improve resource allocation (Boyd and
Prescott, 1986). Project finance reduces these costs as a syndicate of banks provides
the majority of the funds and delegates the major screening and arranging tasks to
the syndicate’s lead banks. The project is separated from the sponsoring firm or
firms and only a single investment rather than the overall sponsor(s) needs to be
evaluated. Shah and Thakor (1987) provide the theoretical evidence that informa-
tion production is cheaper under project finance. In addition, they show that the
riskiest projects have most to gain from the use of project finance.
Furthermore, project finance can improve the efficiency of capital allocation as it
targets sectors that are bottlenecks in LDCs. Take the example of an infrastructure
investment structured as build-operate-transfer project finance. While most free
cash flows are paid to the syndicate lenders and thus not reinvested locally during
the operations phase of the project, the assets will ultimately be transferred to the
government thereby putting technology and revenues into local hands. The newly
acquired infrastructure itself can lead to improved economic growth (Sanchez-Robles,
1998). Generally, funds for large capital investments in developing countries are
often only available from the public sector. While these institutions fund the initial
investment, financing repair and maintenance during the project’s operation can
be problematic leading to temporary or even permanent shutdown of the facility
(Buljevich and Park, 1999). Project finance can overcome this problem by explicitly
taking these financing needs into account and can thus lead to a more effective
allocation of capital.
These specific traits of project finance are very useful when information acquisi-
tion is costly and the market is opaque. The separation of the project from sponsor
improves the transparency of the investment, thereby making it easier to screen.
The unambiguous assignment of screening responsibilities to the lead banks limits
free-riding on the information acquisition internalizes the costs of the screening and
thus creates the appropriate incentives to screen. These lead banks can be expected
to have superior screening skills due to their standing as sophisticated multinational
banks5, their repeated entry into the project finance market and in some cases their
regional specialization in developing countries.
Second, consider transaction costs arising from insufficient monitoring and exer-
impact of investment projects. This framework takes a micro-level view and visualizes the impact
of a project on each of its stakeholders. It applies to investment projects in general and is thus
applicable but not limited to project finance. Due to its more macro-oriented economic focus, we
decide to follow Levine’s (1997) framework instead.
5Leading banks in the project finance markets are typically headquartered in industrialized
countries with a developed financial sector. Based on project finance league tables provided by
LPC Dealscan (considering all project finance deals arranged from 1991 to 2005), the top-10 project
finance banks are RBS (UK), JP Morgan, Citibank, Bank of America (US), Mizuho Financial
Group, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (Japan), Calyon Corporate & Investment Bank (part of
Credit Agricole), BNP Parisbas (France), HSBC (Hong Kong) and Credit Swiss (Switzerland).
Banks are listed by nationality and not by league-table ranking.
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tion of corporate governance. Effective monitoring induces managers to maximize
firm value which in turn improves the efficiency of the firm’s resource allocation
(Levine, 2006). The explicit corporate governance and risk management structure
of project finance is well suited to serve as a substitute for domestic structures and
institutions6.Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996), using the example of infrastructure
projects, show that project finance has several characteristics specifically designed to
deal with agency problems. These characteristics are largely independent of the legal
framework and are thus likely to work when general corporate governance frame-
works are not well developed: (1) Project finance lenders have a strong incentive
to monitor due to high leverage and the non-recourse nature of their claim (Hainz
and Kleimeier, 2008). (2) The separation of the project from the sponsoring firm
improves corporate governance as management is decentralized and project-specific
incentives are created for managers (Laux, 2001) (3) Furthermore, the focus of the
project company on a single investment reduces the risk of misallocation of funds
regarding the initial investment (Brealey, Cooper, and Habib, 1996)7while (4) the
waste of free-cash flows during operation is reduced due to high leverage and the
inclusion of a cash-waterfall as part of the contractual structure. (5) Finally, the
extensive contractual structure increases transparency about the project, thereby
improving governance.
The flexibility of project finance also allows the choice of a corporate structure
which best suits the market conditions. The involved parties are to some extent
free to choose the law that regulates the project (Ahmed, 1999; Harries, 1989). A
logical choice is the law of the country where the major tangible assets are located.
However, in the case of an emerging country it is possible to choose, for example, the
US or UK to circumvent the problems association with a possibly not well developed
local legal system.
Another problem that can arise in LDCs is political (or sovereign) risk, a cost
that is especially difficult to deal with. As discussed above, even international capital
like FDI that can substitute corporate governance on a firm level has difficulties
when dealing with political risk on a national level. Although project finance also
cannot fully mitigate this risk, there is some evidence it may at least reduce it.
Hainz and Kleimeier (2008) show that development banks are particularly effective
in reducing political risk and can act as political umbrellas when included in the
syndicate. Indeed, they find that project finance is the preferred financing tool in
countries with high political risk and poor corporate governance. Similarly, Esty
and Megginson (2003) show that syndicates adjust their concentration to deal with
sovereign risk and economic risk. In countries with low protection and high risk,
syndicates are large to prevent strategic defaults; this at the cost of monitoring
incentives that come with more concentrated debt ownership.
6It has been suggested that project finance can also stimulate reform in a country (Ahmed,
1999), thereby paving the way for other types of finance. Although this offers many interesting
avenues, it is not within the scope of this chapter to pursue and test this implication.
7The inclusion of debt covenants is a more general way to eliminate or reduce the misallocation
of funds (Smith and Warner, 1979). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue however, that firms can
engage in asset substitution to circumvent these covenants subsequent to issuance of the debt.
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Third, consider transaction costs associated with cross-sectional risk diversifica-
tion: when capital is scarce and investors are risk averse, investors will avoid risky
high-return projects and seek out safe low-return projects. Thus, if investors cannot
diversify cross-sectional risk, then savings will not flow towards high-return invest-
ments which can boost growth (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). Project finance will
not alter the risk appetite of the local investors, but as international capital it is not
limited by the same constraints and therefore more likely than domestic capital to
flow to the above mentioned growth-enhancing projects.
Fourth and fifth, consider the transaction costs arising from the inability to
mobilize and pool savings and to facilitate transactions. In many cases the required
sums for an investment are larger than those offered by a single investor. The
inability of the market to pool savings and link them to investments can lead to
severe financing constraints. Closely related is the function of the market to facilitate
transactions by acting as a middle man between individual investors and potential
borrowers, reducing searching and screening costs. The absence of this function
hampers financing (Ang, 2008). Project finance is specifically designed to deal with
large investments and the syndicates normally consist of large (international) banks.
Therefore it should not be hindered much by the inability to pool savings, nor by
the inability to facilitate transactions. However, it has to be noted that the savings
pooled and the transactions facilitated are those of the lenders’ home countries, not
those of the project’s host country. Project finance can do very little to help improve
the market’s ability to pool domestic savings and facilitate domestic transactions.
It can only help in meeting the need for large sums of money for single investments
which cannot be met by domestically pooled savings.
In sum we conclude that project finance is very flexible and can easily be adapted
to different economic and political environments. This flexibility allows project
finance to substitute for underdeveloped financial markets. Its structure enhances
ex-ante screening and ex-post corporate governance. Moreover, project finance is
well suited to deal with political risk and suffers only minimally from the market’s
inability to manage risk, pool savings or facilitate transactions. These characteristics
provide it comparative advantages in underdeveloped markets over most other types
of capital. These advantages are, in our eyes, likely to stimulate growth in LDCs, as
will be tested formally in the next sections.
6.3 Data and Methodology
We will answer the question whether or not project finance is a driver of economic
growth within a neo-classical growth framework, first developed in the Swan-Solow
and Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans models. In summary, these models presume that the
GDP per capita of each country converges towards its equilibrium. In two seminal
papers Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weill (1992) derive an empirical
specification for these models, based on the assumption that it is unlikely that a
country is already at its steady state. In such a setting where countries are not
already at their steady states, transitional dynamics, such as financial development,
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are an important determinant for economic growth. The starting model is based on
this empirical specification and visualizes growth in country i as a function of the
log of initial GDP (yi,0), project finance (PF ) and a set of further control variables
denoted by X:
GROWTHi,t = β0 + β1yi,0 + β2PF + Σjβ2+jXi,j + i. (6.1)
We estimate equation (6.1) in two specifications: in the baseline specification the
selected control variables X include schooling, population growth, and government
consumption. A dummy is included for the sub-Saharan countries in the sample to
account for the stylized finding that growth rates are systematically lower in this
region, even after controlling for all other variables. In the extended specification,
a larger set of control variables will be used measuring economics, population and
institutional characteristics in addition. The set of chosen controls follows Alfaro,
Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) and comprises the most common vari-
ables used in the literature. In a refinement of the model, we will also (1) consider
FDI and contrast its effect on growth with that of project finance and (2) investi-
gate the effect of project finance on growth dependent on the economic development
of the recipient countries. These refinements will be motivated in more detail in
section 4. As a consequence of the choice of control variables, the data is split
into two sets of countries. The first data set, consisting of 90 countries, includes
the variables used in the baseline specification. The second data set reduces to 71
countries, due to limited data availability of some the variables in the extended spec-
ification8.Growth is measured as the log-change in real GDP per capita in constant
US dollar and obtained from the World Bank’s (2008) World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) database. Correspondingly, initial GDP reflects the log of the level of
constant US dollar GDP per capita at the beginning of the growth period.
Until now we have not addressed the potential problem of endogeneity. As has
been pointed out in previous literature9it is quite likely that project finance, or
foreign capital in general, flows mainly to those countries that experience high growth
rates. If this is the case, the results of Table 6.3 will overstate the true effect of
project finance on economic growth. In the worst case, the results are caused by
reverse causality. Robinson (1952) argues for instance that growth is not caused by
financial development but that finance simply develops because the economy grows.
Instrumental variables(IV) analysis provides a solution to this problem. Thus, valid
instruments for both the financial variables have to be constructed.
The first logical candidates are the lagged values of project finance and FDI.
By construction these variables are predetermined with respect to current growth,
preventing reverse causality. And as flows of capital, like project finance and FDI,
are quite persistent over time, lagged values are good predictors for future capital
flows. Wheeler and Mody (1992), for example, show that FDI is self-propagating:
8The appendix contains a complete overview of the countries in both datasets. Note that all
countries for which data are available are included in the dataset, no further selection is imposed.
In particular, countries with no project finance are included if data for the independent variables
are available.
9See for example Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) and Li and Liu (2005).
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large existing stocks of capital stimulate further FDI flows into that country. As an
additional instrument we include the real exchange rate. All of FDI and much of
project finance comes from abroad. A low real exchange rate decreases the relative
local costs while increasing the relative foreign wealth, making investments in the lo-
cal economy more attractive for foreigners (Bloningen, 1997; Froot and Stein, 1991).
Klein and Rosengren (1994) provide empirical support that the real exchange rate
is a determinant of investment flows. The instruments prove to be jointly significant
in the first stage in all cases10, indicating that the chosen instruments are indeed
valid.
We obtain data on project finance from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan
database. We select all deals with the purpose ‘project finance’ and obtain the total
volume of project finance deals from the ‘Totals & Averages Report’. The deals
are converted to US dollar and aggregated by borrower country and year of deal
signing. Note that the deal volume reflects only the debt financing raised for the
project but not the equity investment. We focus on project finance deals signed
between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2005 as Dealscan’s coverage in earlier
years is limited to a few countries and thus not representative.
The measure of net FDI inflows comes from the WDI. Thus, for both project
finance and FDI, we relate the cumulate volume of financing to the growth over the
same period to limit the measurement error of the data (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2001). The schooling variable is measured as the average total years of schooling in
the adult population and comes from Barro and Lee (1996, 2001); the law variable
refers to the ‘rule of law’ as measured by the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG); the black market premium is the difference between the parallel and official
exchange rate, retrieved from the Global Development Network database at New
York University. The other variables come from the WDI: government consumption
measures the central government’s total government expenditures to GDP; openness
is defined as imports plus exports over GDP; inflation is calculated as the percentage
change in the deflator; population growth is defined as annual percentage growth.
Income and location dummies follow the World Bank’s country classification.
The variables used in the regressions are defined in the following manner. Miss-
ing initial values are substituted by the adjoining year if possible. Averages are
calculated if at least 3 out of 5 data points are available in the respective 5-year
period. Project finance and FDI are the cumulative net inflows over the regression
period as a share of GDP. Likewise, population growth is the average growth rate for
the regression period. The schooling variable is defined as the log of (1 + total years
of schooling). The black market variable is the log of (1 + black market premium).
The inflation variable is the log of (1 + average inflation). Openness is defined as
the log of (average exports plus imports as a share of GDP).
We estimate equation (1) by 3SLS for a panel of three 5-year periods of 1991 to
1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005.
10Results not reported for brevity.
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6.4.1 Growth and Project Finance
Table 6.1 provides a first impression about the link between project finance and
economic growth. In the 90 countries contained in the baseline sample, $ 908 bn of
funds were raised in the form of project finance between 1991 and 2005. Covering
84% of the total of $ 1,077 bn raised worldwide, the sample can be said to be
representative for the global project finance market. When comparing the annual
volume of newly signed project finance deals in real US$ (2005), it becomes clear that
the use of project finance has increased over time from $ 16 bn in 1991 to just under
$ 69 bn in 2005. The volume of project finance loans is highest just before the Asian
crisis in 1997 and 1998 with $ 108 bn and $ 110 bn per year, respectively. While the
total numbers are substantial, project finance is relatively small in comparison to the
GDP of the recipient country. The size of new project finance deals amounts in most
years to less than 0.01% of GDP. Even in countries where the use of project finance
is highest, new project finance deals do not amount to more than 0.2% of GDP. For
comparison, FDI inflows are typically in the range of 1% to 5% of GDP. Nevertheless
table 6.1 shows a remarkable trend. High-growth countries, as measured by the
top growth-quartile, raise substantially more funds in form of project finance than
low-growth countries, the bottom growth-quartile: $ 259.5 bn versus $ 16.5 bn in
total from 1991 to 2005. Also in relative terms high-growth countries have more
project finance inflows than both low-growth countries and the average country in
the sample. Although it is too early at this point to postulate any causal relations,
it does appear from the data that more project finance is associated with higher
growth. In the remainder of this section, we will investigate whether this initial
finding is robust.
Table 6.2 presents detailed descriptive statistics of the dependent and indepen-
dent variables as used in the panel regressions with three 5-year growth periods of
1991-1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. Comparing the baseline sample of 90 coun-
tries in Panel A to the reduced sample of 71 countries in Panel B, we find that
both samples are remarkably similar in terms of average growth, project finance and
FDI stocks, schooling, population growth, government consumption and regional
coverage of SSA countries. The reduced sample contains, however, somewhat larger
countries in terms of initial GDP. Panel A shows that the 90 countries typically grow
at 1.66% annually. However, there is considerable variation in the growth rates across
different countries, ranging from −11.03% average annual growth between 1991 and
1995 for Congo to 10.38% average annual growth between 1991 and 1995 in China.
Cumulative inflows — e.g. stocks — of project finance amount to 0.02% of GDP on
average while cumulative FDI flows are far more substantial with more than 14.57%
of GDP for the average country. But these averages can be misleading as stocks of
project finance and inward FDI also vary widely over the sample. Malaysia (0.34%
for 1996 to 2000) and the Philippines (0.27% for 1996 to 2000) have the most project
finance to GDP, while Belgium (168% for 1996 to 2000), Lesotho (118% for 1996 to
2000) and Guyana (91% for 1991 to 1995) lead in terms of FDI. A comparison of
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table 6.1 and 6.2 lays bare a general trend in the data. Although the total project
finance flows are substantial and the large growth notwithstanding, flows of project
finance remain rather small relative to the GDP of the recipient country. The de-
scriptive statistics of the other variables are in line with those of previous studies
and — as they only serve as control variables in the analysis — will not be explicitly
discussed here.
Table 6.3 shows the results of an OLS estimation of equation (1) for a panel of
three 5-year growth periods of 1991-1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. Regressions
1, 3, 5 and 7 show the baseline specification for a sample of 90 countries with the
selected control variables which include schooling, population growth, government
consumption, and a dummy for the SSA countries. In regressions 2, 4, 6 and 8, in-
stitutional quality (law), the black market premium, inflation, and the trade volume
(openness) have been added and the sample drops to 71 countries.
First consider regressions 1 and 2 which exclude project finance and thus al-
low us to compare the results to those generally reported in the empirical growth
literature. Initial income has a significant negative impact on growth, indicating
that (conditional) convergence is present. Furthermore, sub-Saharan countries and
countries that experience high inflation or high population growth face lower GDP
growth, while more schooling and a better rule of law have a significant positive
effect on economic growth. These results are in line with the existing evidence in
the economic growth literature.
Turning to project finance, the main results reveal that project finance is not
unambiguously correlated with economic growth. Regressions 3 and 4 include the
project finance measure and show that, although positive, project finance is not
significantly correlated with growth. As we postulate above that the special char-
acteristics of project finance will be most beneficial in LDCs with a weak domestic
financial system, this result is not surprising. It is likely that project finance is
only significant contingent on the host country’s economic development, e.g. its in-
come level. Therefore, regression 5 and 6 interact project finance with the country’s
income level, identifying the effect of project finance on low-, middle- and high-
income countries. The results corroborate our argument. In general project finance
is shown to have a positive impact on growth, but the effect is only significant for
the low-income countries and not in the middle- and high-income countries.
To assess the quantitative impact of project finance on economic growth in a
low-income country, consider the examples of Uruguay, Ghana, and India. Uruguay
currently has no project finance, ranking it around the 25th percentile11, Ghana,
with 0.014% project finance to GDP (the average over the three five year panels), is
very close to the average; and India, with 0.019% project finance to GDP, is located
at the 75th percentile. Using the coefficient of regression 8 of table 6.3 (73.547), one
can calculate the potential increase in growth when a country moves from low levels
11Uruguay is used here for illustrative purposes. Any other country that does not currently use
project finance can be substituted for Uruguay. The countries in the sample that did not use
project finance over the sample period are (by WDI acronym): BDI, BEN, BTN, GOC, GMB,
GTM, GUY, HTI, LSO, MRT, MUS, MWI, NER, NIC, RWA, SEN, SLE, SLV, SWZ, SYR, TGO,
URY, ZAR, and ZWE.
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of project finance to higher levels of project finance. If a country had increased its
project finance from the minimum (Uruguay) to the average level (Ghana) in the
sample period, it would have raised annual growth by 1.03 percentage points. If it
had raised project finance equal to the 75th percentile (India), it would have even
increased growth by 1.40 percentage points. When this is compared to the average
realized growth rate of 1.66 percentage points, it becomes clear how substantial the
gains from project to growth can be.
These growth-effects of project finance might be driven by benefits unique to
project finance. Alternatively, the growth-effects might be driven by more general
spill overs of project finance as foreign capital. In order to distinguish these two
alternatives, we include a measure of FDI in regressions 7 and 8. Note that in low-
income countries, project finance will generally constitute part of FDI. As pointed
out in section 2 above, the most prominent lead banks in the project finance market
are headquartered in industrialized countries. Thus, while a project in a high-income
country might well be financed by a syndicate of domestic banks, in low-income
countries the syndicate will likely be dominated by foreign banks12.By including FDI
as an additional variable in the regressions we control for the fact the foreign capital
can in general be beneficial for growth. Any remaining growth-effects of project
finance are probably driven by features that are unique to its structure. We find
that FDI is highly significant for all income levels and that project finance remains
significant for low-income countries. This indicates that in low-income countries it
is indeed project finance with its unique features that is beneficial to the country’s
growth.
6.4.2 Robustness Checks
To check whether a few outliers drive the results, the regressions are re-estimated
based on a sample that excludes countries with extremely high levels of project
finance. More specifically, we exclude all observations which belong to the top-5%
in terms of project finance to GDP13. Results are reported in Table 6.4 and we
confirm the finding of project finance as a driver of economic growth. In terms
of the significance of the project finance variables, the results are even stronger
now that outliers are excluded. We now even find evidence that project finance is
unconditionally associated with higher economic growth. Regressions 3 to 6 confirm
that this overall effect is mainly driven by low-income countries. The size of the
coefficients for project finance is similar to those reported in table 6.3 indicating
that outliers do not drive our main results.
12Ahmed (1999) shows that 77% of the total costs of IFC-supported projects are financed by
international sources and that this share declines as domestic financial markets improve.
13The distribution of project finance is skewed with several countries having no project finance.
We therefore focus only on outliers in the right tail of the distribution.
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Table 6.4: The outlier-robust impact of project finance on economic growth:
The dependent variable is the growth rate. We report the analysis of the project finance-growth nexus
based on panel regressions using three 5-year growth periods from 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to
2005 estimated with 3SLS. All regressions instrument PF and FDI with the real exchange rate and lagged
values of PF and FDI. Observations which fall in the top-5% quantile with respect to project finance are
considered outliers and have been excluded (standard errors between brackets). ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The subscript D indicates a dummy variable. For the
definition of all variables see the appendix.
Variable Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6
constant 0.036 0.079 ∗∗∗ 0.029 0.077 ∗∗∗ 0.027 0.068 ∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
GDP -0.006 ∗∗∗ -0.009 ∗∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.009 ∗∗∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.009 ∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PF 84.732 ∗∗∗ 33.175 ∗∗∗
(19.751) (10.400)
PF * Dlow 111.112
∗∗∗ 51.841 ∗∗∗ 104.217 ∗∗∗ 45.633 ∗∗∗
(28.935) (16.000) (30.384) (15.900)
PF * Dmiddle 35.559 18.124 25.789 9.176
(23.394) (13.525) (26.049) (13.494)
PF * Dhigh 58.034
∗∗∗ 22.190 22.811 11.366
(21.574) (18.189) (23.516) (19.264)
FDI 0.072 ∗∗∗ 0.050 ∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.016)
schooling 0.014 ∗∗ 0.005 0.012 ∗ 0.006 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
pop. growth -0.066 -0.737 ∗∗∗ -0.111 -0.749 ∗∗∗ -0.116 -0.611 ∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.220) (0.096) (0.224) (0.097) (0.224)
gov. cons. 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
(0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
DSSA -0.015
∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.023 ∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
law 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
bl. m. premium 0.008 0.008 0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
inflation -0.026 ∗∗∗ -0.025 ∗∗∗ -0.026 ∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
openness 0.001 0.002 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
observations 270 213 270 213 270 213
adjusted R2 0.253 0.446 0.284 0.467 0.337 0.501
6.5 Conclusion
In this study we examine the finance-growth nexus with specific focus on project
finance. Based on the existing theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact
of finance and growth, we hypothesize that project finance has the right features
to stimulate growth. The benefits of foreign capital are known to depend on the
development of the domestic financial sector. Countries receiving foreign capital in-
flows should realize that the quality of capital matters more than its quantity. In this
sense, not all capital is equal. Countries with underdeveloped financial sectors should
therefore focus on safe long-term capital before encouraging more advanced forms
of capital inflows. We argue that project finance can adjust to less-than-favorable
environments in least developed countries and might even substitute for the lack of
institutional and financial development. Results show that project finance promotes
growth in particular in low-income countries. Moving from the 25th to the 75th per-
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centile in the use of project finance reveals that these countries can gain an up to 1.40
percentage points increase in annual economic growth, ceteris paribus. This result is
robust to outliers as well as possible reverse causality14. The evidence of this study
is consistent with the view that project finance has a superior ability to facility in-
formation production and good project governance. The structure of project finance
leads to extensive and effective screening and project finance is also likely to flow to
growth-enhancing industries. With regards to corporate governance, project finance
creates transparency combined with strong monitoring incentives for the investment
which are independent of any external corporate governance environment. Overall,
project finance is an effective tool to deal with high-risk environments. Our results
lead us to wonder whether project finance can also stimulate financial development
itself, paving the way for other sources of international finance. More evidence is
required to answer this question, opening up new avenues for future research.
14Further refinement of the econometric methods could include a closer attention to unobserved
heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence.
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6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Countries Included in Samples
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin*, Bhutan*, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burundi*, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fin-
land, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana*, Haiti*, Hon-
duras, Hungary, Iceland*, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Jamaica*,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait*, Lesotho*, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania*,
Mauritius*, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal*, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger*, Norway, Pakistan, Panama*, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portu-
gal, Republic of Congo, Rwanda*, Senegal, Sierra Leone*, Singapore*, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland*, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thai-
land, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
* indicates that a country is only included in the baseline regression sample but
not in the extended regression sample.
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6.A.2 Data Sources and Variable Definitions
PF: Volume of all project finance deals signed per country. Source: Loan Pricing
Corporation’s Dealscan database. For the lagged values of PF used as instru-
ments, we revert to data provided in 2003 by Euromoney, the previous provider
of the Dealscan database. Whereas the coverage in later years is consistent in
terms of PF volume with Dealscan, Euromoney’s coverage prior to 1990s is far
more complete.
GDP and GDP growth: Real GDP per capita (growth) in constant 2000 US$.
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), Worldbank (2008).
Income dummies: Dummies indicating if a country belongs to the low-, middle-,
or high-income group according to the World Bank’s country classification.
Source: World Bank.
SSAD: Dummy indicating countries geographically located in sub-Saharan Africa
according to the World Bank’s country classification. Source: World Bank.
Schooling: Average years of total schooling of the adult population. Source: Barro
and Lee (1996, 2001), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.
Population growth: Annual population growth in percent. Source: WDI, World
Bank.
Government consumption: Total expenditure of the central government as a
share of GDP; including both current and capital expenditures, excluding net
financing. Source: WDI, World Bank.
Law: Average level of law and order. The variable ranges from 0 to 12 with higher
values indicating better law and order. Source: International Country Risk
Guide.
Black market premium: Calculated as the parallel exchange market relative to
the official market; (parallel exchange rate / official exchange rate – 1) *
100. Source: New York University’s Global Development Network Growth
Database, http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute
Inflation: Inflation as a percentage, measured as the change in the GDP deflator.
Source: WDI, World Bank.
Openness: Calculated as the sum of the volume of imports and exports relative to
GDP; (imports + exports)/GDP. Source: WDI, World Bank.
FDI: Net foreign direct investment inflows. Source: WDI, World Bank.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This dissertation has shed new light on the effects of capital controls on exchange
rate dynamics and economic development. The main finding of the second part is
that capital controls are largely counterproductive in controlling exchange rates. Ob-
served deviations from parity conditions are not induced by capital controls, while
exchange rate risk increases when capital controls are in place. However, in the
third part it is shown that the selective use of capital controls can be beneficial to
low-income countries. Inflow controls are found to have a positive effect on growth,
confirming the view that many forms of foreign capital are only beneficial to a coun-
try if its financial markets are well developed. In addition it is shown that project
finance is one type of capital which is suitable in the least-developed countries. The
rest of the findings are summarized below.
Chapter 2 presents stylized facts of survey exchange rate expectations. These
stylized facts can be seen as a set of general constraints to which good exchange
rate models should adhere. It is shown that, like spot and forward exchange rates,
survey exchange rate expectations are characterized by unit roots, volatility clusters
and fat tails.
Moreover, it is argued that the expectations formation of market participants
may provide a possible explanation for some of the other characteristics of expected
returns. Expectations are formed on with the use of a mixture of chartist and
fundamentalist techniques. Chartist techniques are based on realized spot returns,
while fundamental models share, arguably, many characteristics with the forward
premia. This could explain why, when the characteristics of realized spot returns and
forward premia diverge from one another, those of expected returns lie between these
two poles. This is the case for the properties of excess volatility, serial correlation,
and conditional fat-tailedness: expected spot returns are shown to be less volatile
than realized spot returns, but more so than forward premia; unlike realized spot
returns, expected spot returns exhibit serial correlation, yet they are less persistent
than forward premia; the conditional fat-tailedness of expected spot returns is lower
than that of forward premia but more than that of realized spot rates.
In the second part, chapter 3 investigates the link between capital controls and
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parity conditions. The results show that capital controls are not able to drive in-
terest rates and forward rates (further) away from parity conditions. There is even
some evidence that capital controls may be counter-productive. One of the possible
motives for using capital controls is to create more monetary freedom. The results
imply, however, that governments may even have less room to set monetary policy
if capital controls are employed. Moreover, the results show that there is little to no
difference between developing countries and developed countries with regard to the
effects of capital controls on parity conditions.
The link between financial liberalization and exchange rate risk is the focus of
chapter 4. The results suggest that liberalized financial markets are associated with
lower extreme depreciation quantiles compared to the periods where capital controls
were in place. In fact, extreme quantiles are almost twice as high in the presence of
capital controls as compared to the liberalized capital account regime. This result
holds for both developed and emerging economies and for different capital control
proxies. The drop in tail risk after liberalization is larger for those countries that
experienced relatively more extreme events when capital controls were still in place.
These results confirm earlier studies, which found that other forms of exchange rate
control, such as pegs, also increase the tail risk of currencies. Chapters 3 and 4 thus
both find that capital controls are found to be ineffective in the foreign exchange
market: they neither decrease the exchange rate risk present in currencies, nor do
they provide extra monetary freedom to governments. On the contrary, the evidence
would suggest that capital controls increase exchange rate risk.
Chapter 5, in the third part, studies the effects different types of capital controls
have on economic growth. In order to gauge these effects, a new measure of capital
controls is constructed. This measure covers a much larger range of controls than
previous measurements and makes it possible to differentiate controls on inflows from
controls on outflows. Moreover this proxy can measure the intensity of the controls
in place, in contrast to the dichotomous nature of older measures. Controls on
inflows are found to have a robust positive effect on economic growth, while outflow
controls tend to deter economic growth. Equity market controls, furthermore, also
have negative effects on economic growth. This latter finding fits nicely with the
observed fact that countries tend to liberalize their equity markets before opening
up other capital markets.
Chapter 6 continues with the examination of the finance-growth nexus, looking
at the specific case of project finance. It is well known that the benefits of foreign
capital to the domestic economies are contingent on the development of the domestic
financial sector. Most foreign capital tend to be ineffective if local markets have e.g.
bad corporate governance or bad protection of property rights. Therefore the least
developed countries are better off with relatively ‘safe’ forms of capital. This chapter
argues that project finance is an example of such ‘safe’ capital: it can adjust relatively
well to less-than-favorable environments in least developed countries and may even
partially substitute for the lack of institutional and financial development. The
empirical results are in line with this hypothesis: it is shown that project finance
promotes growth, in particular in low-income countries. This result is robust to
outliers as well as possible reverse causality. The evidence is consistent with the
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view that project finance has a superior ability to facilitate information production
and good project governance. The structure of project finance leads to extensive and
effective screening, and it is also likely to flow to growth-enhancing industries. With
regard to corporate governance, project finance creates transparency combined with
strong monitoring incentives for investments, both of which are independent of any
external corporate governance environment. Overall, project finance is advocated
as an effective tool to deal with high-risk environments.
This thesis raises a number of new research questions. The results of chapter 4
can be extended to a multivariate framework to compare capital controls with other
determinants of exchange rate risk. The results of the third part also deserve more
attention; a more detailed analysis of which types of controls are most effective adds
to the literature on the sequencing of capital account liberalizations. In addition,
the effectiveness of project finance in the least-developed countries can serve as a
starting point from which to investigate other types of capital which are effective
in dealing with suboptimal allocation of capital. Lastly, the results of the chap-
ter on exchange rate expectations in chapter 3 can be used to investigate the role
that foreign investors play in currency crises. The current exchange rate literature
has raised several issues regarding the existence of ‘peso bubbles’—apparent irra-
tionalities present in the forward foreign exchange—and the self-fulfilling nature of
currency crises. Survey exchange rate expectations offer an interesting angle from
which to study these issues.
With the recent turmoil in financial markets as a backdrop, the results of this
thesis and the proposals for future research which it advances are relevant not only
to academics, but also to policymakers. The results highlight how important it is for
developing countries to carefully think through the process of financial liberalization.
A country should only open up its financial markets when its domestic financial
sectors are in a position to handle international capital: the current credit crisis
has shown how tumultuous global financial markets can be. At the same time, the
results of this thesis constitute a warning: capital controls come at a cost and are in
many cases not an effective policy tool. At this moment in time, policy makers are
facing the difficult task of revising the international financial architecture. As for
my two cents, I believe the risk for industrialized countries lies more in the danger
of overregulation than in the free flow of capital.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
De aanname dat vrije markten superieur zijn aan andere alternatieven is e´e´n van de
hoekstenen van economisch onderzoek. De theorie is duidelijk: vrije goederenmark-
ten stellen consumenten in staat om die goederen te kopen die ze het liefst willen
hebben en brengen ook een gezonde competitie onder producenten teweeg. Op een
soortgelijke manier zorgen vrije kapitaalmarkten voor de meest efficinte allocatie van
kapitaal. Rijke landen, die relatief veel kapitaal hebben, kunnen dit geld uitlenen
aan arme landen die te kampen hebben met een kapitaalschaarste. Beiden landen
halen hier voordeel bij: de investeerder incasseert een hogere rente dan welke hij in
zijn thuisland had kunnen ontvangen en de ontvangende landen kunnen het kapitaal
goed gebruiken. Bovendien bevordert kapitaalmobiliteit de diversificatie van risico.
Vanuit die optiek is het niet verbazingwekkend dat de meeste ontwikkelde landen
hun kapitaalmarkten hebben geliberaliseerd. In de jaren negentig was er inderdaad
een brede consensus onder de meeste landen dat kapitaalcontrolesweinig of geen rol
meer speelden in het bevorderen van financie¨le stabiliteit. Bretton Woods (1944–
1971), gekenmerkt door vaste wisselkoersen en sterke monetaire controle, leek ver
weg.
Hoewel de werking van kapitaalcontroles duidelijk beschreven zijn in de economi-
sche theorie, is de praktijk echter weerbarstiger omdat de theorie veelal uitgaat van
perfecte kapitaalmarkten of een first best wereld. In de praktijk zijn er echter vele
imperfecties in de kapitaalmarkten: markten zijn niet compleet, informatie is niet
symmetrisch, en binnenlandse kredietmarkten imperfect, om maar een paar voor-
beelden te nemen. Bovendien wijst de recente literatuur op het gebied van financie¨le
crises op de mogelijkheid van meerdere evenwichten en zelfvoltrekkende voorspellin-
gen, beide welke een mogelijke instabiliteit van de financie¨le markt inhouden. In
deze second best wereld van marktverstoringen zijn de effecten van kapitaalcontroles
moeilijker te bepalen. De Aziatische financie¨le crisis van 1997 legde de zwaktes van
de huidige internationale financie¨le wereld pijnlijk bloot en plaatste kapitaalcontro-
les terug op de agenda. De Aziatische landen die hun kapitaalmarkten het meest
verregaand geliberaliseerd hadden, zoals Thailand en Indonesi, werden het hardst
getroffen door de crisis, terwijl China en Maleisi, die terugvielen op het gebruik van
kapitaalcontroles, relatief ongeschonden uit de crisis leken te komen. De kredietcrisis
in 2008 laat zien dat ook de westerse landen niet immuun zijn . Het huidige debat
trekt de aanname van marktefficie¨ntie sterk in twijfel, en veel mensen roepen om
meer en strengere regulering. Er zijn zelfs stemmen om een tweede ‘Bretton Woods’
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te cree¨ren.
Met het oog op deze ontwikkelingen is gedegen onderzoek naar de effecten van
kapitaalcontroles belangrijk. Hoewel het niet aannemelijk is dat de ontwikkelde lan-
den hun kapitaalmarkten zullen afsluiten voor buitenlands kapitaal, is het niet on-
denkbaar dat de huidige ontwikkelingen een belangrijke factor spelen in de beslissing
van ontwikkelingslanden om hun kapitaalmarkten al dan niet te liberaliseren. Een
evenwichtige kijk op de voor- en nadelen van kapitaalcontroles is belangrijk om te
bepalen of men al al dan niet moet overgaan tot liberalisatie. De doelstelling van
deze dissertatie is daarom nieuwe inzichten te verkrijgen in de rol van controles op
internationale kapitaalbewegingen. De dissertatie is opgezet rondom drie kernvra-
gen:
1. Wat zijn de karakteristieke eigenschappen van wisselkoersvoorspellingen?
2. Hoe benvloedt financie¨le liberalisatie wisselkoersrisico en de relatie tussen
rentes en wisselkoersen?
3. Hoe wordt economische groei be¨ınvloed door financie¨le liberalisatie en welke
vormen van kapitaal zijn effectief als financie¨le markten slecht ontwikkeld zijn?
Het eerste deel van deze dissertatie bekijkt wisselkoersverwachtingen van markt-
participanten verkregen door enqueˆtes. Het voordeel van deze enqueˆtes is dat ze
wisselkoersverwachtingen observeerbaar maken. Hoewel wisselkoersverwachtingen
niet direct te maken hebben met financie¨le liberalisatie, bieden ze een interessante
invalshoek om naar financie¨le liberalisatie te kijken. Hoewel veel onderzoek gedaan is
met verwachtingsdata van wisselkoersen, heeft men nog nooit de karakteristieken van
deze enqueˆte data zelf in kaart gebracht. Hoofdstuk 2 vult dit gat in de literatuur met
een bespreking van de belangrijkste empirische tijdreekseigenschappen van wissel-
koersverwachtingen. . Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat de eigenschappen van verwachte
wisselkoersen erg gelijklopend zijn met de eigenschapppen van gerealiseerde contant-
en termijnkoersen. Hieruit volgt tevens dat de eigenschappen van verwachte wis-
selkoersrendementen ook moeten lijken op de eigenschappen van gerealiseerde wis-
selkoersrendementen en termijnpremies. Verwachte wisselkoersen worden, net zoals
de gerealiseerde contant- en termijnkoers, ook gekenmerkt door eenheidswortels.
Verwachte wisselkoersrendementen worden, net zoals de gerealiseerde rendementen
en de termijnpremies, gekenmerkt doorvolatiliteitsclusters en vette staarten. Waar
de eigenschappen van gerealiseerde wisselkoersrendementen en termijnpremies van
elkaar verschillen, schijnen de eigenschappen van verwachte wisselkoersrendementen
een tussenliggende positie in te nemen. Dit is het geval voor eigenschappen zoals
exces volatiliteit, autocorrelatie, en conditionele dikstaartigheid.
Deel twee van deze dissertatie onderzoekt het verband tussen kapitaalcontroles en
de dynamiek van wisselkoersen. Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt het effect van kapitaalcon-
troles op het verband tussen renteverschillen en wisselkoersen, ofwel de zogenaamde
ongedekte rentepariteitsconditie. Het afsluiten van de binnenlandse economievoor
buitenlandse invloeden vormt een belangrijk motief voor overheden om kapitaalcon-
troles in te stellen. Deze studie toont echter aan dat kapitaalcontroles geen goed
middel zijn om deze doelstelling te bereiken: de resultaten laten zien dat kapitaal-
controles geen effect hebben op de voornoemde relatie tussen rentes en wisselkoersen
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Het terugdringen van wisselkoersvolatiliteit is een ander belangrijk motief voor
overheden om kapitaalcontroles in te stellen. De vraag die in hoofdstuk 4 wordt
bekeken, is echter of controles daar daadwerkelijk bij helpen. Grote depreciaties van
de eigen valuta vormen meestal de belangrijkste bron van zorg voor beleidsmak-
ers. Dit hoofdstuk gebruikt statistische extreme waardentheorie om de waarschijn-
lijkheid van optreden van deze extreme neerwaartse bewegingen te meten. In een
eerste stap wordt bepaald hoe vet de staarten van de distributie van wisselkoer-
srendementen zijn. Des te vetter de staarten , des te groter de kans dat zich een
extreem grote neerwaartse (of opwaartse) beweging voordoet. In een tweede stap
wordt met behulp van een zogenaamde kwantielschatter berekend—voor een gegeven
kleine overschrijdingskans— hoe groot deze extreme bewegingen precies zijn. De re-
sultaten laten zien dat voor de meeste landen de staartdikte en de grootte van de
extreme kwantielen afnemen na liberalisatie. . Geliberaliseerde markten vertonen
dus minder extreme depreciaties dan gecontroleerde markten en dit geldt voor zowel
ontwikkelingslanden als voor ontwikkelde landen. Op basis van de resultaten in
hoofdstuk 3 en hoofdstuk 4 kan men dus concluderen dat kapitaalcontroles contra-
productief zijn in het reguleren van wisselmarkten.
Het laatste deel van dit proefschrift neemt het bredere vraagstuk van economische
ontwikkeling onder de loep. Er bestaat een grote literatuur over hoe ontwikkelings-
landen hun gesloten en onderontwikkelde kapitaalmarkten kunnen transformeren
naar open en hoogontwikkelde kapitaalmarkten Dit deel van de dissertatie sluit aan
bij die literatuur. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt gekeken naar de positieve en negatieve
effecten van verschillende types van kapitaalcontroles op economische groei, ter-
wijl 6 beargumenteert dat projectfinanciering een geschikte vorm van kapitaal is en
groeibevorderend functioneert in laag ontwikkelde kapitaalmarkten.
Om de effecten van verschillende types van kapitaalcontroles van elkaar te on-
derscheiden, wordt in hoofdstuk 5 een nieuwe maatstaf ontwikkeld die een grotere
variteit aan verschillende controles omvat dan tot nog toe het geval was in empirisch
groeistudies. . Bovendien geeft deze maatstaf een indicatie van de intensiteit van de
controles, waar voorgaande maatstaven dit veelal niet deden. De resultaten van dit
hoofdstuk laten zien dat in ontwikkelingslandencontroles op de instroom van kapi-
taal wel een positieve invloed hebben op economische groei en dit in tegenstelling
tot controles op de uitstroom van kapitaal. Ook wordt aangetoond dat controles op
de in- en uitstroom van kapitaal in de aandelenmarkten een negatief effect hebben
op economische groei. Dit fenomeen kan ook verklaren waarom veel landen hun
aandelenmarkten relatief vroeg liberaliseren.
Projectfinanciering en het effect op economische groei staan centraal in hoofdstuk
6. In deze vorm van financiering wordt een project, bijvoorbeeld een energiecen-
trale, opgezet binnen een‘projectbedrijf’ dat als een onafhankelijke rechtspersoon
opereert en dat voornamelijk gefinancieerd wordt door syndicaatsleningen. De vorm
van financiering wordt voornamelijk gebruikt voor complexe projecten met veel as-
symetrische informatie en een hoog risico. Wij argumenteren dat projectfinanciering
erg geschikt is voor gebruik in ontwikkelingslanden omdat de unieke structuur van
deze vorm van kapitaal goed om kan gaan met slecht ontwikkelde financie¨le markten.
In de empirische sectie wordt aangetoond dat dit inderdaad het geval is.
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Deze dissertatie werpt een aantal onderzoeksvragen op voor vervolgonderzoek.
Ten eerste is er de mogelijkheid om de verwachtingsdata (besproken in hoofdstuk
2) te gebruiken om te kijken naar de rol van buitenlandse investeerders in financie¨le
crises. Ten tweede kunnen de resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 uitgebreid worden naar
een multivariate analyseom kapitaal controles te vergelijken met andere determi-
nanten van wisselkoersrisico. Ten derde kan de constatering van hoofdstuk 6 dat
projectfinanciering bijdraagt aan economische groei dienen als een startpunt om
andere vormen van kapitaal te vinden die geschikt zijn om economiee¨n met slecht
ontwikkelde financie¨le markten te ontwikkelen.
De resultaten en de suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek in deze dissertatie
zijn zowel relevant voor academici als beleidsmakers. De resultaten onderstrepen
het belang voor ontwikkelingslanden om goed na te denken over hoe en wanneer
hun kapitaalmarkten te liberaliseren: financie¨le liberalisatie is een proces dat alleen
ondernomen moet worden als binnenlandse kapitaalmarkten daar klaar voor zijn.
Tegelijkertijd bevat deze dissertatie ook een waarschuwing: kapitaalcontroles zijn
niet kosteloos en zijn in veel gevallen niet het juiste middel voor beleidsmakers.
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